[Gpg4win-commits] [git] Gpg4win - branch, master, updated. gpg4win-2.2.1-3-gee9da19

[by Werner Koch]

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commit ee9da19f4085d470414fba5ea751d5aedd2603f6
Author: Werner Koch <wk at gnupg.org>
Date:   Tue Nov 26 15:32:37 2013 +0100

    Convert the English compendium to org-mode
    
    * doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.org: New.
    --
    
    This is not yet finished but the bulk of changes has been done.  There
    are still a couple of bugs and the final formatting has obviously not
    been done.

diff --git a/doc/manual/Makefile.am b/doc/manual/Makefile.am
index ee7778f..39b5f42 100644
--- a/doc/manual/Makefile.am
+++ b/doc/manual/Makefile.am
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ eps_manual_files = $(png_manual_files:.png=.eps)
 
 EXTRA_DIST = 	gpg4win-compendium-de.tex \
 		gpg4win-compendium-en.tex \
+		gpg4win-compendium-en.org \
 		fdl.tex fdl-book.tex version.tex.in indexstyle.ist \
 		hyperlatex.sty \
 		$(png_compendium_files) $(png_hyperlatex_files)
diff --git a/doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.org b/doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.org
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a5ff2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.org
@@ -0,0 +1,5378 @@
+#+STARTUP: showall indent
+#+TITLE: The Gpg4win Compendium
+#+AUTHOR: A publication of the Gpg4win Initiative
+#+DATE: November 2013
+#
+#+OPTIONS: toc:nil
+#+LaTeX_CLASS: book
+#+LaTeX_CLASS_OPTIONS: [a4paper,10pt,twoside,openright,titlepage]
+#+LATEX_HEADER: \usepackage{times}
+# LATEX_HEADER: \usepackage{fancyhdr}
+#+LATEX_HEADER: \usepackage{makeidx}
+#+LATEX_HEADER_EXTRA: \DeclareUnicodeCharacter{21A9}{$\hookleftarrow$}
+#+macro: Button /[\thinsp{}$1\thinsp]/
+#+macro: Menu   /$1/
+#+macro: MarginPGP @@latex:\marginpar{\includegraphics[width=1.5cm]{openpgp-icon.png}}@@
+#+macro: MarginCMS @@latex:\marginpar{\includegraphics[width=1.5cm]{smime-icon.png}}@@
+
+#+BEGIN_LaTeX
+\parindent 0cm
+\parskip\medskipamount
+
+\frontmatter
+
+\begin{titlepage}
+  \begin{center}
+    \includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{gpg4win-logo.png}
+    \\[10mm]
+    \LARGE The Gpg4win Compendium
+    \\[3mm]
+    \Large \textmd{Secure mail and file encryption\\
+      using GnuPG for Windows}
+    \\[10mm]
+    \vspace*{100mm}
+    \small A publication of the Gpg4win Initiative
+    \\[10mm]
+    \large November 2013
+  \end{center}
+\begin{titlepage}
+#+END_LaTeX
+
+** Publisher’s details
+#+LaTeX: \thispagestyle{empty}
+
+Copyright © 2002 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie [1]\\
+Copyright © 2009, 2010 Intevation GmbH\\
+Copyright © 2005, 2013 g10 Code GmbH\\
+
+Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
+under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or
+any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no
+Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A
+copy of the license is included in the section entitled “GNU Free
+Documentation License”.
+
+--------------
+
+This book is based on a version by Ute Bahn Karl Bihlmeier, Manfred
+J. Heinze, Isabel Kramer and Dr. Francis Wray.
+
+It has been extensively revised by Werner Koch, Florian v. Samson,
+Emanuel Schütze and Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner.
+
+It has been translated from the German original by Brigitte Hamilton.
+
+
+#+LaTeX:\newpage
+** About this compendium
+
+The Gpg4win Compendium consists of three parts:
+
+- *Part [[#part:Novices][“For Novices”]]*: A quick course in Gpg4win.
+
+- *Part [[#part:AdvancedUsers][“For Advanced Users”]]*: Background information for Gpg4win.
+
+- *[[part:Annex][Annex]]*: Additional technical information about Gpg4win.
+
+*Part [[#part:Novices][“For Novices”]]* provides a brief guide for the installation and daily
+use of Gpg4win program components. The practice robot *Adele* will
+help you with this process and allow you to practice the de- and
+encryption process (using OpenPGP) until you have become familiar with
+Gpg4win.
+
+The amount of time required to work through this brief guide will
+depend on your knowledge of your computer and Windows. It should take
+about one hour.
+
+*Part [[#part:AdvancedUsers][“For Advanced Users”]]* provides background information which
+illustrates the basic mechanisms on which Gpg4win is based, and also
+explains some of its less commonly used capabilities. Part I and II
+can be used independently of each other. However, to achieve an
+optimum understanding, you should read both parts in the indicated
+sequence, if possible.
+
+The *[[part:Annex][Annex]]* contains details regarding the specific technical issues
+surrounding Gpg4win, including the GpgOL Outlook program extension.
+
+Just like the cryptography program package Gpg4win, this compendium
+was not written for mathematicians, secret service agents or
+cryptographers, but rather was written to be read and understood *by
+anyone.*
+
+The Gpg4win program package and compendium can be obtained at:
+[[http://www.gpg4win.org]]
+
+#+LaTeX:\newpage
+** Typographical conventions
+
+This compendium uses the following text markers:
+
+ - /Italics/ are used for text that appears on a screen (e.g. in menus
+   or dialogs). In addition, square brackets are used to mark
+   {{{Button(buttons)}}}.
+
+   Sometimes italics will also be used for individual words in the text,
+   if their meaning in a sentence is to be highlighted without
+   disrupting the text flow, by using *bold* fond (e.g. /only/ OpenPGP).
+
+ - *Bold* is used for individual words or sentences which are deemed
+   particularly important and hence must be highlighted. These
+   characteristics make it easier for readers to quickly pick up
+   highlighted key terms and important phrases.
+
+ - =Typewriter font= is used for all file names, paths, URLs, source
+   codes, as well as inputs and outputs (e.g. for command lines).
+
+ - A left arrow with a hook (↩) at the end of a line indicates that
+   the line is continued at the next line without an actual line
+   break.
+
+#+TOC: headlines 3
+
+#+LaTeX: \mainmatter
+* For Novices
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: part:Novices
+  :END:
+
+# This part provides a brief guide for the installation and daily use of
+# Gpg4win program components. The practice robot *Adele* will help you
+# with this process and allow you to practice the de- and encryption
+# process (using OpenPGP) until you have become familiar with Gpg4win.
+#
+# The amount of time required to work through this brief guide will
+# depend on your knowledge of your computer and Windows. It should take
+# about one hour.
+
+** Gpg4win --- Cryptography for Everyone
+
+#+index: Cryptography
+
+What is Gpg4win? Wikipedia answers this question as follows:
+
+#+BEGIN_QUOTE
+  Gpg4win is an installation package for Windows (2000/XP/2003/Vista)
+  with computer programs and handbooks for emailand file encryption.
+  It includes the GnuPG encryption software, as well as several
+  applications and documentation. Gpg4win itself and the programs
+  contained in Gpg4win are Free Software.
+#+END_QUOTE
+
+The "Novices" and "Advanced Users" handbooks have been combined for this
+second version under the name "Compendium". In Version 2, Gpg4win
+includes the following programs:
+
+#+index: GnuPG
+- GnuPG ::
+  GnuPG forms the heart of Gpg4win --- the actual encryption software.
+
+#+index: Kleopatra
+- Kleopatra ::
+#+index: Certificate Administration
+   The central certificate
+   administration of Gpg4win, which ensures uniform user navigation
+   for all cryptographic operations.
+
+#+index: GNU Privacy Assistant|see GPA
+#+index: GPA
+- GNU Privacy Assistant (GPA) ::
+   is an alternative program for managing certificates, in addition to
+   Kleopatra.
+
+#+index: GnuPG for Outlook|see GpgOL
+#+index: GpgOL
+- GnuPG for Outlook (GpgOL) ::
+   is an extension for Microsoft Outlook 2003 and 2007, which is used to
+   sign and encrypt messages.
+
+#+index: GPG Explorer eXtension|see GpgEX
+#+index: GpgEX
+#+index: Windows-Explorer
+- GPG Explorer eXtension (GpgEX) ::
+   is an extension for Windows Explorer which
+   can be used to sign and encrypt files using the context menu.
+
+#+index: Claws Mail
+- Claws Mail ::
+   is a full email program that offers very good support for GnuPG.
+
+Using the GnuPG (GNU Privacy Guard) encryption program, anyone can
+encrypt emails securely, easily and at no cost. GnuPG can be used
+privately or commercially without any restrictions. The encryption
+technology used by GnuPG is secure, and cannot be broken based on
+today's state of technology and research.
+
+#+index: Free Software
+GnuPG is *Free Software* [2]. That means that each person has the
+right to use this software for private or commercial use.  Each person
+may and can study the source code of the programs and --- if they have
+the required technical knowledge --- make modifications and forward
+these to others.
+
+With regard to security software, this level of transparency ---
+guaranteed access to the source code --- forms an indispensable
+foundation. It is the only way of actually checking the trustworthiness
+of the programming and the program itself.
+
+#+index: OpenPGP
+#+index: S/MIME
+#+index: X.509
+
+GnuPG is based on the international standard *OpenPGP* (RFC 4880),
+which is fully compatible with PGP and also uses the same
+infrastructure (certificate server etc.) as the latter. Since Version
+2 of GnuPG, the cryptographic standard *S/MIME* (IETF RFC 3851, ITU-T
+X.509 and ISIS-MTT/Common PKI) are also supported.
+
+#+index: PGP
+PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy") is not Free Software; many years
+ago, it was briefly available at the same conditions as GnuPG. However,
+this version has not corresponded with the latest state of technology
+for some time.
+
+#+index: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie
+#+index: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
+Gpg4win's predecessors were supported by the Bundesministerium für
+Wirtschaft und Technologie
+ as part of the Security on the Internet initiative. Gpg4win
+and Gpg4win2 were supported by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
+Informationstechnik (BSI).
+
+Additional information on GnuPG and other projects undertaken by the
+Federal Government for security on the Internet can be found on the
+webpages http://www.bsi.de and http://www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de of the
+Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
+
+** Encrypting emails: because the envelope is missing
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:why
+  :END:
+
+#+index: Envelope
+
+The encryption of messages is sometimes described as the second-oldest
+profession in the world. Encryption techniques were used as far back as
+Egypt's pharaoh Khnumhotep II, and during Herodot's and Cesar's time.
+Thanks to Gpg4win, encryption is no longer the reserve of kings, but is
+accessible to everyone, for free.
+
+#+ATTR_HTML: width=300
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.9\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/egyptian-stone.png]]
+
+Computer technology has provided us with some excellent tools to
+communicate around the globe and obtain information. However, rights and
+freedoms which are taken for granted with other forms of communication
+must still be secured when it comes to new technologies. The Internet
+has developed with such speed and at such a scale that it has been
+difficult to keep up with maintaining our rights.
+
+With the old-fashioned way of writing a letter, written contents are
+protected by an envelope. The envelope protects messages from prying
+eyes, and it is easy to see if an envelope has been manipulated. Only if
+the information is not important, do we write it on an unprotected post
+card, which can also be read by the mail carrier and others.
+
+You and no one else decides whether the message is important,
+confidential or secret.
+
+emails do not provide this kind of freedom. An email is like a
+post card - always open, and always accessible to the electronic mailman
+and others. It gets even worse: while computer technology offers the
+option of transporting and distributing millions of emails, it also
+provides people with the option of checking them.
+
+#+index: Echelon system
+Previously, no one would have seriously thought about collecting all
+letters and postcards, analyse their contents or monitor senders and
+recipients. It would not only have been unfeasiable, it would have also
+taken too long. However, modern computer technology has made this a
+technical possibility. There are indications that this is already being
+done on a large scale. A Wikipedia article on the Echelon system [3]
+provides interesting background information on this topic.
+
+Why is this an issue --- because the envelope is missing.
+
+#+ATTR_HTML: width=300
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sealed-envelope.png]]
+
+What we are suggesting here is essentially an "envelope" for
+your electronic mail. Whether you use it, when or for whom and how often
+- that is entirely up to you. Software such as Gpg4win merely returns
+the right to choose to you. The right to choose whether you think a
+message is important and requires protection.
+
+#+index: Telecommunication secrecy
+#+index: Mail secrecy
+#+index: Correspondence secrecy
+This is the key aspect of the right to privacy of correspondence, post
+and telecommunications in the Basic Law, and the Gpg4win program
+package allows you to exercise this right. You do not have to use this
+software, just as you are not required to use an envelope. But you
+have the right.
+
+To secure this right, Gpg4win offers a so-called "strong encryption
+technology". "Strong" in this sense means that it cannot be broken with
+known tools. Until recently, strong encryption methods used to be
+reserved for military and government circles in many countries. The
+right to make them accessible to all citizens was championed by Internet
+users, and sometimes also with the help of visionary people in
+government institutions, as was the case with support for Free Software
+for encryption purposes. Security experts around the world now view
+GnuPG as a practical and secure software.
+
+*It is up to you how you want to value this type of security.*
+
+You alone decide the relationship between the convenience of encryption
+and the highest possible level of security. These include the few but
+important precautions you must make to implement to ensure that Gpg4win
+can be used properly. This compendium will explain this process on a
+step-by-step basis.
+
+
+
+** How Gpg4win works
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:FunctionOfGpg4win
+  :END:
+
+#+index: public key method
+The special feature of Gpg4win and its underlying *“Public Key
+method”* is that anyone can and should understand it. There is nothing
+secretive about it --- it is not even very difficult to understand.
+
+The use of individual Gpg4win program components is very simple, even
+though the way it works is actually quite complicated. This section will
+explain how Gpg4win works --- not in all details, but enough to explain
+the principles behind this software. Once you are familiar with the
+principles, you will have considerable trust in the security offered by
+Gpg4win.
+
+At the end of this book, in Chapter\ref{ch:themath}, you can also open
+the remaining secrets surrounding "Public Key" cryptography and discover
+why it is not possible to break messages encrypted with Gpg4win using
+current state of technology.
+
+
+
+**** Lord of the keyrings
+
+Anyone wishing to secure something valuable locks it away --- with a
+key. Even better is a key that is unique and is kept in a safe location.
+
+#+ATTR_HTML: width=300
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/schlapphut-with-key.png]]
+
+If the key should ever fall into the wrong hands, the valuables are no
+longer secure. Their security stands and falls with the security and
+uniqueness of the key. Therefore the key must be at least as well
+protected as the valuables themselves. To ensure that it cannot be
+copied, the exact characteristics of the key must also be kept secret.
+
+Secret keys are nothing new in cryptography: it has always
+been that keys were hidden to protect the secrecy of the messages.
+Making this process very secure is very cumbersome and also prone to
+errors.
+
+#+ATTR_HTML: width=300
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+file:tangled-schlapphut.png
+
+#+index: Symmetric encryption
+The basic problem with the "ordinary" secret transmission of messages is
+that the same key is used for both encryption and decryption, and that
+both the sender as well as recipient must be familiar with this secret
+key. For this reason, these types of encryption systems are also called
+*"symmetric encryption"*.
+
+This results in a fairly paradoxical situation: Before we can use this
+method to communicate a secret (an encrypted message), we must have also
+communicated another secret in advance: the key. And that is exactly the
+problem, namely the constantly occuring issue of always having to
+exchange keys while ensuring that they are not intercepted by third
+parties.
+
+In contrast --- and not including the secret key --- Gpg4win
+works with another key that is fully accessible and public. It is also
+described as a "public key" encryption system.
+
+This may sound contradictory, but it is not. The clue: It is no longer
+necessary to exchange a secret key. To the contrary: The secret key can
+never be exchanged! The only key that can be passed on is the public key
+(in the public certificate) --- which anyone can know.
+
+#+index: Key!pair
+That means that when you use Gpg4win, you are actually using a pair of
+keys --- a secret and a second public key. Both key
+components are inextricably connected with a complex mathematical
+formula. Based on current scientific and technical knowledge, it is not
+possible to calculate one key component using the other, and it is
+therefore impossible to break the method.
+
+Section \ref{ch:themath} explains why that is.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/verleihnix.png]]
+
+#+index: public key method
+The principle behind public key encryption
+
+The *secret* or *private key* must be kept secret.
+
+The *public key* should be as accessible to the general public as much
+as possible.
+
+Both key components have very different functions:
+
+#+BEGIN_QUOTE
+  The secret key component *decrypts* messages.
+#+END_QUOTE
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.75\textwidth
+file:key-with-shadow-bit.png
+
+#+BEGIN_QUOTE
+  The public key component *encrypts* messages.
+#+END_QUOTE
+
+
+
+**** The public mail strongbox
+
+#+index: Mail strongbox
+#+index: Symmetric encryption
+#+index: non-public key method|see Symmetric encryption
+
+This small exercise is used to explain the difference between the
+"public key" encryption system and symmetric encryption ("non-public
+key" method)...
+
+
+*The "secret key method" works like this:*
+
+Imagine that you have installed a mail strongbox in front of your house,
+which you want to use to send secret messages.
+
+The strongbox has a lock for which there is only one single key. No one
+can put anything into or take it out of the box without this key. This
+way, your secret messages are pretty secure.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.75\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/letter-into-safe.png]]
+
+Since there is only one key, the person you are corresponding with must
+have the same key that you have in order to open and lock the mail
+strongbox, and to deposit a secret message.
+
+You have to give this key to that person via a secret route.
+
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.75\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/secret-key-exchange.png]]
+
+They can only open the strongbox and read the secret message
+once they have the secret key.
+
+Therefore everything hinges on this one key: If a third party knows the
+key, it is the end of the secret messages. Therefore you and the person
+you are corresponding with *must exchange the key in a manner that is as
+secret* as the message itself.
+
+But actually --- you might just as well give them the secret message
+when you are giving them the key...
+
+*How this applies to email encryption:* Around the world, all
+participants would have to have secret keys and exchange these keys in
+secret before they can send secret messages per email.
+
+So we might as well forget about this option ...
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.75\textwidth
+file:letter-out-of-safe.png
+
+*Now the "public key" method*
+
+#+index: Mail strongbox
+#+index: Asymmetric encryption
+You once again install a mail strongbox in front
+of your house. But unlike the strongbox in the first example, this one
+is always open. On the box hangs a key --- which is visible to everyone
+--- and which can be used by anyone to lock the strongbox (asymetric
+encryption method).
+
+*Locking, but not opening:* that is the difference!
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.7\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/pk-safe-open.png]]
+
+This key is yours and --- as you might have guessed --- it is your
+public key.
+
+If someone wants to leave you a secret message, they put it in the
+strongbox and lock it with your public key. Anyone can do this, since
+the key is available to everyone.
+
+No one else can open the strongbox and read the message. Even the person
+that has locked the message in the strongbox cannot unlock it again,
+e.g. in order to change the message.
+
+This is because the public half of the key can only be used for locking
+purposes.
+
+The strongbox can only be opened with one single key: your own secret
+and private part of the key.
+
+*Getting back to how this applies to email encryption:*
+Anyone can encrypt an email for you.
+
+#+index: Key!public
+#+index: Key!private
+To do this, they do not need a secret key; quite the opposite, they only
+need a totally non-secret , "public" key. Only one key
+can be used to decrypt the email, namely your private and secret
+key.
+
+You can also play this scenario another way:
+
+If you want to send someone a secret message, you use their mail
+strongbox with their own public and freely available key.
+
+To do this, you do not need to personally know the person you are
+writing to, or have to speak to them, because their public key is always
+accessible, everywhere. One you have placed your message in the
+strongbox and locked it with the recipient's key, the message is not
+accessible to anyone, including you. Only the recipient can open the
+strongbox with his private key and read the message.
+
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.75\textwidth
+file:pk-safe-opened-with-sk.png
+
+*But what did we really gain:* There is still a secret key!
+
+However, this is quite different from the "non-public key" method: You
+are the only one who knows and uses your secret key. The key is never
+forwarded to a third party --- it is not necessary to transfer keys in
+secret, nor is it advised.
+
+Nothing must be passed between sender and recipient in secret ---
+whether a secret agreement or a secret code.
+
+And that is exactly the crux of the matter: All symmetric encryption
+methods can be broken because a third party has the opportunity to
+obtain the key while the key is being exchanged.
+
+#+index: Key!pair
+This risk does not apply here, because there is no exchange of secret
+keys; rather, it can only be found in one and very secure location: your
+own keyring --- your own memory.
+
+#+index: Asymmetric encryption
+This modern encryption method which uses a non-secret and public key, as
+well as a secret and private key part is also described as "asymmetric
+encryption".
+
+
+
+** The passphrase
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:passphrase
+  :END:
+
+#+index: Passphrase
+
+As we have seen in the last chapter, the private key is one of the most
+important components of the "public key" or asymmetric encryption
+method. While one no longer needs to exchange the key with another party
+in secret, the security of this key is nevertheless the "key" to the
+security of the "entire" encryption process.
+
+On a technical level, a private key is nothing more than a file which is
+stored on your computer. To prevent unauthorised access of this file, it
+is secured in two ways:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+file:think-passphrase.png
+
+#+index: Viruses
+#+index: Worms
+#+index: Trojans
+First, no other user may read or write in the file --- which is
+difficult to warrant, since computer administrators always have access
+to all files, and the computer may be lost or attacked by
+viruses, worms or Trojans.
+
+For this reason we need another layer of protection: the passphrase.
+This is not a password --- a passphrase should not consist of only one
+word, but a sentence, for example. You really should keep this
+passphrase "in your head" and never have to write it down.
+
+At the same time, it cannot be possible to guess it. This may sound
+contradictory, but it is not. There are several proven methods of
+finding very unique and easy to remember passphrases, which cannot be
+easily guessed.
+
+Think of a phrase that is very familiar to you, e.g.:
+
+  - =People in glass houses should not be throwing stones.=
+
+Now, take every third letter of this sentence:
+
+  - =oegsoehloerisn= ==
+
+While it may not be easy to remember this sequence of letters, it is
+also unlikely that you will forget how to arrive at the passphrase as
+long as you remember the original sentence. Over time, and the more
+often you use the phrase, you will commit it to memory. No one else can
+guess the passphrase.
+
+Think of an event that you know you will never forget about. Maybe it's
+a phrase that you will always associate with your child or partner, i.e.
+it has become "unforgettable". Or a holiday memory or a line of text of
+a song that is personally important to you.
+
+Use capital and small letters, numbers, special characters and spaces,
+in any order. In principle, anything goes, including umlaute, special
+characters, digits etc. But remember --- if you want to use your secret
+key abroad at a different computer, please remember that not all
+keyboards may have such special characters. For example, you will likely
+only find umlaute (ä, ö, ü usw.) on German keyboards.
+
+You can also make intentional grammar mistakes, e.g. "mustake" instead
+of "mistake". Of course you also have to be able to remember these
+"mustakes". Or, change languages in the middle of the phrase. You can
+change the sentence:
+
+  - =In München steht ein Hofbräuhaus.=
+
+into this passphrase:
+
+  - =inMinschen stet 1h0f breuhome=
+
+Think of a sentence that does not make sense, but you can still
+remember e.g.:
+
+  - =The expert lamenting nuclear homes=
+
+  - =Knitting an accordeon, even during storms.=
+
+A passphrase of this length provides good protection for your secret
+key.
+
+It can also be shorter if you use capital letters, for example:
+
+  - =THe ExPERt laMenTIng NuclEAr hoMES.=
+
+While the passphrase is now shorter, it is also more difficult to
+remember. If you make your passphrase even shorter by using special
+characters, you will save some time entering the passphrase, but it is
+also morr likely that you will forget your passphrase.
+
+Here is an extreme example of a very short but also very secure
+passphrase:
+
+  - =R!Qw"s,UIb *7\$=
+
+However, in practice, such sequences of characters have not proven
+themselves to be very useful, since there are simply too few clues by
+which to remember them.
+
+A *bad passphrase* can be "broken" very quickly, if it ...
+
+-  ... is already used for another purpose (e.g. for an email account
+   or your mobile phone). The same passphrase would therefore already be
+   known to another, possibly not secure, software. If the hacker is
+   successful, your passphrase becomes virtually worthless.
+
+-  ... comes from a dictionary. Passphrase finder programs can run a
+   password through complete digital dictionaries in a matter of minutes
+   --- until it matches one of the words.
+
+-  ... consists of a birth date, a name or other public information.
+   Anyone planning to decrypt your email will obtain this type of
+   information.
+
+-  ... is a very common quote, such as "to be or not to be". Passphrase
+   finder programs also use quotes like these to break passphrases.
+
+-  ... consists of only one word or less than 8 characters. It is very
+   important that you think of a longer passphrase.
+
+When composing your passphrase, please *do not use* any of the
+aforementioned examples. Because anyone seriously interested in getting
+his hands on your passphrase will naturally see if you used one of these
+examples.
+
+
+*Be creative!* Think of a passphrase now! Unforgettable and unbreakable.
+
+In Chapter \ref{ch:CreateKeyPair} you will need this passphrase to
+create your key pair.
+
+But until then, you have to address another problem: Someone has to
+verify that the person that wants to send you a secret message is real.
+
+
+
+** Two methods, one goal: OpenPGP & S/MIME
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:openpgpsmime
+  :END:
+#+index: OpenPGP
+#+index: S/MIME
+#+index: Mail strongbox
+
+You have seen the importance of the "envelope" for your email and how
+to provide one using tools of modern information technology: a mail
+strongbox, in which anyone can deposit encrypted
+mails which only you, the owner of the strongbox, can decrypt. It is not
+possible to break the encryption as long as the private key to your
+"strongbox" remains your secret.
+
+#+index: Authenticity
+Still: If you think about it, there is still another problem. A little
+further up you read about how --- in contrast to the secret key method
+--- you do not need to personally meet the person you are corresponding
+with in order to enable them to send a secret message. But how can you
+be sure that this person is actually who they say they are? In the case
+of emails, you only rarely know all of the people you are
+corresponding with on a personal level --- and it is not usually easy to
+find out who is really behind an email address. Hence, we not only
+need to warrant the secrecy of the message, but also the identity of the
+sender --- specifically *authenticity*.
+
+#+index: Authentication
+#+index: Chain of trust
+Hence someone must authenticate that the person who wants to send you
+a secret message is real. In everyday life, we use ID, signatures or
+certificates authenticated by authorities or notaries for
+"authentication" purposes. These institutions derive their right to
+issue notarisations from a higher-ranking authority and finally from
+legislators. Seen another way, it describes a chain of trust which
+runs from "the top" to "the bottom", and is described as a
+*"hierarchical trust concept"*.
+#+index: Hierarchical trust concept
+
+In the case of Gpg4win or other email encryption programs, this
+concept is found in almost mirror-like fashion in *S/MIME*. Added to
+this is*OpenPGP*, another concept that only works this way on the
+Internet. S/MIME and OpenPGP have the same task: the encryption and
+signing of data. Both use the already familiar public key method. While
+there are some important differences, in the end, none of these
+standards offer any general advantage over another. For this reason you
+can use Gpg4win to use both methods.
+
+#+index: Certificate issuer
+#+index: Certificate Authority (CA)
+The equivalent of the hierarchical trust concept is called
+"Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension" or *S/MIME*. If you use
+S/MIME, your key must be authenticated by an accredited organisation
+before it can be used. The certificate of this organisation in turn was
+authenticated by a higher-ranking organisation etc. --- until we arrive
+at a so-called root certificate. This hierarchical chain of trust
+usually has three links: the root certificate, the certificate of the
+issuer of the certificate (also
+CA for Certificate Authority), and finally your own user
+certificate.
+
+#+index: Web of Trust
+A second alternative and non-compatible notarisation method is the
+*OpenPGP* standard, does not build a trust hierarchy but rather
+assembles a *"Web of trust"*.  The Web of Trust
+represents the basic structure of the non-hierarchical Internet and its
+users. For example, if User B trusts User A, then User B could also
+trust the public key of User C, whom he does not know, if this key has
+been authenticated by User A.
+
+Therefore OpenPGP offers the option of exchanging encrypted data and
+emails without authentication by a higher-ranking agency. It is
+sufficient if you trust the email address and associated certificate
+of the person you are communicating with.
+
+Whether with a trust hierarchy or Web of Trust --- the authentication of
+the sender is at least as important as protecting the message. We will
+return to this important protection feature later in the compendium. For
+now, this information should be sufficient to install Gpg4win and
+understand the following chapters:
+
+-  Both methods --- *OpenPGP* and *S/MIME* --- offer the required
+   security.
+
+-  The methods are *not compatible* with each other. They offer two
+   alternate methods for authenticating your secret communication.
+   Therefore they are not deemed to be interoperable.
+
+-  Gpg4win allows for the convenient *and parallel* use of both methods
+   --- you do not have to choose one or the other for encryption/signing
+   purposes.
+
+Chapter \ref{ch:CreateKeyPair} of this compendium, which discusses the
+creation of the key pair, therefore branches off to discuss both
+methods. At the end of Chapter\ref{ch:CreateKeyPair} the information is
+combined again.
+
+In this compendium, these two symbols will be used to refer to the two
+alternative methods:
+
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=2.5cm
+[[file:images-compendium/openpgp-icon.png]]
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=2.5cm
+[[file:images-compendium/smime-icon.png]]
+
+
+** Installing Gpg4win
+
+#+index: Installation
+
+Chapters 1 to 5 provided you with information on the background related
+to encryption. While Gpg4win also works if you do not understand the
+logic behind it, it is also different from other programs in that you
+are entrusting your secret correspondence to this program. Therefore it
+is good to know how it works.
+
+With this knowledge you are now ready to install Gpg4win and set up your
+key pair.
+
+If you already have a GnuPG-based application installed on your computer
+(e.g. GnuPP, GnuPT, WinPT or GnuPG Basics), please refer to the
+Annex\ref{ch:migration} for information on transferring your existing
+certificates.
+
+You can load and install Gpg4win from the Internet or a CD. To do this,
+you will need administrator rights to your Windows operating system.
+
+If you are downloading Gpg4win from the Internet, please ensure that
+you obtain the file from a trustworthy site, e.g.:
+http://www.gpg4win.org. To start the installation, click on the
+following file after the download:
+
+=gpg4win-2.0.0.exe= (or higher version number).
+
+If you received Gpg4win on a CD ROM, please open it and click on the
+"Gpg4win" installation icon. All other installation steps are the same.
+
+The response to the question of whether you want to install the program
+is {{{Button(Yes)}}}.
+
+The installation assistant will start and ask you for the
+language to be used with the installation process:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-inst-language_en.png]]
+
+Confirm your language selection with {{{Button(OK)}}}.
+
+Afterwards you will see this welcome dialog:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-inst-welcome_en.png]]
+
+Close all programs that are running on your computer and click on
+{{{Button(Next)}}}.
+
+The next page displays the *licensing agreement* --- it is
+only important if you wish to modify or forward Gpg4win. If you only
+want to use the software, you can do this right away --- without reading
+the license.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-inst-license_en.png
+
+Click on {{{Button(Next)}}}.
+
+On the page that contains *the selection of components* you
+can decide which programs you want to install.
+
+A default selection has already been made for you. Yo can also install
+individual components at a later time.
+
+Moving your mouse cursor over a component will display a brief
+description. Another useful feature is the display of required hard
+drive space for all selected components.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-inst-components_en.png
+
+Click on {{{Button(Next)}}}.
+
+The system will suggest a folder for the installation, e.g.:
+=C:\Programme\GNU\GnuPG=.
+
+You can accept the suggestion or select a different folder for
+installing Gpg4win.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-inst-directory_en.png
+
+Then click on {{{Button(Next)}}}.
+
+Now you can decide which *links* should be installed --- the
+system will automatically create a link with the start menu. You can
+change this link later on using the Windows dashboard settings.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-inst-options_en.png
+
+Then click on {{{Button(Next)}}}.
+
+If you have selected the default setting --- *link with start
+menu* --- you can define the name of this start menu on the next page or
+simply accept the name.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-inst-startmenu_en.png
+
+Then click on {{{Button(Install)}}}.
+
+During the *installation* process that follows, you will see a
+progress bar and information on which file is currently being installed.
+You can press {{{Button(Show~details)}}} at any time to show the installation
+log.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-inst-progress_en.png
+
+Once you have completed the installation, please click on {{{Button(Next)}}}.
+
+The last page of the installation process is shown once the
+installation has been successfully completed:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-inst-finished_en.png
+
+You have the option of displaying the README file, which contains
+important information on the Gpg4win version you have just installed. If
+you do not wish to view this file, deactivate this option.
+
+Then click on {{{Button(Finish)}}}.
+
+In some cases you may have to restart Windows. In this case,
+you will see the following page:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-inst-finished2_en.png
+
+Now you can decide whether Windows should be restarted immediately or
+manually at a later time.
+
+Click on {{{Button(Finish)}}}.
+
+Please read the README file which contains up-to-date information on the
+Gpg4win version that has just been installed. You can find this file
+e.g. via the start menu:
+{{{Menu(Start\to{}Programs\to{}Gpg4win\to{}Documentation\to{}Gpg4win README)}}}
+
+*And that's it!*
+
+You have successfully installed Gpg4win and are ready to work with the
+program.
+
+For information on *automatically installing* Gpg4win, as may be of
+interest for software distribution systems, please see the
+Annex\ref{ch:auto} "Automatic installation of Gpg4win".
+
+
+
+** Creating a certificate
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:CreateKeyPair
+  :END:
+#+index: Certificate!create
+#+index: Key!create
+#+index: Key!pair
+
+Now that you have found out why GnuPG is so secure
+(Chapter\ref{ch:FunctionOfGpg4win}), and how a good passphrase provides
+protection for your private key (Chapter\ref{ch:passphrase}), you are
+now ready to create your own key pair.
+
+As we saw in Chapter\ref{ch:FunctionOfGpg4win}, a key pair consists of
+a public and a private key. With the addition of an email address,
+login name etc., which you enter when creating the pair (so-called meta
+data), you can obtain your private certificate with the public /and /
+private key.
+
+#+index: X.509
+This definition applies to both OpenPGP as well as S/MIME (S/MIME
+certificates correspond with a standard described as
+"X.509").
+
+*It would be nice if I could practice this important step of creating a
+key pair ....*
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}Not to worry, you can do just that --- but only with
+OpenPGP:
+
+#+index: Authentication
+If you decide for the OpenPGP method of authentication, the "Web of
+Trust", then you can practice the entire process for creating a key
+pair, encryption and decryption as often as you like, until you feel
+very comfortable.
+
+This "dry run" will strengtthen your trust in Gpg4win, and the "hot
+phase" of OpenPGP key pair creation will no longer be a problem for you.
+
+#+index: GnuPP
+Your partner in this exercise is *Adele* . Adele is a test service
+which is still derived from the GnuPP predecessor project and is still
+in operation. In this compendium we continue to recommend the use of
+this practice robot. We would also like to thank the owners of
+gnupp.de for operating this practice robot.
+
+Using Adele, you can practice and test the OpenPGP key pair which you
+will be creating shortly, before you start using it in earnest. But
+more on that later.
+
+*Let's go!* Open Kleopatra using the Windows start menu:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.7\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-startmenu_en.png]]
+
+#+index: Kleopatra
+#+index: Certificate administration
+
+You will see the main Kleopatra screen --- the
+certificate administration:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-kleopatra-mainwindow-empty_en.png
+
+At the beginning, this overview will be empty, since you have not
+created or imported any certificates yet.
+
+Click on {{{Menu(File\to{}New~Certificate)}}}.
+
+In the following dialog you select the format for the certificate. You
+can choose from the following: *OpenPGP* (PGP/MIME) or *X.509* (S/MIME).
+
+The differences and common features of the two formats have already been
+discussed in Chapter\ref{ch:openpgpsmime}.
+
+# <<chooseCertificateFormat>>
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-kleopatra-ChooseCertificateFormat_en.png]
+
+This chapter of the compendium breaks off into two sections for each
+method at this point. Information is then combined at the end of the
+Chapter.
+
+Depending on whether you chose OpenPGP or X.509 (S/MIME), you can now
+read either:
+
+-  Section [[#createKeyPairOpenpgp]]: *Creating an OpenPGP certificate*
+   (see next page) or
+
+-  Section [[#createKeyPairX509]]: *Creating an X.509 certificate*
+   @@latex:{(see page \pageref{createKeyPairX509})}@@.
+
+
+*** Creating an OpenPGP certificate
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: createKeyPairOpenpgp
+   :END:
+#+index: OpenPGP!create certificate
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}In the certificate option dialog, click on
+{{{Button(Create personal OpenPGP key pair)}}}.
+
+Now enter your email address and your name in the following window.
+Name and email address will be made publicly visible later.
+
+You also have the option of adding a comment for the key pair. Usually
+this field stays empty, but if you are creating a key for test
+purposes, you should enter "test" so you do not forget it is a test
+key. This comment becomes part of your login name, and will become
+public just like your name and email address.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-kleopatra-openpgp-personalDetails_en.png
+
+If you first wish to *test* your OpenPGP key pair, you can simply
+enter any name and fictional email address, e.g.: =Heinrich Heine= and
+=heinrich at gpg4win.de=
+
+The *Advanced settings are only be required in exceptional* cases. For
+details, see the Kleopatra handbook
+(via {{{Menu(Help\to{}Kleopatra handbook)}}}).
+
+Click on {{{Button(Next)}}}.
+
+You will see a list of all of the main entries and settings
+for *review purposes*. If you are interested in the (default) expert
+settings, you can view these via the {{{Menu(All details)}}} option.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-kleopatra-openpgp-reviewParameters_en.png
+
+If everything is correct, click on {{{Button(Create key)}}}.
+
+Now to the most important part: entering your *passphrase*!
+
+To create a key pair, you must enter your personal passphrase:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.45\textwidth
+file:sc-kleopatra-openpgp-pinentry_en.png
+
+If you have read Chapter\ref{ch:passphrase} you should now have an
+easy-to-remember but hard to break secret passphrase. Enter it in the
+dialog displayed at the top.
+
+Please note that this window may have been opened in the background and
+is not visible at first.
+
+If the passphrase is not secure enough because it is too short or does
+not contain any numbers or special characters, the system will tell you.
+
+At this point you can also enter a *test passphrase* or start in
+earnest; it's up to you.
+
+To make sure that you did not make any typing errors, the system will
+prompt you to enter your passphrase twice. Always confirm your entry
+with {{{Button(OK)}}}.
+
+Now your OpenPGP key pair is being created:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-kleopatra-openpgp-createKey_en.png
+
+This may take a couple of minutes. You can assist the creation of the
+required random numbers by entering information in the lower input
+field. It does not matter what you type, as the characters will not be
+used, only the time period between each key stroke. You can also
+continue working with another application on your computer, which will
+also slightly increase the quality of the new key pair.
+
+As soon as *the key pair creation has been successful*, you
+will see the following dialog:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+file:sc-kleopatra-openpgp-keyPairCreated_en.png
+
+#+index: Fingerprint
+#+index: Key!ID
+The 40-digit "fingerprint" of your newly generated
+OpenPGP certificate is displayed in the results text field. This
+fingerprint is unique anywhere in the world, i.e. no other person will
+have a certificate with the same fingerprint. Actually, even at 8 digits
+it would already be quite unlikely that the same sequence would occur
+twice anywhere in world. For this reason, it is often only the last 8
+digits of a fingerprint which are used or shown, and which are described
+as the key ID.  This fingerprint identifies the identity of
+the certificate as well as the fingerprint of a person.
+
+However, you do not need to remember or write down the fingerprint. You
+can also display it later in Kleopatra's certificate details.
+
+Next, you can activate one or more of the following three
+buttons:
+
+-  Creating a backup copy of your (private) certificate... ::
+   Enter the path under which your full certificate (which contains your
+   new key pair, hence the private /and / public key) should be
+   exported:
+
+   #+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+   [[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-openpgp-exportSecretKey_de.png]]
+
+   Kleopatra will automatically select the file type and store your
+   certificate as an =.asc= or =.gpg= file --- depending on whether
+   you activate or deactivate the *ASCII armor* option.
+
+   For export, click on {{{Button(OK)}}}.
+
+   *Important:* If you save the file on the hard drive, you should copy
+   the file to another data carrier (USB stick, diskette or CD-ROM) as
+   soon as possible, and delete the original file without a trace, i.e.
+   do not leave it in the Recycle bin! Keep this data carrier and
+   back-up copy in a safe place.
+
+   You can also create a back-up copy later; to do this, select the
+   following from the Kleopatra main menu:
+   {{{Menu(File\to{}Export private certificate...)}}} (see Chapter
+   \ref{ch:ImExport}).
+
+-  Sending a certificate via email ... ::
+   Clicking on this button should create a new oneemail --- with your
+   new public certificate in the attachment. Your secret Open PGP key
+   will of course /not/ be sent. Enter a recipient email address; you
+   can also add more text to the prepared text for this email.
+
+   *Please note:* Not all email programs support this function. Of
+   course you can also do this manually: If you do not see a newemail
+   window, shut down the certificate creation assistant, save your
+   public certificate via {{{Menu(File\to{}Export certificate)}}} and
+   sent this file via email to the people you are corresponding with.
+   For more details see Section\ref{sec_publishPerEmail}.
+
+-  Sending certificates to certificate servers... ::
+   Chapter \ref{fixme}  explains how to set up a globally available OpenPGP
+   certificate server in Kleopatra, and how you can publish your public
+   certificate on this server \ref{ch:keyserver}.
+
+This completes the creation of your OpenPGP certificate. End the
+Kleopatra assistant with {{{Button(Finish)}}}.
+
+Now let's go to Section [[#sec_finishKeyPairGeneration]]
+@@latex:{on page \pageref{sec_finishKeyPairGeneration}}@@. Starting at
+that point, the explanations for OpenPGP and X.509 will again be
+identical.
+
+
+*** Creating an X.509 certificate
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: createKeyPairX509
+   :END:
+
+#+index: X.509!create certificate
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}In the certificate format selection dialog on page
+\pageref{chooseCertificateFormat} click on the button
+{{{Button(Create personal X.509 key pair and authentication
+request)}}}.
+
+In the following window, enter your name (CN = common name), your
+email address (EMAIL), organisation (O) and your country code (C).
+Optionally, you can also add your location (L = Locality) and department
+(OU = Organizational Unit).
+
+If you first wish to *test* the X.509 key pair creation process, you can
+enter any information for name, organization and country code, and can
+also enter a fictional email address, e.g.:
+ : CN=Heinrich Heine,O=Test,C=DE,EMAIL=heinrich at gpg4win.de
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-x509-personalDetails_en.png]]
+
+The *Advanced settings will only be required in exceptional* cases. For
+details, see the Kleopatra handbook (via
+{{{Menu(Help\to{}Kleopatra handbook)}}}).
+
+Click on {{{Button(Next)}}}.
+
+You will see a list of all main entries and settings for
+*review purposes*. If you are interested in the (default) expert
+settings, you can view these via the {{{Menu(All details)}}} option.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-x509-reviewParameters_en.png]]
+
+Once everything is correct, click on {{{Button(Create key)}}}.
+
+Now to the most important part: Entering your *passphrase*!
+
+In order to create a key pair, you will be asked to enter your
+passphrase:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.45\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-x509-pinentry_en.png]]
+
+If you have read Chapter \ref{ch:passphrase} you should now have an
+easy-to-remember but hard to break secret passphrase. Enter it in the
+dialog displayed at the top!
+
+Please note that this window may have been opened in the background, so
+it may not be visible at first.
+
+If the passphrase is not secure enough because it is too short or does
+not contain any numbers or special characters, the system will let you
+know.
+
+At this point you can also enter a *test passphrase* or start in
+earnest; it's up to you.
+
+#+index: Certificate!request
+To make sure that you did not make any typing errors, the system will
+prompt you to enter your passphrase twice. Finally, you will be asked to
+enter your passphrase a third time: By doing that, you are sending your
+certificate request to the authenticating
+instance in charge. Always confirm your entries with {{{Button(OK)}}}.
+
+Now your X.509 key pair is being created:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-x509-createKey_en.png]]
+
+This may take a couple of minutes. You can assist the creation of the
+required random numbers by entering information in the lower input
+field. It does not matter what you type, as the characters will not be
+used, only the time period between each key stroke. You can also
+continue working with other applications on your computer, which will
+slightly increase the quality of the key pair that is being created.
+
+As soon as *the key pair has been successfully* created, you
+will see the following dialog:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-x509-keyPairCreated_en.png]]
+
+The next steps are triggered with the following buttons:
+
+#+index: Certificate Authority (CA)
+-  Save request in file... ::
+   Here, you enter the path under which your X.509 certificate request
+   should be backed up, and confirm your entry. Kleopatra will
+   automatically add the file ending =.p10=} during the saving
+   process. This file can then be sent to an authentication instance (in
+   short CA for Certificate
+   Authority). Further below, we will
+   refer you to cacert.org, which is a non-commercial authentication
+   instance (CA) that issues X.509 certificates free of charge.
+
+-  Sending an request by email ... ::
+   This creates a new email with the certificate request which has
+   just been created in the attachment. Enter a recippient email
+   address --- usually that of your certificate authority in charge; you
+   can also add more text to the prepared text of this email.
+
+   *Please note:* Not all email programs support this function. Of
+   course you can also do this manually: If you do not see a new
+   emailwindow, save your request in a file (see above) and send it
+   by email to your certificate authority (CA).
+
+   As soon as the CA has processed your request, the CA system
+   administrator will send you the completed X.509 certificate, which
+   has been signed by the CA. You only need to import the file into
+   Kleopatra (see Chapter\ref{ch:ImExport}).
+
+End the Kleopatra assistant with {{{Button(Finish)}}}.
+
+
+
+**** Creating an X509 certificate using www.cacert.org
+
+#+index: CAcert
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}CAcert is a non-commercial certificate
+authority which issues X.509 certificates free of charge. It offers an
+alternative to commercial root CAs, some of which charge very high fees
+for their certificates.
+
+To create a (client) certificate at CAcert, you first have to register
+at [[http://www.cacert.org]].
+
+Immediately following registration, you can create one or more client
+certificates on cacert.org: please make sure you have sufficient key
+length (e.g. 2048 bits). Use the web assistant to define a secure
+passphrase for your certificate.
+
+Your client certificate is now created.
+
+Afterwards you will receive an email with two links to your new X.509
+certificate and associated CAcert root certificate. Download both
+certificates.
+
+Follow the instructions to install the certificate on your browser. In
+Firefox, you can use e.g.
+{{{Menu(Edit\to{}Settings\to{}Advanced\to{}Certificates)}}}
+to find your installed certificate under the first tab ``Your
+certificates" with the name (CN) *CAcert WoT User*.
+
+You can now issue a personal X.509 certificate which has your name in
+the CN field. To do this, you must have your CAcert account
+authenticated by other members of the CACert Web of Trust. Information
+on obtaining such a confirmation can be found on the Internet pages of
+CAcert.
+
+Then save a backup copy of your personal X.509 certificate. The ending
+=.p12= will automatically be applied to the backup copy.
+
+*Attention:* This =.p12= file contains your public /and / your
+private key. Please ensure that this file is protected againt
+unauthorised access.
+
+To find out how to import your personal X.509 certificate in Kleopatra,
+see Chapter\ref{ch:ImExport}.
+
+
+Let's now look at Section \ref{sec_finishKeyPairGeneration} on the next
+page. This is where explanations for OpenPGP and X.509 are identical
+again.
+
+
+
+*** Certificate creation process complete
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: sec_finishKeyPairGeneration
+   :END:
+
+*This completes the creation of your OpenPGP or X.509 key pair. You now
+have a unique electronic key.*
+
+During the course of this compendium, we will always use an OpenPGP
+certificate for sample purposes --- however, all information will also
+apply accordingly to X509 certificates.
+
+You are now back in the Kleopatra main window. The OpenPGP certificate
+which was just created can be found in the certificate administration
+under the tab Menu{My certificates}:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-withOpenpgpTestkey_en.png]]
+
+Double-click on your new certificate to view all details
+related to the certificate:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[sc-kleopatra-openpgp-certificateDetails_en]]
+
+What do the certificate details mean?
+
+Your certificate is valid indefinitely, i.e. it has no "built-in expiry
+date". To change its validity at a later point, click on
+{{{Button(Change expiry date)}}}.
+
+*For more details about the certificate, see
+Chapter\ref{ch:CertificateDetails}.*
+
+
+
+** Distribution of public certificates
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:publishCertificate
+  :END:
+#+index: Certificate!public
+
+When using Gpg4win on a daily basis, it is very practical that for the
+purpose of encrypting and checking signatures you are always dealing
+with "public" certificates which only contain public keys. As long as
+your own secret key and the passphrase which protects it are secure, you
+have already gone a long way towards ensuring secrecy.
+
+Everyone can and should have your public certificate, and you can and
+should have the public certificates of your correspondence partners ---
+the more, the better.
+
+Because:
+
+*To exchange secure emails, both partners must have and use the
+public certificate of the other person. Of course the recipient will
+also require a program capable of handling certificates --- such as the
+Gpg4win software package with Kleopatra certification administration.*
+
+Therefore, if you want to send encrypted emails to someone, you must
+have their public certificate to encrypt the email.
+
+In turn, if someone wants to send you encrypted emails, he must have
+your public certificate and use it for encryption purposes.
+
+For this reason you should now allow access to your public certificate.
+
+Depending on how many people you corespond with, and which certificate
+format you are using, you have several options. For example, you can
+distribute your public certificate ...
+
+-  ... directly via *email* to specific correspondence partners ---
+   see Section \ref{sec_publishPerEmail}.
+
+-  ... on an *OpenPGP certificate server* (applies /only / to OpenPGP)
+   --- See Section\ref{sec_publishPerKeyserver}.
+
+-  ... via your own homepage.
+
+-  ... in person, e.g. with a USB stick.
+
+Let's look at the first two variants on the following pages.
+
+
+
+*** Publishing per email, with practice for OpenPGP
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: sec_publishPerEmail
+   :END:
+
+Do you wish to make your public certificate accessible to the person you
+are corresponding with? Simply send them your exported public
+certificate per email. This section will show you how this works.
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}Practice this process with your public OpenPGP
+certificate! Adele can assist you. The following exercises only apply to
+OpenPGP; for information on publishing public X.509 certificates, please
+see page \pageref{publishPerEmailx509}.
+
+*Adele* is a very nice email robot which you can use to practice
+correspondence. Because it is usually more pleasant to correspond with a
+smart human being rather than a piece of software (which is what Adele
+is, after all), you can imagine Adele this way:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/adele01.png]]
+
+First, send Adele your public OpenPGP certificate. Using the public key
+in this certificate, Adele will send an encrypted email back to you.
+
+You then use your own secret key to decrypt Adele's response. To be able
+to respond to Adele with an encrypted email, Adele has attached her
+own public certificate.
+
+Adele acts just like a real person you are corresponding with. Of
+course, Adele's emails are not nearly as interesting as those from
+the people you are actually corresponding with. On the other hand, you
+can use Adele to practice as much as you like --- which a real person
+might find bothersome after a while.
+
+So, now you export your public OpenPGP certificate and send it via
+email to Adele. The following pages how how this works.
+
+
+
+**** Exporting your public OpenPGP certificate
+
+#+index: Certificate!export
+
+Select the public certificate to be exported in Kleopatra (by clicking
+on the corresponding line in the list of certificates) and then click on
+{{{Menu(File\to{}Export certificates...)}}} in the menu. Select a
+suitable file folder on your PC and save the public certificate with the
+file type =.asc= e.g.: =mein-OpenPGP-Zertifikat.asc=.
+The other file types, which can be selected, =.gpg=
+or =.pgp=, will save your certificate in binary format. That
+means that in contrast to an =.asc= file, they cannot be read in
+the text editor.
+
+When you select the menu item, please make sure that you are only
+exporting your public certificate --- and /not / the certificate of your
+entire key pair with the associated private key by mistake.
+
+Review the file once more by selecting Windows Explorer and selecting
+the same folder that you indicated for the export.
+
+Now *open* the exported certificate file with a text editor, e.g.
+WordPad. The text editor will display your public OpenPGP certificate as
+it really looks --- a fairly confusing block of text and numbers:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-wordpad-editOpenpgpKey_en.png]]
+
+When publishing your OpenPGP certificate by email, there
+are two variants which can take into account whether an email program
+can send attachments.
+
+**** Variant 1: Send public OpenPGP certificate as an email text
+
+This option always works, even if you are not able to attach files ---
+as may be the case with some email services on the Web.
+Also, it is a way of seeing your public certificate for the first time,
+knowing exactly what is behind it, and what the certificate actually
+consists of.
+
+*Highlight* the entire public certificate in the text editor from
+
+: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+up to
+: -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+
+and *copy* it with the menu command or the key shortcut
+=Ctrl+C=. Now you have copied the certificate in the memory of
+your computer (Clipboard in a Windows context).
+
+Now you can start your email program --- it does not matter which one
+you use --- and add your public certificate into an empty email. In
+Windows, the key command for adding ("Paste") is =Ctrl+V=. You
+may know this process --- copying and pasting --- as "Copy & Paste".
+
+The email program should be set up in such a way that it is possible
+to send only text messages and not HTML formated messages (see
+Section\ref{sec_brokenSignature} and Annex \ref{appendix:gpgol}).
+
+*Now address this* email to =adele at gnupp.de and write
+something in the subject line e.g. {{{Menu(My public OpenPGP certificate)}}}.
+
+This is approximately what your email will look like:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-ol-adele-sendOpenpgpKey-inline_en.png]]
+
+Now send the email to Adele. Make sure to include your /own/ email
+address as the sender. Otherwise you will never receive Adele's
+response ...
+
+
+
+**** Variant 2: Send public OpenPGP certificate as an email
+attachment
+
+As an alternate to Variant 1, you can also send your exported public
+OpenPGP certificate directly as an *email file attachment*. This is
+often the simpler and more commonly used method. Above, you learnt about
+the "Copy & Paste" method, because it is more transparent and easier to
+understand.
+
+Now write another email to Adele --- this time with the certificate
+file in the attachment:
+
+Add the previously exported certificate file as an attachment to your
+new email --- just as you would for any other file (e.g. pulling the
+file into the emtpy \Emailwindow). Add the recipient (adele at gnupp.de)
+and a subject, e.g.: {{{Menu(My public OpenPGP certificate --- as a file
+attachment)}}}.
+
+Of course you can also add a few explanatory sentences. However, Adele
+does not need this explanations, because her only purpose is to help you
+practice this process.
+
+Your finished email should look something like this:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-ol-adele-sendOpenpgpKey-attachment_en.png]]
+
+Now send the email and attachment to Adele.
+
+
+
+**** In short:
+
+You have exported your public OpenPGP certificate in Kleopatra into a
+file. Subsequently, you have also copied the content of the file
+directly into an email and attached the complete file as an
+emailattachment. Both emails have been sent to someone else --- in
+this case, to Adele.
+
+The same process applies if you are sending your public certificate to a
+real email address. Usually, you should send public certificates as a
+file attachment, as described in Variant 2. This is the easiest way to
+do it, both for you and the recipient. And it also has the advantage
+that your recipient can import your certificate file directly into his
+own certificate administration (e.g. Kleopatra).
+
+
+
+*** Publish via OpenPGP certificate server
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: sec_publishPerKeyserver
+   :END:
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}*Please note: You can only distribute your OpenPGP
+certificate via an OpenPGP certificate server.*
+
+Publishing your public OpenPGP certificate on a public certificate
+server is always a good idea, even if you are only exchanging encrypted
+emails with just a few people. This way, your public certificate is
+accessible to everyone on an Internet server. This saves you time in
+having to send your certificate email to all of the people you are
+corresponding with.
+
+At the same time, publishing your email address on a certificate
+server can also make your email address more susceptible to spam.
+This can only be addressed with good spam protection.
+
+
+*This is how it works:* Select your public OpenPGP certificate in
+Kleopatra and click on
+{{{Menu(File\to{}Export certificate to server...)}}}. If you have not
+defined a certificate server, you will see a warning:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.6\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-exportCertificateToServer_en.png]]
+
+The public OpenPGP certificate server already contains
+keys.gnupg.net} default settings. Click on {{{Button(Continue)}}}
+to send your selected public certificate to this server. There, your
+public certificate is distributed to all globally connected certificate
+servers. Anyone can download your public certificate from one of these
+OpenPGP certificate servers and use it send you a secure email.
+
+If you are only testing this process, please do /not/ send the
+practice certificate: In the top dialog, click on
+{{{Button(Cancel)}}}. The test certificate is worthless and cannot be
+removed by the certificate server. You would not believe how many test
+certificates with names like "Julius Caesar", "Helmut Kohl" or "Bill
+Clinton" are already floating around on these servers ...
+
+**** In short:
+
+Now you know how to publish your public OpenPGP certificate on an
+OpenPGP certificate server on the Internet.
+
+*For information on how to search for the public OpenPGP certificate
+of people you are corresponding with on a certificate server, see
+Chapter\ref{ch:keyserver}. You can read this chapter now or later
+when you need this function.*
+
+
+
+*** Publishing X.509 certificates
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: publishPerEmailx509
+   :END:
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}In the case of public X.509 certificates, this process is
+even easier: all you need to do is to send a signed S/MIME email to
+the person you are corresponding with. Your public X.509 certificate is
+contained in this signature, and can be imported into the recipient's
+certificate administration.
+
+Unfortunately, you cannot use Adele to practice X.509 certificates since
+the robot only supports OpenPGP. Therefore you should pick another
+person to write you, or alternately write to yourself.
+
+Some public X.509 certificates are distributed by the certificate
+authority. This is usually done using X.509 certificate servers, which
+however do not synchronize on a global basis, as is the case with
+OpenPGP key servers.
+
+#+index: Certificate!chain
+#+index: Certificate!CA
+When you export your public X.509 certificate, you can highlight the
+entire public certificate chain and save it in
+a file --- generally the root certificate, CA
+certificate and personal certificate --- or only
+your public certificate.
+
+The first is recommended since the person you are corresponding with may
+be missing some parts of the chain, which he otherwise would have to
+find. To do this, click on all elements of the certificate chain in
+Kleopatra while holding the Shift key, and export the highlighted
+certificate into a file.
+
+If the person you are corresponding with does not have the root
+certificate, he must indicate that he trusts it, or have an
+administrator do so, in order to finally also trust you. If this has
+already been done (e.g. because they are both part of the same "root"),
+then this shiop is already in place.
+
+
+
+** Decrypting emails, practicing for OpenPGP
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:decrypt
+  :END:
+
+#+index: E-mail!decrypt
+
+Gpg4win, the certificate of your key pair and of course your passphrase
+are all you need to decrypt emails.
+
+This Chapter shows you step for step how to decrypt emails in
+Microsoft Outlook using the Gpg4win program component GpgOL.
+#+index: Outlook
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}Initially, you can practice this process with Adele and
+your public OpenPGP certificate. The following exercises again only
+apply to OpenPGP --- explanations regarding the decryption of S/MIME
+emails can be found at the end of this chapter on page
+\pageref{encrypt-smime}.
+
+In Section\ref{sec_publishPerEmail} you sent your public OpenPGP
+certificate to Adele. Using this certificate, Adele will now encrypt an
+email and send a message back to you. You should receive Adele's
+response after a short time period.
+
+
+# cartoon: Adele typing and sending a mail
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/adele02.png]]
+
+
+**** Decrypting a message with MS Outlook and GpgOL
+
+Most email programs also have special program extensions ("plugins"),
+which can be used to perform the encryption and decryption process
+directly in the email program. *GpgOL* is such a program extension
+for MS Outlook, which is used here to decrypt Adele'semails. For more
+information on other software solutions, please see
+Annex\ref{ch:plugins}. You can read this section now, or later when you
+need this function.
+
+Start MS Outlook and open Adele's response email. Until now, you have
+only known Kleopatra as a certificate administration program. However,
+the program can do much more than that: It can control the actual GnuPG
+encryption software and hence not just manage your certificates but also
+take care of all cryptographic tasks (with GnuPG's assistance).
+Kleopatra provides the visual user interface, hence the dialogs which
+you as the user see while you encrypt or decrypt emails.
+
+Hence Kleopatra processes Adele's encrypted emails. These emails
+have been encrypted by Adele using /your/ public OpenPGP key.
+
+To decrypt the message, Kleopatra will now ask for your passphrase that
+protects your private key. Enter your passphrase.
+
+The decryption is successful if you do not see an error dialog! You can
+now read the decrypted email.
+
+You can retrieve the exact results dialog of the decryption by clicking
+on {{{Menu(Extras\to{}GpgOL decryption/check)}}} in the menu of the
+opened email.
+
+However, surely you also want to see the result, namely the decrypted
+message ...
+
+
+
+**** The decrypted message
+
+Adele's decrypted response will look something like this [4]:
+
+#+BEGIN_EXAMPLE
+    Hello Heinrich Heine,
+
+    here is an encrypted response to your e-mail.
+
+    I received your public key with the key ID
+    FE7EEC85C93D94BA and the name
+    `Heinrich Heine <heinrich at gpg4win.de>'.
+
+    Attached is the public key of adele at gnupp.de,
+    the friendly e-mail robot.
+
+    Regards,
+    adele at gnupp.de
+#+END_EXAMPLE
+
+The text block that follows is Adele's public certificate.
+
+In the next chapter, you will import this certificate and add it to your
+certificate administration. You can use imported public certificates at
+any time to encrypt messages to the people you are corresponding with,
+or to check their signed emails.
+
+
+
+**** In short:
+
+1. You have decrypted and encrypted an email using your private key.
+
+2. Your correspondence partner has attached his own public certificate,
+   so that you can answer him in encrypted form.
+
+**** email decryption using S/MIME
+     :PROPERTIES:
+     :CUSTOM_ID: encrypt-smime
+     :END:
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}So this is how emails are decrypted using the private
+OpenPGP key --- but how does it work with S/MIME?
+
+The answer: The same!
+
+To decrypt an encrypted S/MIME email, simply open the message in
+Outlook and enter your passphrase in the pin entry dialog. You will see
+a status dialog that is similar to that shown for OpenPGP. After closing
+this dialog, you will see the decrypted S/MIME email.
+
+Differently from OpenPGP decryption, however, when using S/MIME you
+cannot use Adele to practice, since Adele only supports OpenPGP.
+
+
+
+** Importing a public certificate
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:importCertificate
+  :END:
+
+#+index: Certificate!import
+
+The person you are corresponding with does not always have to send their
+public certificate when they send signed emails to you. You can
+simply store their public certificate in your certificate administrator
+--- e.g. Kleopatra.
+
+**** Storing a public certificate
+
+Before you import a public certificate into Kleopatra, you must save it
+in a file. Depending on whether you received the certificate as an
+emailfile attachment or as a block of text contained in your
+email, please proceed as follows:
+
+-  If the public certificate was included as an email *file
+   attachment*, save it on your hard drive --- just as you would
+   normally do.
+
+-  If the public certificate was mailed as a block of text that *was
+   included in the* email, you have to highlighte the entire
+   certificate:
+
+   In the case of (public) OpenPGP certificates, please highlight the
+   area from
+
+   : -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+   up to
+   : -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+
+   just as we have seen in Section\ref{sec_publishPerEmail}.
+
+   Now use Copy & Paste to insert the highlighted section into a text
+   editor and save the public certificate. For file endings, you should
+   use =.asc= or =.gpg= for OpenPGP certificates and
+   =.pem= or =.der= for X.509 certificates.
+
+
+
+**** Importing public certificates into Kleopatra
+
+Whether you have saved the public certificate as an email attachment
+or text block --- in both cases, you will be importing it into your
+Kleopatra certificate administration. To do this, start Kleopatra if
+the program is not running already. In the menu, click on
+{{{Menu(File\to{}Import certificate...)}}}, search for the public
+certificate you have just saved and import it. You will receive an
+information dialog showing the result of the import process:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-import-certificate_en.png]]
+
+It displays the imported public certificate in Kleopatra, in a separate
+tab {{{Menu(Imported certificates)}}} with the title
+{{{Menu(<Path to certification file>)}}}'':
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-withAdeleKey_en.png]]
+
+This tab is used for checking purposes, since a file can contain more
+than one certificate. You can close the tab using the
+{{{Menu(Fenster\to{}Close tab)}}} command or via the "Close tab"
+button on the right side of the window).
+
+Now change over to the tab "Other certificates". You should also be able
+to see the public certificate you have imported.
+
+Now you have imported someone else's certificate --- in this case Adele's
+public OpenPGP certificate --- into your certificate administration. You
+can use this certificate at any time to send encrypted messages to the
+owner of the certificate, and to check his signatures.
+
+As soon as you are exchanging encrypted email more frequently and
+with a larger number of persons, you will likely want to search and
+import for certificates on globally available key servers. To see how
+this works, please see Chapter\ref{ch:keyserver} .
+
+**** Before continuing, an important question:
+
+How do you know that the public OpenPGP certificate really came from
+Adele? It is possible to send emails under someone else's name --- in
+this respect, merely having the sender's name does not mean anything.
+
+So how can you ensure that a public certificate actually belongs to the
+sender?
+
+*This key question related to certificate inspections is explained in
+the next Chapter\ref{ch:trust}*.
+
+
+
+** Certificate inspection
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:trust
+  :END:
+
+How do you know if a certificate actually belongs to the sender? And
+vice versa --- why should the person you are writing to believe that the
+certificate you sent to him is really yours? The sender's name on an
+email means nothing, just like putting a sender's name on an
+envelope.
+
+If your bank, receives an email with your name, with a request to
+transfer your entire bank balance to a numbered account in the Bahamas,
+we should hope that it will refuse to do so --- no matter what the
+email address is. On its own, an email address itself does not
+really say anything about the sender's identity.
+
+
+
+**** Fingerprints
+
+#+index: Fingerprint
+If you are only corresponding with a very small
+circle of people, it is easy to check their identity: You check the
+fingerprint of the other certificate.
+
+Each certificate features a unique identification, which is even better
+than someone's fingerprint. For this reason this identification is also
+referred to as a "fingerprint".
+
+If you display the details of a certificate in Kleopatra, e.g. by
+double-clicking on the certificate, you will see its 40-character
+fingerprint, among other things:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-openpgp-certificateDetails_de.png]]
+
+The fingerprint of the above OpenPGP certificate is therefore as
+follows: =7EDC0D141A82250847448E91FE7EEC85C93D94BA=
+
+In short --- the fingerprint clearly identifies the certificate and its
+owner.
+
+Simply call the person you are corresponding with and let them read the
+fingerprint of their certificate to you. If the information matches the
+certificate you have on hand, you clearly have the right certificate.
+
+Of course you can also meet the owner of the certificate in person, or
+use another method to ensure that certificate and owner can be matched.
+Frequently, the fingerprint is also printed on business cards;
+therefore, if you have a business card whose authenticity is guaranteed,
+you can save yourself a phone call.
+
+
+
+**** Authenticating an OpenPGP certificate
+
+#+index: Certificate!authenticate
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}Once you have obtained confirmation of the authenticity of
+the certificate "via a fingerprint", you can authenticate it --- but
+only in OpenPGP. With X.509, users cannot authenticate certificates ---
+this can only be done by the certificate authorities (CA).
+
+By authenticating a certificate, you are letting other (Gpg4win) users
+know that you are of the opinion that this certificate is real --- hence
+authentic: You are acting as a kind of "godfather" for this certificate,
+and help to increase the general level of trust in its authenticity.
+
+*So how does the authentication process work?*
+In Kleopatra, select an OpenPGP certificate that you think is real and
+would like to authenticate. In the menu, select:
+{{{Menu(Certificates\to{}Authenticate certificates...)}}}
+
+Reconfirm the OpenPGP certificate to be authenticated in the following
+dialog, using {{{Button(Next)}}}:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-certifyCertificate1_en.png]]
+
+In the next step, select your own OpenPGP certificate, which
+you will use to authenticate the certificate selected in the last step:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-certifyCertificate2_en.png]]
+
+Here you decide whether to {{{Button(Authenticate for private use only)}}} or
+or {{{Button(Authenticate and make visible to all)}}}. With the last variant,
+you have the option of subsequently uploading the authenticated
+certificate to an OpenPGP certificate server, and hence make an updated
+and authenticated certificate available to the entire world.
+
+Now confirm your selection with {{{Button(Authenticate)}}}.
+
+Similar to the process of signing an email, you also have to enter
+your passphrase when authenticating a certificate (with your private
+key). The authentication proccess is only complete once this information
+is entered correctly.
+
+Following a successful authentication, the following window
+appears:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-certifyCertificate3_en.png]]
+
+Do you want to check the authentication one more? To do this, open the
+certificate details of the certificate you have just
+authenticated.Select the tab {{{Menu(User ID and authentications)}}} and
+click on the button {{{Button(Obtain authentications)}}}.
+
+You will now see all authentications contained in this certificate,
+sorted by user ID. You should also be able to see your certificate in
+this list, if you have just authenticated it.
+
+
+
+**** Web of trust
+
+#+index: Web of Trust
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}The process of authenticating certificates creates a "Web
+of Trust" (WoT), which extends beyond the group of Gpg4win users and
+their correspondence, and it means that you are not always required to
+verify an OpenPGP certificate for its authenticity.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/key-with-sigs.png]]
+
+Naturally, trust in a certificate will increase if it has been
+authenticated by a lot of people. Your own OpenPGP certificate will
+receive authentications from other GnuPG users over time. This enables
+more and more people to trust that this certificate is really yours and
+not someone else's.
+
+The continued weaving of this "Web of Trust" creates a flexible
+authentication structure.
+
+There is one theoretical possibility of making this certificate test
+null and void: Someone plants a wrong certificate on you. In other
+words, you have a public OpenPGP key that pretends to be from X but in
+reality was replaced?? by Y. If this falsified certificate is
+authenticated, it clearly creates a problem for the "Web of Trust". For
+this reason it is very important to make sure that prior to
+authenticating a certifidate, you make absolutely sure the certificate
+really belongs to the person that purports to own it.
+
+But what if a bank or government authority wants to check whether the
+certificates of their customers are real? Surely, they cannot call them
+all...
+
+
+
+**** Authentication instances
+
+#+index: Authentication instances
+#+index: Certificate Authority (CA)
+
+In this case, we need a "superordinate" instance that all users can
+trust. After all, you do not personally check the ID of a person not
+known to you by phoning the municipal office, but rather trust that the
+office that issued the ID will have already checked and authenticated
+these details.
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}These types of authentication instances also exist in the
+case of OpenPGP certificates. In Germany, for example, the magazine c't
+has long been offering such a service free of charge, as have many
+universities.
+
+Therefore, if you have received an OpenPGP certificate whose
+authenticity has been confirmed by such an authentication instance, you
+should be able to rely on it.
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}Such authentication instances or "Trust Centers" are also
+provided for in other encryption methods --- such as S/MIME. However, in
+contrast to the "Web of Trust", these feature a hierarchical structure,
+with a "top authentication instance" that authenticates additional
+"sub-instances" and entitles them to authenticate user certificates (see
+Chapter\ref{ch:openpgpsmime}).
+
+#+index: Authentication
+The best way to describe this infrastructure is to use the example of a
+seal: The sticker on your license plate can only be provided by an
+institution that is authorised to issue such stickers, and they have
+received that right from another superordinate body. On a technical
+level, an authentication is nothing more than an
+authenticating party signing a certificate.
+
+#+index: Signature law
+Of course, hierarchical authentication infrastructures are much better
+suited to the requirements of government and official instances than the
+loose "Web ofTrust" of GnuPG, which is based on mutual trust. At the
+same time, the key aspect of the authentication is the same for both:
+Gpg4win also supports a hierarchical authentication (S/MIME) in addition
+to the "Web of Trust" (OpenPGP). Accordingly, Gpg4win offers a basis
+that corresponds with the Signature Act of the Federal
+Republic of Germany.
+
+If you would like to learn
+more about this topic, the following websites provide more information
+on this and other IT security topics:
+
+- http://www.bsi.de (German)
+
+- http://www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de (German)
+
+- http://www.gpg4win.org (English)
+
+Another, rather technical, information source on the issue of
+authentication infrastructure is the GnuPG handbook, which can also be
+found at:
+http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html.
+
+
+** Encrypting emails
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:encrypt
+  :END:
+
+#+index: E-mail!encrypt
+
+Now it is getting exciting again: You are sending an encrypted email.
+
+In this case, you will need Outlook (or another email program that
+supports cryptography), Kleopatra and of course the public certificate
+of the person you are correspondign with.
+
+*Note for OpenPGP:*
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}You can use Adele to practice the encryption process with
+OpenPGP; on the other hand, Adele does not support S/MIME. You can send
+the email to be encrypted to =adele at gnupp.de=. It does not
+matter what your write in your message, since Adele cannot read it.
+
+*Note for S/MIMIE:*
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}Following the installation of Gpg4win, the S/MIME
+functionality is already activated in GpgOL. If you want to turn off
+S/MIME (with GnuPG), for example to use Outlook's own S/MIME function,
+you have to deactivate the option {{{Menu(Activate S/MIME support)}}} in the
+following GpgOL option dialog under
+{{{Menu(Extras\to{}Options\to{}GpgOL)}}}:
+
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.55\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-gpgol-options_de.png]]
+
+
+
+**** Send an encrypted message
+
+First, compose a new in Outlook and address it to the person you are
+writing to.
+
+To send your message as in an encrypted form, select the item
+{{{Menu(Extras\to{}Encrypt message)}}} in the menu of the message
+window. The button with the lock icon in the tool bar is activated ---
+you can also click right on the lock.
+
+Your Outlook message windows should look something like this:
+
+# screenshot: OL composer with Adele's address and body text
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-ol-sendEncryptedMail_en.png]]
+
+Now click {{{Button(Send)}}}.
+
+# <<encryptProtocol>>
+Gpg4win will automatically detect the protocol --- OpenPGP or S/MIME
+--- of the public certificate provided by the person you are
+corresponding with.
+
+As long as there is only one certificate that matches the recipient's
+email address, your message will be encrypted and sent.
+
+
+
+**** Selecting certificates
+
+#+index: Certificate!selection
+If Kleopatra is not able to clearly
+determine a recipient certificate using the lemail address, e.g. if
+you have an OpenPGP /and/ S/MIME certificate from the person you are
+corresponding with, a selection dialog which allows you to select the
+right certificate will be displayed.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-encrypt-selectCertificate_en.png]]
+
+If Kleopatra is not able to find the public certificate of the person
+you are corresponding with, you probably have not imported it into your
+certificate administration yet (see Chapter\ref{ch:importCertificate})
+or perhaps have not authenticated it yet (for OpenPGP; see
+Chapter\ref{ch:trust}), or have not expressed your trust in the root
+certificate of the certification chain (for S/MIME, see
+Chapter\ref{sec_allow-mark-trusted}).
+
+You need the correct public certificate of your correspondence partner
+to encrypt your messages.
+
+Remember the principle in Chapter\ref{ch:FunctionOfGpg4win}:
+
+#+BEGIN_QUOTE
+  *You have to use someone's public certificate to send them an an
+  encrypted email.*
+#+END_QUOTE
+
+
+
+**** Completing the encryption process
+
+Once your message was successfully encrypted and sent, you will receive
+a confirmation message:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-encryption-successful_de.png]]
+
+*Congratulations! You have encrypted your first email!*
+
+** Signing emails
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:sign
+  :END:
+
+#+index: E-mail!sign
+
+In Chapter\ref{ch:trust} you learnt more about verifying the
+authenticity of a public OpenPGP certificate, and signing it with your
+own private OpenPGP key.
+
+This chapter also explains how to *sign* a complete *email* rather
+than only the certificate. That means applying a digital signature to
+the email --- which is a form of an electronic seal.
+
+"Sealed" in this way, the text can still be read by everyone, but it
+allows the recipient to find out whether the email was manipulated or
+modified during delivery. The signature tells the recipient that the
+message is really from you. And: If you are corresponding with someone
+whose public certificate you do not have (for whatever reason), you can
+at least "seal" the message with your own private key.
+
+#+index: Signature!digital
+You have probably noticed that this digital
+signature is not identical to an email
+"signature", which is sometimes included at the end of an email and
+includes such items as telephone number, address and website. While
+these email signatures simply function as a type of business card, a
+digital signature will protect your email from manipulation and
+clearly confirms the sender.
+
+#+index: Signature!qualified electronic
+#+index: Signature Act
+Besides, a digital signature cannot be compared with a qualified
+electronic signature, as it went into effect as part of the Signature
+Act (May 22, 2001). However, it serves exactly the
+same purpose for private or professional email communication.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.35\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/man-with-signed-key.png]]
+
+
+
+*** Signing with GpgOL
+
+In fact, signing an email is even easier than encrypting it (see
+Chapter\ref{ch:encrypt}). Once you have composed a new email, go
+through the following steps --- similar to the encryption process:
+
+-  Send message with signature
+
+-  Select certificate
+
+-  Completing the signing process
+
+These steps are described in detail on the following pages.
+
+**** Sending a signed message
+
+First, compose a new email in Outlook and address it to the person
+you are writing to.
+
+Before you send your message, tell the system that your message should
+be sent with a signature: To do this, activate the button with the
+signature pen or the menu item {{{Menu(Format\to{}Sign message)}}}.
+
+Your email window would then look something like this:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-ol-sendSignedMail_en.png]]
+
+Now click on {{{Button(Send)}}}.
+
+
+
+**** Selecting certificates
+
+Just as is the case for encrypting emails, Gpg4win automatically
+detects the protocol --- OpenPGP or S/MIME --- for which your own
+certificate (with the private key for signing) is available.
+
+If you have your own OpenPGP /and/ S/MIME certificate with the same
+email address, Kleopatra will ask you to select a protocol before the
+email is signed:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.45\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-format-choice_de.png]]
+
+If you have several certificates (e.g. two OpenPGP certificates for the
+same email address) for the selected method,Kleopatra will open a
+window which displays your certificates (here: OpenPGP), each with its
+own private key:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-sign-selectCertificate_en.png]]
+
+Confirm your selection with {{{Button(OK)}}}.
+
+
+
+**** Completing the signing process
+
+#+index: Pinentry
+In order to complete the signing process for your email, you will be
+asked to enter your secret passphrase in the following pin
+entry window:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-sign-OpenpgpPinentry_en.png]]
+
+This is required because:
+
+#+BEGIN_QUOTE
+  *You can only sign with your own private key.*
+#+END_QUOTE
+
+It makes sense, because only your own private key confirms your
+identity. The person you are corresponding with can then check your
+identity using your public certificate, which he already has or can
+obtain. Because only your private key matches your public certificate.
+
+Confirm your passphrase entry with {{{Button(OK)}}}. Your message is
+now signed and sent.
+
+Once your message has been signed successfully, the following dialog
+appears:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-sign-successful_de.png]]
+
+*Congratulations! You have encrypted your first email!*
+
+
+
+**** In short:
+
+You have learnt how to *sign* an email using your own certificate ---
+which contains your private key.
+
+You know how to *encrypt* an email using the public certificate of
+the person you are writing to.
+
+Now you are familiar with the two most important techniques for sending
+secure emails: encryption and signatures.
+
+Of course you can also combine the two techniques. From now on, each
+time you send an email, think about how you want to send it ---
+depending on the importance and required level of protection for your
+email:
+
+-  non-encrypted
+
+-  encrypted
+
+-  signed
+
+-  signed and encrypted (more on this in Section\ref{sec_encsig})
+
+You can use these four combinations with either OpenPGP or S/MIME.
+
+
+
+*** Checking signatures with GpgOL
+
+#+index: Check!signature with GpgOL
+
+Let's assume you have received a signed email from the person you are
+corresponding with.
+
+It is very easy to check this digital signature. All you need is the
+public OpenPGP or X.509 certificate of your correspondence partner. You
+should have already imported his public certificate into your
+certificate administration prior to performing this check (see
+Chapter\ref{ch:importCertificate}).
+
+To check a signed OpenPGP or S/MIME email, proceed as you would for
+decrypting an email (see Chapter\ref{ch:decrypt}):
+
+Start Outlook and open a signed email.
+
+GpgOL will automatically transfer the email to Kleopatra for a
+signature check. Kleopatra will report the result in a status dialog,
+e.g.:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-verifySignedMail_en.png]]
+
+The signature check was successful! Now close to the dialog in order to
+read the signed email.
+
+If you want to perform the check again manually, select
+{{{Menu(Extras\to{}Decrypt/Check GpgOL)}}} in the menu of the open
+email.
+
+If the signature check is not successful, it means that the message was
+changed during the delivery process. Because of the technical nature of
+the Internet, it is possible that the email was unintentionally
+modified because of a defective transmission. That is probably the most
+likely cause. However, it can also mean that the text was changed
+intentionally.
+
+Section\ref{sec_brokenSignature} has information on how to proceed in
+such a case.
+
+
+
+*** Reasons for a broken signature
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: sec_brokenSignature
+   :END:
+
+#+index: Signature!broken
+
+There are several reasons for a broken signature:
+
+If you receive the message "Bad signature" or "Check failed", it is a
+warning that your email may have been manipulated! That means that it
+is possible that someone changed the email's contents or the subject
+line.
+
+At the same time, a broken signature does not necessarily mean that the
+email was manipulated. It is also possible that the email was
+modified due to a defective transmission.
+
+In any case, you should always take a broken signature seriously and ask
+the sender to resend the email!
+
+It is recommended that you set your program to only send emails in
+"text" format and *not* in "HTML" format. However, if you decide to use
+HTML for signed or encrypted emails, it is possible that formatting
+information will be lost by the time it reaches the recipient, which can
+result in a broken signature.
+
+In Outlook 2003 and 2007, you can set the message format to
+{{{Menu(Text only)}}}
+in {{{Menu(Extras\to{}Options\to{}E-Mail Format)}}}.
+
+
+
+*** Encryption and signature
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: sec_encsig
+   :END:
+#+index: E-mail!encrypt and sign
+
+You know: A message is usually encrypted using the public certificate of
+your correspondence partner, who then decrypts the email using his
+private key.
+
+The reverse possibility --- encryption with a private key --- does not
+make sense, since the whole world knows the associated public
+certificate and could then decrypt the message.
+
+However, as you have already seen in this chapter, there is still
+another method to create a file using your private key --- namely the
+signature.
+
+A digital signature confirms the author --- because if someone
+successfully applies your public certificate to this file (the
+signature), this file could only have been encoded by your private key.
+And only you can have access to this key.
+
+You can combine both options, namely encrypting and signing the
+email:
+
+1. You *sign* the message with your own private key. This proves that
+   you are the author.
+
+2. You then *encrypt* the text using the public certificate of the
+   person you are correpsonding with.
+
+This means that the message has two security characteristics:
+
+1. Your seal on the message: the signature with your private key.
+
+2. A solid outer envelope: encryption using the public certificate of
+   the person you are corresponding with.
+
+
+Your correspondence partner opens the outer strong envelope with his own
+private key. This ensures secrecy, because only this key can be used to
+decode the text. He reads the seal with your public certificate, which
+proves that you were the author, because if your public certificate
+matches, the seal (digital signature) can only have been encoded with
+your private key.
+
+It is pretty tricky when you think about it, but also very simple.
+
+
+
+** Archiving emails in an encrypted form
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:archive
+  :END:
+#+index: E-mail!archive in encrypted form
+
+You should also archive your important --- and hence possibly encrypted
+--- emails in only one way: encrypted.
+
+Of course you can simply save a clear text version of your texts, but
+that is actually not required. If your message was supposed to be
+secret, it should not be stored on your computer in clear text.
+Therefore you should always store your encrypted sent emails in an
+/encrypted/ form!
+
+You can probably already guess the problem: To decrypt your archived
+(sent) emails, you will need the private key of the recipient --- and
+you don't or will ever have it ...
+
+So what to do?
+
+Very easy: *You also encrypt to yourself!*
+
+The message is encrypted once for the actual person you are writing to
+--- e.g. Adele --- and once more for you, using your own public
+certificate. This way, you can later make the email legible using
+your own private key.
+
+Gpg4win will automatically encrypt each encrypted message to your own
+certificate. To do this, Gpg4win uses your sender email address. If
+you have multiple certificates for an email address, you have to
+select the certificate to encrypt to during the encryption process.
+
+
+
+**** In short:
+
+1. You have encrypted an email using the public certificate of the
+   person you are corresponding with, and used it to answer him.
+
+2. Kleopatra additionally encrypts your sent encrypted emails using
+   your own public certificate, so that the messages remain legible for
+   you.
+
+\vspace{1cm}
+*And that's it! At the end of the first part of this compendium, you
+have gained a lot of introductory knowledge about Gpg4win.*
+
+*Welcome to the world of free and secure email encryption!*
+
+For an even better understanding of how Gpg4win really works in the
+background, we recommend that you read the second part of the Gpg4win
+compendium. It contains even more interesting stuff!
+
+
+* For Advanced Users
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: part:AdvancedUsers
+  :END:
+
+# This part provides background information which illustrates the basic
+# mechanisms on which Gpg4win is based, and also explains some of its
+# less commonly used capabilities. Part I and II can be used
+# independently of each other. However, to achieve an optimum
+# understanding, you should read both parts in the indicated sequence,
+# if possible.
+
+** Certificate details
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: CertificateDetails
+   :END:
+#+index: Certificate!details
+
+In Chapter [[sec_finishKeyPairGeneration]], you have already seen the
+detailed dialog for the certificate you generated. It contains a lot of
+information about your certificate. The following section provides a
+more detailed overview of the most important points, with brief
+information on the differences between OpenPGP and X.509 certificates,
+including:
+
+#+index: Certificate!User ID
+-  user ID
+
+-  fingerprints
+
+#+index: Key!ID
+-  key ID
+
+#+index: Certificate!validity
+-  validity
+
+-  trust in certificate holders *(OpenPGP only)*
+
+-  authentications *(OpenPGP only)*
+
+-  The user ID  :: consists of the name and email address which you
+   entered during the certificate creation process, e.g.
+   =Heinrich Heine <heinrich at gpg4win.de>=
+
+   For OpenPGP certificates, you can use Kleopatra to add additional
+   user IDs to your certificate using the menu
+   {{{Menu(Certificates\to{}Add user ID...)}}} menu item. This makes
+   sense if, for example, you wish to use the same certificate for
+   another email address.
+
+   Please note: Kleopatra only allows you to add user IDs for OpenPGP
+   certificates, but not X.509.
+
+-  Fingerprints :: are used to differentiate multiple certificates from
+   each other. You can use fingerprints to look for (public)
+   certificates, which are stored on a globally available OpenPGP
+   certificate server (key server) or an X.509 certificate server. You
+   can read more about certificate servers in the next chapter.
+
+-  The key ID :: consists of the last eight characters of the
+   fingerprint and fulfils the same function. While less characters make
+   it easier to handle key IDs, they also increase the risk of multiple
+   hits (different certificates with the same ID).
+
+#+index: Expiry date
+-  The validity :: of certificates describes the duration of their
+   validity and their expiry date, if applicable.
+
+   In the case of OpenPGP certificates, the validity is usually set
+   to {{{Menu(Indefinite)}}}. You can change this in Kleopatra by
+   clicking on {{{Button(Change expiry date)}}} in the certificate
+   details --- or select the
+   {{{Menu(Certificates\to{}Change expiry date)}}} and enter a new
+   date. This means that you can declare the certificate valid for
+   a limited time period, e.g. in order to issue it to outside employees.
+
+   The validity of X.509 certificates is defined by the certificate
+   authority when the certificate is issued, and cannot be changed by
+   the user.
+
+-  Trust in the certificate holder :: {{{MarginPGP}}} quantifies your
+     own subjective confidence that the owner of the OpenPGP
+     certificate is real (authentic) and that he will also correctly
+     authenticate other OpenPGP certifictes. You set the trust with
+     {{{Button(Change trust in certificate holder)}}} in the
+     certificate details, or via the
+     menu{{{Menu(Certificates\to{}Change trust status)}}} menu item.
+
+   The trust status is only relevant for OpenPGP certificates. No such
+   method exists for X.509 certificates.
+
+-  Authentications :: {{{MarginPGP}}}of your OpenPGP certificate include
+   the user IDs of those certificate holders who are convinced of the
+   authenticity of your certificate and have thus authenticated it.
+   Trust in the authenticity of your certificate increases with the
+   number of authentications you receive from other users.
+
+   Authentications are only relevant to OpenPGP certificates. This type
+   of trust mechanism does not exist for X.509 certificates.
+
+You do not necessarily have to know the certificate details to use
+Gpg4win on a daily basis, but they do become relevant when you want to
+receive or change new certificates.
+
+You already learnt how to inspect and authenticate someone else's
+certificate and about the "Web of Trust" in Chapter\ref{ch:trust}.
+
+
+
+** The certificate server
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:keyserver
+  :END:
+#+index: Certificate server
+#+index: Key server|see Certificate server
+
+Section\ref{sec_publishPerKeyserver} already provided a lot of
+information on how to use a certificate server to publish your public
+(OpenPGP or X.509) certificate. This section will take a closer look at
+certificate servers, and will show you how to use them with Kleopatra.
+
+Key servers can be used by all programs that support the standards
+OpenPGP or X.509. Kleopatra supports both types, hence both OpenPGP as
+well as X.509 certificate servers.
+
+#+index: Certificate server!OpenPGP
+#+index: Denial of Service
+ - OpenPGP certificate servers :: {{{MarginPGP}}} (also called /key
+      server/) are organized on a decentralised basis and synchronize
+      each other on a global basis. There are no current statistics
+      about their number of how many OpenPGP certificates they
+      contain. This shared network of OpenPGP certificate servers
+      provides better availability and prevents individual system
+      administrators from deleting certificates which would make
+      secure communication impossible ("Denial of Service" attack).
+
+      #+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+      [[file:images-compendium/keyserver-world.png]]
+
+#+index: Certificate server!X.509
+#+index: LDAP
+ -  X.509 certificate servers :: {{{MarginCMS}}} are generally made
+      available by the certificate authorities via LDAP and are
+      sometimes also described as directory services for X.509
+      certificates.
+
+
+
+*** Key server configuration
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: configureCertificateServer
+   :END:
+#+index: Certificate server!set up
+
+Open the configuration dialog in Kleopatra:
+{{{Menu(Settings\to{}Configure~Kleopatra...)}}}
+
+Now set up a new certificate server under the group
+{{{Menu(Directory~Services)}}} by clicking on the {{{Menu(New)}}}
+button. Select between {{{Menu(OpenPGP)}}} or {{{Menu(X.509)}}}.
+
+In {{{Menu(OpenPGP)}}}, a default OpenPGP certificate server with the server
+address =hkp://keys.gnupg.net= (Port: 11371, Protokoll: hkp)
+will be added to the list. You can use this server without making any
+changes --- or you can use one of the suggested OpenPGP server addresses
+on the next page.
+
+For {{{Menu(X.509)}}} you will see the following default settings for an
+X.509 certificate server: (Protokoll: ldap, Servername: server,
+Server-Port: 389). Complete the information on the server name and basic
+DN of your X.509 certificate server and check the server port.
+
+If your certificate server requires a user name and password, activate
+the option {{{Menu(Requires user authentication)}}} and enter the required
+information.
+
+The screenshot below shows a configured OpenPGP certificate server:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-configureKeyserver_en.png]]
+
+Confirm the configuration by pressing {{{Button(OK)}}}. You have successfully
+configured your certificate server.
+
+To ensure that you have correctly configured the certificate server, it
+is helpful to start e.g. a certificate search on the server (for
+instructions, see Section\ref{searchAndImportCertificateFromServer}).
+
+#+index: Proxy
+*Proxy setting:* If you use a proxy in your
+network, you should add the parameter
+=http-proxy=<proxydomain>= to the certificate server address in
+the {{{Menu(Server name)}}} column. The full server name could therefore look
+as follows:
+=keys.gnupg.net http-proxy=proxy.hq=
+You can also review and if necessary correct the certificate server
+configurations in the file:
+=\%APPDATA\%\gnupg\gpg.conf=
+
+Explanations regarding the system-wide configuration of X.509 key
+servers can be found in Section\ref{x509CertificateServers}.
+
+**** OpenPGP certificate server addresses
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}We recommend that you only use up-to-date OpenPGP
+certificate servers, since only they can handle the newer OpenPGP
+characteristics.
+
+Here is a selection of well-functioning certificate servers:
+
+-  hkp://pks.gpg.cz
+
+-  hkp://pgp.cns.ualberta.ca
+
+-  hkp://minsky.surfnet.nl
+
+-  hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com
+
+-  hkp://keyserver.pramberger.at
+
+-  http://keyserver.pramberger.at
+
+-  http://gpg-keyserver.de
+
+If you have problems with your firewall, it is best to try certificate
+servers whose URL begins with: =http://=
+
+The certificate servers under the addresses
+
+-  [[hkp://keys.gnupg.net]] (Kleopatra pre-selection, see screenshot on
+   previous page)
+
+-  http://http-keys.gnupg.net
+
+are a collection point for an entire network of these servers; a
+concrete server will be selected randomly.
+
+*Attention:* Do not use =ldap://keyserver.pgp.com= as a
+certificate server, since it does synchronize with other servers
+(Status: May 2010).
+
+
+
+*** Search and import certificates from certificate servers
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: searchAndImportCertificateFromServer
+   :END:
+#+index: Certificate server!search for certificates
+#+index: Certificate!import
+
+Once you have configured at least one certificate server, you can now
+look for and import certificates.
+
+To do this, in Kleopatra click on {{{Menu(File\to{}Search for
+certificates on server...)}}}.
+
+You will see a search dialog with an input field into which you can
+enter the name of the certificate holder --- or ideally --- the email
+address of his certificate.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-certificateSearchOnKeyserver_en.png]]
+
+To view the details of a selected certificate, click on the button
+{{{Button(Details...)}}}.
+
+If you wish to add one of the certificates you have found into your
+local certificate collection, select the certificate from a list of
+search results and click on {{{Button(Import)}}}.
+
+Kleopatra will subsequently display a dialog with the import results.
+Confirm with {{{Button(OK)}}}.
+
+If the import was successful, you will see the selected certificate in
+Kleopatra's certificate administration.
+
+*** Export certificates to OpenPGP certificate servers
+
+#+index: Certificate!export
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}If you have configured an OpenPGP certificate server as
+described in Section \ref{configureCertificateServer}, a click of your
+mouse will send your public OpenPGP certificate around the world.
+
+Select your OpenPGP certificate in Kleopatra and then click on the menu
+item {{{Menu(File\to{}Export certificate to server...)}}}.
+
+You only need to send your certificate to any of the available OpenPGP
+certificate servers, since almost all of these will synchronize on a
+global level. It may take one to two days until your OpenPGP certificate
+is actually available worldwide, but then you will have a ``global"
+certificate.
+
+If you export your certificate without first having configured an
+OpenPGP certificate server, Kleopatra will suggest the default server
+=hkp://keys.gnupg.net=.
+
+
+
+** Encrypting file attachments
+
+#+index: Encrypting file attachments
+
+If you want to send an encrypted email and attach files, you
+generally also want your attachments to be encrypted.
+
+Where GnuPG is well integrated into your email program, attachments
+should be treated just like the actual text of your email, hence they
+should be signed, encrypted or both.
+
+*GpgOL automatically assumes the encryption and signing of attachments.*
+
+In the case of encryption tools that are not as well integrated into an
+email program, you have to be careful: Attachments are often sent
+along in uncrypted form.
+
+What to do in such a case? Easy: you encrypt the attachment separately
+and then attach it to the email. Therefore this is no different from
+simply encrypting files, as described in Chapter\ref{ch:EncFiles}.
+
+
+
+** Signing and encrypting files
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:EncFiles
+  :END:
+#+index: GpgEX
+
+You can use Gpg4win for signing and encrypting not just emails, but
+also individual files. The principle is the same:
+
+-  You *sign* a file using your private certificate, to ensure that the
+   file cannot be modified.
+
+-  Then *encrypt* the file using a public certificate, to prevent
+   unauthorized persons from seeing it.
+
+Using the application *GpgEX*, you can sign or encrypt files out of
+Windows Explorer --- with both OpenPGP or S/MIME. This chapter shows you
+exactly how this works.
+
+If you are sending a file as an email attachment, e.g. GpgOL will
+automatically look after signing and encrypting your file together with
+your email. You do not have to do anything else.
+
+
+
+*** Signing and checking files
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: sec_signFile
+   :END:
+#+index: File!sign
+
+When signing a file, you are mainly concerned about making sure it is
+not changed, rather than keeping it secret (Integrity).
+#+index: Integrity
+
+Signing is very easy using *GpgEX* from the Windows Explorer context
+menu. Select one or more files or folders and use the right mouse key to
+select the context menu:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.3\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-gpgex-contextmenu-signEncrypt_de.png]]
+
+You will see the {{{Menu(Sign and encrypt)}}} menu.
+
+In the following window, select the option {{{Menu(Sign)}}}:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-signFile1_en.png]]
+
+#+index: ASCII armor
+If required, you can also use the option
+{{{Menu(Output as text (ASCII armor)}}}.
+The signature file will receive the file
+ending =.asc= (OpenPGP) or =.pem= (S/MIME). These file
+types can be opened with any text editor --- you will however only see
+the numbers and letters you have already seen before.
+
+If this option is not selected, the signature will be created with the
+ending =.sig= (OpenPGP) or =.p7s= (S/MIME). These
+files are binary files, and they cannot be viewed in a text editor.
+
+Then click on {{{Button(Next)}}}.
+
+In the following dialog --- if not already selected by default
+--- select your private (OpenPGP or S/MIME) certificate with which you
+want to sign the file.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-signFile2_en.png]]
+
+Now confirm your selection with {{{Button(Sign)}}}.
+
+Enter your passphrase in the pin entry dialog.
+
+Once the signing process has completed successfully, the
+following window appears:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-signFile3_en.png]]
+
+You have now successfully signed the file.
+
+A "separate" signature is always used to sign a file. That means that
+your file that is to be signed will remain unchanged and a second file
+with the actual signature will be created. To verify the signature later
+on, you will need both files.
+
+The example below shows which new file you will receive if you sign your
+selected file (here =<dateiname>.txt=) using OpenPGP or S/MIME.
+There are four possible resulting file types:
+
+- OpenPGP ::
+   =<filename>.txt \to{} <filename>.txt\textbf{.sig}=
+   =<filename>.txt \to{} <filename>.txt\textbf{.asc}=
+   \small(output as text/ASCII-armor) \normalsize
+
+- S/MIME ::
+   =<filename>.txt \to{} <filename>.txt\textbf{.p7s}=
+   =<filename>.txt \to{} <filename>.txt\textbf{.pem}=
+   \small{ (output as text/ASCII-armor)} \normalsize
+
+
+
+**** Checking a signature
+
+#+index: File!check signature
+
+Now check the integrity of the file that has just been signed, i.e.
+check that it is correct!
+
+To check for integrity and authenticity, the signature file --- hence
+the file with the ending =.sig=, =.asc=,
+=.p7s= or =.pem= --- and the signed original file
+(original file) must be in the same file folder. Select the signature
+file and select the entry {{{Menu(Decrypt and check)}}} from the Windows
+Explorer context menu:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.3\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-gpgex-contextmenu-verifyDecrypt_de]]
+
+You will see the following window:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-verifyFile1_en.png]]
+
+Under {{{Menu(Enter file)}}}, Kleopatra shows the full path to your
+selected signature file.
+
+The option {{{Menu(Input file is a separate signature)}}} is activated
+since you have signed your original file (here: {{{Menu(Signed
+file)}}}) with the input file. Kleopatra will automatically find the
+associated signed original file in the same file folder.
+
+The same path is also automatically selected for the {{{Menu(Ouput
+folder)}}}. It only becomes relevant however once you are processing
+more than one file simultaneously.
+
+Confirm the operations with {{{Button(Decrypt/Check)}}}.
+
+Following a successful check of the signature, the following window
+appears:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-verifyFile2_en.png]]
+
+The result shows that the signature is correct --- therefore you can
+be sure that the file's integrity has been preserved and therefore the
+file has *not* been modified.
+
+Even if only one character is added to the original file, or
+is deleted or modified, the signature will be shown as having been
+broken (Kleopatra displays the result as a red warning):
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-verifyFile2a-badSignature_en.png]]
+
+
+*** Encrypting and decrypting files
+
+#+index: File!encrypt
+
+Files can be signed and encrypted just like emails. You should
+practice it once more in the following section using GpgEX and
+Kleopatra.
+
+Select one (or more) file(s) and open the context menu using your right
+mouse key:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.3\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-gpgex-contextmenu-signEncrypt_de.png]]
+
+Select {{{Menu(Sign and encrypt)}}} again.
+
+You will see the already familiar dialog from signing a file
+(see also section\ref{sec_signFile}).
+
+In the top field, select the option {{{Menu(Encrypt)}}}:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-encryptFile1_en.png]]
+
+
+You should only change the encryption settings if this is required:
+
+#+index: ASCII armor
+-  Output as text (ASCII armor): :: When you activate
+   this option, you will obtain the encrypted file with the file ending
+   =.asc= (OpenPGP) or =.pem= (S/MIME). These file
+   types can be opened with any text editor --- but you will only see
+   the mixture of letters and characters you have already seen before.
+
+   If this option is not selected, the system will create an encrypted
+   file with the ending =.gpg= (OpenPGP) or =.p7m=
+   (S/MIME). These files are binary files, so they cannot be viewed with
+   a text editor.
+
+-  Delete unencrypted original: :: If this option is activated, the
+   selected original file will be deleted after encryption.
+
+Click on {{{Button(Next)}}}.
+
+Who should the file be encrypted for? Select one or more
+recipient certificates in the next dialog:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-encryptFile2_en.png]]
+
+To make your selection, choose the required certificates in the top
+portion and press {{{Button(Add)}}}. You will see all selected certificates
+in the lower dialog portion for review purposes.
+
+Depending on the selected recipient certificate and its type (OpenPGP or
+S/MIME), your file is then encrypted using OpenPGP and/or S/MIME. So if
+you selected an OpenPGP certificate /and / an S/MIME certificate, you
+will receive two encrypted files. The possible file types for the
+encrypted files are found on the next page.
+
+
+Now click on {{{Button(Encrypt)}}}: The file is encrypted.
+
+After a successful encryption, the results window should look
+something like this:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-encryptFile3_en.png]]
+
+That's it! You have successfully encrypted your file!
+
+
+Similar to signing a file, the result will depend on the selected
+encryption method (OpenPGP or S/MIME). An encryption of your original
+file (here =<filename>.txt=) can result in four possible file
+types:
+
+-  OpenPGP: ::
+   =<filename>.txt \to{} <filename>.txt\textbf{.gpg}=
+   =<filename>.txt \to{} <filename>.txt\textbf{.asc}=
+   \small(for output as text/ASCII-armor) \normalsize
+
+-  S/MIME: ::
+   =<filename>.txt \to{} <filename>.txt\textbf{.p7m}=
+   =<filename>.txt \to{} <filename>.txt\textbf{.pem}=
+   \small{ (for output as text/ASCII-armor)} \normalsize
+
+You now forward one of these four possible encrypted files to your
+selected recipient. In contrast to signing a file, the unencrypted
+original file is of course *not* forwarded.
+
+
+
+**** Decrypting a file
+
+#+index: File!decrypt Now you can decrypt the previously encrypted file
+for test purposes.
+
+To this end, you should also have encrypted to your own certificate
+during the previous encryption process --- otherwise you cannot decrypt
+the file with your private key (see Chapter\ref{ch:archive}).
+
+Select the encrypted file --- hence one that ends with =.gpg=, =.asc=,
+=.p7m= or =.pem= --- and select the entry {{{Menu(Decrypt and check)}}} in
+the Windows Explorer context menu:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.3\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-gpgex-contextmenu-verifyDecrypt_de]]
+
+If you like, you can still change the output folder in the
+following decryption dialog.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-decryptFile1_en.png]]
+
+Click on {{{Button(Decrypt/Check)}}}.
+
+Then enter your passphrase.
+
+The result shows that the decryption was successful:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.85\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-decryptFile2_en.png]]
+
+You should now be able to easily read the decrypted file or use it with
+a corresponding program.
+
+
+
+**** In short
+
+You have learnt how to do the following using GpgEX:
+
+-  sign files
+
+-  check signed files
+
+-  encrypt files
+
+-  decrypt files
+
+**** Simultaneous encryption and signature
+
+You have probably already noticed this option in the corresponding
+dialogs. If you select it, GpgEX will combine both tasks in one step.
+
+Please ensure that /signatures are applied first/, before the encryption
+process.
+
+The signature is therefore always encrypted at the same time. It can
+only be viewed and checked by those who have successfully decrypted the
+file.
+
+If you want to sign /and/ encrypt the file, you can only do it with
+OpenPGP at this time.
+
+
+
+** Importing and exporting a private certificate
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:ImExport
+  :END:
+
+#+index: Key!pair
+Chapters \ref{ch:publishCertificate} and \ref{ch:importCertificate}
+explained the import and export of certificates. You exported your own
+certificate in order to publish it, and you have imported the
+certificate of your correspondence partner and thus attached it to your
+"key ring" (i.e. accepted it into your certificate
+administration).
+
+This process always referred to *public* keys. However, sometimes it is
+also necessary to import or export a *private* key. For example, if you
+wish to continue to use an already existing (OpenPGP or S/MIME) key pair
+with Gpg4win, you have to import it. Or, if you want to use Gpg4win from
+another computer, the entire key pair has to be transferred to that
+computer --- the public and private key.
+
+
+
+*** Export
+
+#+index: Certificate!export
+
+You must make up a backup copy using Kleopatra anytime you transfer a
+private certificate to another computer or want to save it to another
+hard drive partition or backup medium.
+
+You may have already set up such a backup copy at the end of your
+OpenPGP certificate creation process. Since your OpenPGP certificate may
+have received additional authentications in the meantinme, you should
+back it up again if applicable.
+
+Open Kleopatra, select your own certificate click on
+{{{Menu(File\to{}Export private certificate)}}}.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.6\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-openpgp-exportSecretKey_de.png]]
+
+Select the path and the file name of the output file. The file type is
+set automatically. Depending on whether you want to export a private
+OpenPGP or S/MIME key, the file ending =.gpg= (OpenPGP) or
+=.p12= (S/MIME)will be selected by default. These are binary
+files which contain your encrypted certificate (including the private
+key).
+
+#+index: ASCII armor
+When you activate the option
+{{{Menu(ASCII-protected (ASCII armor)}}},
+the file ending =.asc= (OpenPGP) or
+=.pem= (S/MIME) will be selected. These file types can be
+opened with any text editor --- but you will only see the "mess" of
+numbers and characters that we have already seen before.
+
+If this option is not selected, an encrypted file with the ending
+=.gpg= (OpenPGP) or =.p12= (S/MIME) will be created.
+These files are binary files, so they cannot be viewed with a text
+editor.
+
+Kleopatra stores both key parts --- private and public --- in *one*
+private certificate.
+
+*Attention:* Please handle this file very carefully. It contains your
+private key and therefore information that is critical to security!
+
+
+
+*** Import
+
+#+index: Certificate!import
+
+To import your previously exported private certificate into Kleopatra,
+proceed as you would for importing other public certificates (see
+Chapter\ref{ch:importCertificate}):
+
+Click on {{{Menu(File\to{}Import certificate...)}}} and select the
+file to be imported. If it concerns a PKCS12 file (e.g. type
+=.p12=), the system will first ask you for a passphrase to
+unlock the private key:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-pinentry-p12-import-a_en.png]]
+
+Now enter the prassphrase --- which could also be a new one --- that is
+used to protect your private key after the import is complete:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-pinentry-p12-import-b_en.png]]
+
+Repeat the passphrase entry. If your passphrase is too short or consist
+only of letters, the system will give you a corresponding warning.
+
+Following a successful import, an information window
+displaying the results of the import process will appear; here is an
+example of a private OpenPGP certificate:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.6\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-kleopatra-import-openpgp-secret-key_en.png]]
+
+Kleopatra has imported both the private as well as the public key from
+the backup file. Your certificate can be found in "My certificates" in
+Kleoatra's certificate administration.
+
+Please also save the backup copy of your private certificate --- if
+possible on a physically secured (e.g. in a vault) external medium. Then
+delete it from your hard drive and also remember to remove the deleted
+file from your "recycling bin". Otherwise this file poses a great
+security risk for your secret email encryption.
+
+{{{MarginPGP}}}There may be cases when you are not able to import a
+certificate exported with PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy"). This is because
+some PGP versions use an algorithm (IDEA) which cannot be supported by
+GnuPG for legal reasons.
+
+To take care of this problem, simply change the passphrase in PGP and
+export/import the OpenPGP certificate again. If this also does not work,
+set the passphrase in PGP to "empty", that is, no protection, and
+export/import again --- in this case you must ensure that you have
+*securely deleted the file* and then *set up a new real passphrase* in
+PGP and Gpg4win.
+
+*Congratulations! You have successfully exported and reimported your key
+pair.*
+
+
+
+** System-wide configuration and pre-population for \protect{S/MIME}
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:smime-configuration
+  :END:
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}As part of a central software distribution or environments
+in which many users are working on one computer, it makes sense to set
+up some system-wide specifications and pre-populations for Gpg4win.
+
+This relates particularly to S/MIME, because in the case of specified
+chains of trust it makes sense that users share the information.
+
+Some typical system-wide settings include:
+
+#+index: Trustworthy root certificates
+#+index: Root certificates
+ - Trustworthy root certificates ::
+   To avoid a situation where each user must
+   search and install the required root certificates, and check and
+   authenticate the trustworthiness of the same (see Section
+   \ref{sec_allow-mark-trusted}), it is useful to install a system-wide
+   pre-population of the most important root certificates.
+
+   To this end, the root certificates should be saved --- as described
+   in Section \ref{trustedrootcertsdirmngr} --- and the trustworthy root
+   certificates should be defined --- as described in Section
+   \ref{sec_systemtrustedrootcerts}.
+
+#+index: Certificate!CA
+ - Directly available CA certificates ::  To save
+   users from searching and importing the certificates of certificate
+   authorities, it also makes sense to pre-populate the system with the
+   most important CA certificates. For a description, see Section
+   \ref{extracertsdirmngr}.
+
+#+index: Proxy
+#+index: Certificate Revocation Lists
+#+index: CRLs|see Certificate Revocation Lists
+#+index: OSCP
+#+index: LDAP
+#+index: HTTP
+#+index: Directory Manager|see DirMngr
+#+index: DirMngr
+ - Proxy for certificate server and certificate revocation list searches ::
+      Internal networks cannot permit individual computers to directly
+      connect to the outside (central firewall), but can provide an
+      acting service, a so-called "proxy". DirMngr can also handle
+      HTTP and LDAP proxies.
+
+      With respect to validity information, X.509 protocols offer
+      different options. Most certification agencies publish
+      certificate revocation lists (also described as CRLs , supported
+      as per RFC5280) and OSCP (as per RFC2560). OSCP has more recent
+      information, but with the disadvantage that network traffic
+      occurs all the way to the OSCP service, and it is therefore
+      possible to see with whom messages are being exchanged. GnuPG
+      can work with both options; component "DirMngr" that runs as the
+      system-wide service.
+
+      S/MIME certificates usually contain information on where your
+      certificate revocation list can be picked up
+      externally. Oftentimes it includes HTTP, but also directory
+      services via LDAP.  In contrast to OpenPGP, the
+      client cannot pick where to pick up the certificate revocation
+      list, but has to follow the available information. Since some
+      certificates only provide certificate revocation lists via LDAP,
+      it is necessary to allow both HTTP as well as LDAP queries to
+      the outside. If possible, an acting service can ensure, at the
+      content level, that only X.509 certificate revocation lists with
+      correct information are transmitted.
+
+   If your network requires a proxy for the HTTP and HKP or LDAP queries
+   required for OpenPGP or S/MIME, please follow these steps:
+
+   1. Set the X.509 certificate server search to a proxy, as described
+      in Section\ref{x509CertificateServers}.
+
+   2. Set the certificate revocation list search to a proxy, also
+      described in Section\ref{x509CertificateServers}.
+
+   3. Restart the DirMngr (see Section\ref{dirmngr-restart}).
+
+
+
+** Known problems and help
+
+#+index: Troubleshooting
+
+*** GpgOL menus and dialogs no longer found in Outlook
+
+#+index: Outlook It may happen that the menus and dialogs added to
+Outlook by GpgOL can no longer be found.
+
+This may be due to a technical problem that caused Outlook to deactivate
+the GpgOL component.
+
+Reactivate GpgOL via the Outlook menu:
+Outlook2007: {{{Menu(?\to{}Deactivated components)}}}
+Outlook2003: {{{Menu(?\to{}Info\to{}Deactivated components)}}}
+
+To (de)activate GpgOL manually, use Outlook's add-in manager:
+
+-  *Outlook2003:*
+   {{{Menu(Extras\to{}Options\to{}Other\to{}Advanced options...\to{}Add-In manager...)}}}
+
+-  *Outlook2007:* {{{Menu(Extras\to{}Trust relations
+           Center\to{}Add-Ins)}}} --- then select {{{Menu(Exchange ---
+           Client extensions)}}} under {{{Menu(Manage)}}} and click on
+           {{{Button(Go~to...)}}}.
+
+*** GpgOL buttons are not on the Outlook 2003 toolbar
+
+If there are already a lot of buttons on the toolbar of the message
+window, Outlook 2003 will not necessarily display GpgOL's
+signature/encryption icons.
+
+You can display these buttons by clicking on the small icon with the
+arrow pointing downwards on the tool bar ({{{Menu(Options for toolbar)}}}):
+You will see an overview of all non-displayed buttons. Clicking on an
+entry will move it into the visible area of the toolbar.
+
+*** GpgOL button are listed unter "Add-Ins" (Outlook 2007)
+
+Outlook 2007 introduced the so-called "ribbon" interface. This
+multi-functional bar in the Outlook message window has different tabs.
+The GpgOL buttons (for encryption, signatures etc.) are organised under
+the "Add-Ins" tab; Outlook saves all buttons of extensions in that
+location. It is not possible to integrate the GpgOL buttons under
+"Messages", for example.
+
+You can adjust your {{{Menu(tool bar for quick access)}}} and add the toolbar
+commands of the Add-Ins tab.
+
+*** Errors when starting GpgOL
+
+If you have first installed Gpg4win (and hence the GpgOL program
+component) on a drive, then uninstalled it and re-installed it on
+another drive? If yes, it is possible that Outlook will continue to
+search for the GpgOL path on the first (old) drive.
+
+This means that the GpgOL program extension is no longer started when
+Outlook starts, and the following error message appears:
+
+/The extension =old path to gpgol.dll= could not be installed or
+loaded/
+
+The problem can be solved by using 'Detect and repair' in Help, among
+other things.}
+
+You can solve this problem by resetting the internal Outlook (cached)
+program extension path. To do this, please delete the following file:
+
+  : %APPDATA%\Lokale Einstellungen\Application data\ ↩
+  : Microsoft\Outlook\extend.dat
+
+*Outlook should not be running during this process.* Then restart
+Outlook, and it should work fine with GpgOL.
+
+*** Installation of Gpg4win on a virtual drive
+
+Please note that it is not possible to install Gpg4win on a *virtual
+drive* simulated with the command =subst=. These virtual drives
+can only be used locally by the current user. System services, such as
+DirMngr, do not see these drives. Therefore the installation path is not
+valid --- the installation will stop with error type
+=error:StartService: ec=3=. Please install Gpg4win on a drive
+that is available across the system.
+
+*** GpgOL does not check "CryptoEx" InlinePGP emails
+
+#+index: CryptoEx
+
+To check or decrypt signed or encrypted InlinePGP email(s) sent by
+the Outlook program extension "CryptoEx", S/MIME support must be
+activated in the GpgOL options.
+
+Make sure that the following option is active in Outlook under
+{{{Menu(Extras\to{}Options\to{}GpgOL)}}}:
+{{{Menu(Activate S/MIME support)}}}.
+
+
+
+*** Does not allow S/MIME operations (system service "DirMngr" not running)
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: dirmngr-restart
+   :END:
+#+index: DirMngr
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}The "Directory Manager" (DirMngr) is a service installed by
+Gpg4win, which manages access to certificate servers. One task of the
+DirMngr is to load certificate revocation lists (CRLs) for S/MIME
+certificates.
+
+It is possible that S/MIME operations (signature creation and check,
+encryption and decryption) cannot be performed because DirMngr is not
+available. Therefore Gpg4win default settings must ensure that DirMngr
+checks the revocation lists --- if this is not done, the operation
+cannot be performed, since it means the potential use of a compromised
+certificate.
+
+To address this problem, the system administrator restarts
+DirMngr. This is done via {{{Menu(System
+control\to{}Administration\to{}Services)}}}. You will see DirMngr in
+the list --- and the service can be restarted via the context menu.
+
+*** S/MIME operations not allowed (CRLs not available)
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: smime-problem-crl
+   :END:
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}It is possible that S/MIME operations (signature
+creation and check, encryption and decryption) cannot be performed
+because the CRLs are not available. Therefore Gpg4win default settings
+must ensure that revocation lists are checked --- if this is not done,
+the operation cannot be performed, since it means the potential use of
+a compromised certificate.
+
+Help is provided by setting up an acting service ("proxies")for picking
+up revocation lists (see Section \ref{x509CertificateServers}).
+
+In an emergency (or for testing purposes, CRL checks can also be turned
+off. To do this, open the Kleopatra menu
+{{{Menu(Settings\to{}Set up Kleopatra)}}} and then the group
+{{{Menu(S/MIME check)}}}. Activate the option {{{Menu(Never consult
+recovation lists)}}}.
+*Attention:* Be aware that this also means that you run a higher risk of
+using a compromised certificate. Turning off the revocation list check
+is never a substitute for setting up a proxy.
+
+*** S/MIME operations not allowed (root certificate is not trustworthy)
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: smime-problem-rootcertificate
+   :END:
+#+index: Root certificates
+#+index: Certificate!chain
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}The respective root certificate must be trusted for a full
+review of X.509 certificate chains. Otherwise
+it is not possible to perform S/MIME operations (signature creation and
+check, encryption and decryption).
+
+To express your trust in a root certificate, you have two options.
+
+-  Write the fingerprint of the corresponding root certificate in a
+   /system-wide/ configuration file. Now the root is trustworthy for all
+   users. To do this, you must have Windows administrator rights. For a
+   detailed description, see Section\ref{sec_systemtrustedrootcerts}.
+
+-  Root certificate set by user (no system-wide adjustment required). To
+   do this, you must mark the option {{{Menu(Allow
+           marking of root certificates as trustworthy)}}} in Kleopatra's
+   settings. After that, every time you import a new root certificate,
+   you will be asked whether you trust it. For more details, see
+   Section\ref{sec_allow-mark-trusted}.
+
+
+
+** Files and settings in Gpg4win
+
+*** Personal user settings
+
+The personal settings for each user are found in the file folder:
+=%APPDATA%\gnupg=. Often, this is the following folder:
+=C:\Documents and settings\<name>\Application data\gnupg\=
+
+Please note that this is a hidden file folder. To make it visible, you
+have to activate the option {{{Menu(Show all files and folders)}}} under the
+group {{{Menu(Hidden files and folders)}}} in the tab {{{Menu(View)}}} of the
+Explorer {{{Menu(Extras\to{}Folder options)}}} menu
+
+This file folder contains all personal GnuPG data, hence private keys,
+certificates, trust settings and configurations. This folder is /not/
+deleted when Gpg4win is uninstalled. Please ensure that you make regular
+backup copies of this folder.
+
+*** Cached certificate revocation lists
+
+#+index: Certificate Revocation Lists
+#+index: DirMngr
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}The system-wide service Mngr (Directory Manager)
+also checks whether an X.509 certificate is blocked and
+can therefore not be used. To this end, certificate revocation lists
+(CRLs) are picked up from the issuing offices for the certificates (CAs)
+and cached for the duration of the validity period.
+
+The lists are saved under:
+
+  : C:\Documents and Settings\LocalService\Lokale Settings\ ↩
+  : Application data\GNU\cache\dirmngr\crls.d\
+
+These are /protected/ files, which Explorer does not display by default.
+However, if you wish to show these files, deactivate the option
+{{{Menu(Hide protected system files)}}} in the Window Explorer {{{Menu(View)}}}
+settings.
+
+No changes should be made to this file folder.
+
+
+*** Trustworthy root certificates from DirMngr
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: trustedrootcertsdirmngr
+   :END:
+#+index: DirMngr
+#+index: Trustworthy root certificates
+#+index: Root certificates
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}For a full review of X.509 certificates, you must trust the
+root certificates which were used to sign the revocation lists.
+
+The root certificates which the DirMngr should trust across the entire
+system when performing its checks are stored in the following file
+folder:
+
+  : C:\Documents and settings\All Users\Application data\ ↩
+  : GNU\etc\dirmngr\trusted-certs\
+
+*Important:* The corresponding root certificates must be available as
+files in DER format in the above file folder, with the file name
+=.crt= or =.der=.
+
+The DirMngr runs as a system-wide service and must be restarted if
+changes have been made to the "trusted certs" file folder. Afterwards,
+the root certificates saved in this folder are set to *trustworthy* for
+all users.
+
+Please also see Section \ref{sec_systemtrustedrootcerts} in order to
+completely trust root certificates (system-wide).
+
+*** Other certificates from DirMngr
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: extracertsdirmngr
+   :END:
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}Since the X.509 certificate chain must be checked prior to a
+cryptography operation, the corresponding certificate of the
+authentication instance ("Certificate Authority", CA) must also be
+checked.
+
+For immediate availability, CA certificates can be saved in this
+(system-wide) file folder:
+
+  : C:\Documents and settings\All Users\Application data\ ↩
+  : GNU\lib\dirmngr\extra-certs\
+
+Certificates that are not available here and/or not available from users
+must automatically be loaded by X.509 certificate servers.
+These CA certificates can also be imported manually by a user however.
+
+It makes sense to store the most important CA certificates in this
+folder as part of system-wide specifications.
+
+
+
+*** System-wide configuration for use of external X.509 certificate servers
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: x509CertificateServers
+   :END:
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}GnuPG can be configured in such a way that allows the system
+to search for missing X.509 certificates or certificate revocation lists
+on external X.509 certificate servers (see also Chapter
+\ref{ch:smime-configuration}).
+
+To conduct a *X.509 certificate search*, the system service DirMngr uses
+a list of certificate servers which can be entered in the file
+
+  : C:\Documents and settings\All Users\Application data\ ↩
+  : GNU\etc\dirmngr\ldapservers.conf
+
+These certificate servers are used for all users (system-wide). In
+addition, users can also set up additional user-specific certificate
+servers for certificate searches --- e.g. directly via Kleopatra (see
+Chapter\ref{configureCertificateServer}).
+
+The exact syntax for certificate server entries in the aforementioned
+configuration file is as follows:
+
+  : HOSTNAME:PORT:USERNAME:PASSWORD:BASE\_DN
+
+#+index: Proxy
+If access to external X.509 certificate servers is blocked by firewalls
+in the internal network, it is also possible to configure a proxy
+service in =ldapservers.conf= for transmitting the
+certificate search, as illustrated in the following sample line:
+
+=proxy.mydomain.example:389:::O=myorg,C=de=
+
+#+index: Certificate Revocation Lists
+With respect to a search of *Certificate Revocation
+Lists* (CRLs), the same directory
+contains a configuration file from:
+
+  : C:\Documents and settings\All Users\Application data\ ↩
+  : GNU\etc\dirmngr\dirmngr.conf
+
+Please note that only administrators can write in this file.
+
+You can add the following proxy options to this configuration file (each
+option in a row):
+
+#+index: HTTP
+ - =http-proxy HOST[:PORT]= :: This option uses =HOST= and =PORT= for
+      accessing the certificate server. The environment variable
+      =http_proxy= will be overwritten if this option is activated.
+
+   Example:
+   : http-proxy http://proxy.mydomain.example:8080
+
+#+index: LDAP
+ - =ldap-proxy HOST[:PORT]= :: This option uses =HOST= and =PORT= for
+      accessing the certificate server. If no port number is listed,
+      the standard LDAP port 389 will be used. This option will
+      overwrite the LDAP URL contained in the certificate, or will use
+      =HOST= and =PORT= if no LDAP URL has been entered.
+
+ - =only-ldap-proxy= :: This option ensures that DirMngr only uses the
+      proxy configured under =ldap-proxy=. Because otherwise DirMngr
+      will try to use other configured certificate servers, if the
+      connection via =ldap-proxy= is not successful.
+
+
+*** System-wide trustworthy root certificates
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: sec_systemtrustedrootcerts
+   :END:
+#+index: Root certificates
+#+index: trustlist.txt
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}}The pre-populated root certificates which are deemed as
+trustworthy for the entire system are defined in the file:
+
+  : C:\Documents and settings\All Users\Application data\ ↩
+  : GNU\etc\gnupg\trustlist.txt
+
+To mark a root certificate as trustworthy, the corresponding fingerprint
+of the certificate, followed by an empty space and a large =S=
+must be entered into the above file. A certificate is explicitly marked
+as not trustworthy if the row beings with the prefix "=!=". You
+can also enter multiple root certificates. In that case, please ensure
+that each fingerprint is located in a new row. A row that begins with
+=#= will be treated as a comment and ignored.
+
+Important: The end of the file must be followed by an empty row.
+
+An example:
+
+#+BEGIN_EXAMPLE
+    # CN=Wurzel ZS 3,O=Intevation GmbH,C=DE
+    A6935DD34EF3087973C706FC311AA2CCF733765B S
+
+    # CN=PCA-1-Verwaltung-02/O=PKI-1-Verwaltung/C=DE
+    DC:BD:69:25:48:BD:BB:7E:31:6E:BB:80:D3:00:80:35:D4:F8:A6:CD S
+
+    # CN=Root-CA/O=Schlapphuete/L=Pullach/C=DE
+    !14:56:98:D3:FE:9C:CA:5A:31:6E:BC:81:D3:11:4E:00:90:A3:44:C2 S
+#+END_EXAMPLE
+
+In some cases it is useful to reduce the criteria for checking the root
+certificate. To do this, you can set an additional flag =relax=
+after the =S=: =<FINGERPRINT> S relax=
+
+For more details, see current GnuPG documentation (item
+"trustlist.txt"):
+http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Agent-Configuration.html
+
+Therefore the exact syntax for entries in trustlist.txt is as follows:
+
+ : [!]<FINGERABDRUCK> S [relax]
+
+whereby =!= and =relax= are optional.
+
+Instead of the flag =S=, the values =P= and =*= are also provided,
+which are reserved for future use.
+
+*Important:* To fully mark root certificates as trustworthy in Kleopatra
+(certificate is highlighted in blue), the root certificates must also be
+stored for the DirMngr, as described in Section
+\ref{trustedrootcertsdirmngr}.
+# Fixme: With decent GnuPG/Dirmngr version this is not anymore required
+
+
+*** User marking of trustworthiness of root certificates
+   :PROPERTIES:
+   :CUSTOM_ID: sec_allow-mark-trusted
+   :END:
+#+index: Trustworthy root certificates
+#+index: Root certificates
+
+{{{MarginCMS}}} Root certificates can also be marked as trustworthy by
+individual users --- this means that a system-wide configuration (see
+Section \ref{trustedrootcertsdirmngr} and
+\ref{sec_systemtrustedrootcerts}) is then not required.
+
+Open the Kleopatra menu {{{Menu(Settings\to{}Configure Kleopatra)}}}
+and then the groupo {{{Menu(S/MIME check)}}}. Then activate the option
+{{{Menu(Allow root certificates to be marked trustworthy)}}}. Now, if
+you are using a root certificate that has not been previously marked
+as trustworthy, the system will ask you whether you wish to classify
+it as trustworthy. Please ensure that the gpg-agent may have to be
+restarted before a change takes effect (e.g. by logging in and out).
+
+#+index: trustlist.txt
+The root certificates which you have marked as trustworthy (or
+explicitly marked as non-trustworthy) are automatically stored in the
+following file:
+
+  : C:\Dokumente und Einstellungen\<USERNAME>\ ↩
+  : Application data\gnupg\trustlist.txt
+
+The same syntax applies to trustlist.txt as described in Section
+\ref{sec_systemtrustedrootcerts}.
+
+
+
+** Detecting problems in Gpg4win programs (log files)
+
+#+index: Log file
+
+It is possible that one of the Gpg4win program components does not work
+as expected.
+
+Quite often this is due to a feature related to the work environment,
+which Gpg4win software developers are not able to detect.
+
+To assist them with finding the problem, or to allow users to see the
+detailed technical processes, Gpg4win programs also offer help.
+
+Usually though, this type of help must first be activated. One of the
+most important tools are log files: This is where detailed diagnostic
+information on internal technical processes is stored. By looking at a
+log file, a software developer can often quickly detect a problem and
+the possible solution, even if the program may seem very complex at the
+beginning.
+
+If you wish to send an error report to the software developer, you may
+this information helpful:
+
+http://gpg4win.org/reporting-bugs.html
+
+Log files --- described as ,,debug information'' in the above-mentioned
+URL --- frequently offer valuable information and should therefore be
+attached to an error report.
+
+This chapter describes how to activate program process information
+(which is what log files essentially are) for individual Gpg4win
+programs.
+
+
+
+*** Activating Kleopatra log files
+
+#+index: Log file!Kleopatra
+
+Kleopatra log data consists of many files, therefore the first step is
+to create a file folder for the log files, for example:
+=C:\TEMP\kleologdir=
+
+Please note that these are user settings, not system administrator
+settings. Therefore the settings must be made for each user who wants to
+create Kleopatra log data, and you must ensure that different
+=kleologdir= file folders are used.
+
+The path to this folder must be noted in the new environment variables
+=KLEOPATRA\_LOGIDR=:
+
+To do this, open the control panel, choose {{{Menu(System)}}}, then the tab
+{{{Menu(Advanced)}}} and finally the button
+{{{Button(Environment variables)}}}.
+
+Add the following new *user variable*:
+
+#+BEGIN_QUOTE
+  Name of variable: =KLEOPATRA\_LOGDIR=
+
+  Value of variable: =C:\TEMP\kleologdir=
+#+END_QUOTE
+
+Make sure that the entered file folder actually exists. You can also
+create it afterwards.
+
+To ensure the log function goes into effect, Kleopatra must be shut down
+and restarted, the file folder of log data must exist and must be
+available for Kleopatra to write on.
+
+While Kleopatra is used, it will record process information in the file
+=kleo-log= (main log file) as well as possibly many files with
+a name that following this pattern:
+=pipe-input-<TIME STAMP>-<RANDOM CHARACTER>=
+
+It may be that this information is not enough for a software developer
+to detect the error. He will then ask you to create another environment
+variable --- just as you did earlier:
+
+#+BEGIN_QUOTE
+  Name of variable: =KLEOPATRA\_LOGOPTIONS=
+
+  Value of variable: =all=
+#+END_QUOTE
+
+It is possible that the log files become very big very quickly. You
+should activate the log function only for provoking a specific error
+function and hence record it.
+
+You can then turn the log function off again by deleting the environment
+file or slightly varying its name (so it can be easily reactivated later
+on). Do not forget to delete or move the log files, especially if they
+have become very large or there are a lot of files. It also makes sense
+to remove the log files before you start a new recording.
+
+
+
+*** Activating GpgOL log files
+
+#+index: Log file!GpgOL
+
+To activate a GpgOL log file, you have to start a ``Registry
+Editor". To do this, enter the command =regedit= under
+{{{Menu(Start\to{}Execute)}}} or into an input request field.
+
+Now select the following GpgOL key from the tree structure on the left
+hand side: =HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\GNU\GpgOL=
+
+On the right hand side you will see a list of entries (so-called
+character sequences), some of which already have pre-defined values.
+These entries are created when Outlook is first started with GpgOL.
+
+To activate the GpgOL log file, double-click on the entry
+=enableDebug= and set this value to =1=.
+
+To set a value for =logFile=, enter the name of the file into which
+the log file should be written, for example: =C:\TEMP\gpgol.log=
+
+Restart Outlook to start the recording process.
+
+Remember that this file can become very large. Set =enableDebug= to
+=0= as soon as you no longer require the GpgOL log data recordings.
+
+Also do not forget to delete or move the log file, especially if it has
+become a very large file. Before starting a new recording, it also makes
+sense to remove the log file.
+
+More advanced technical information on GpgOL --- such as more possible
+values for enableDebug --- can be found in the technical (English) GpgOL
+handbook. It can be found in your Gpg4win installation directory,
+usually:
+
+  : C:\Programme\GNU\GnuPG\share\doc\gpgol\gpgol.pdf
+
+
+
+*** Activating DirMngr log file
+
+#+index: DirMngr
+#+index: Log file!DirMngr
+
+The DirMngr is a system-wide service, therefore log files can only be
+activated with administrator rights.
+
+To activate the log file, open the following configuration file:
+
+#+begin_example
+  C:\Documents and settings\All Users\Application data\  ↩
+  GNU\etc\dirmngr\dirmngr.conf
+#+end_example
+
+Add the following two rows in the configuration file (the path to the
+log file can of course be adjusted):
+
+#+BEGIN_EXAMPLE
+  debug-all
+  log-file C:\TEMP\dirmngr.log
+#+END_EXAMPLE
+
+Then restart DirMngr under
+{{{Menu(System~controls\to{}Administration\to{}Services)}}} so that
+the modified configuration file is reimported and the new settings
+become active.
+
+Comment out your adjustment in the aforementioned configuration file
+(hence =#--debug-all=) as soon as you no longer need the DirMngr log file
+recording.
+
+Also do not forget to delete or move the log file, especially if it has
+become a very large file. Before starting a new recording, it also makes
+sense to remove the log file.
+
+
+
+*** Activating GnuPG log files
+
+#+index: Log file!GnuPG
+
+You can activate the individual creation of a log file for each of the
+following GnuPG components:
+
+-  GPG Agent
+
+-  GPG for S/MIME
+
+-  GPG for OpenPGP
+
+-  Smartcard Daemon
+
+Users can also make personal configurations for these programs. This
+also includes the setup of a log file for the program process.
+
+The respective log file is activated in the GnuPG backend --- which
+can be reached via the Kleopatra menu
+{{{Menu(Settings\to{}Configure~Kleopatra...\to{}GnuPG system)}}}. This
+configuration window features two debug options for eac hof the four
+programs:
+
+-  Option {{{Menu(Set debug level to )}}}
+   Here you define the details of the information to be recorded. Debug
+   level {{{Menu(4 - Guru)}}} is the highest level and creates very big
+   files. If you no longer need these files, set the debug level to
+   {{{Menu(0 - None)}}}).
+
+-  Option {{{Menu(Write log to FILE in server mode)}}}
+   Here, you enter the log file into which all debug information should
+   be stored, e.g. =C:\TEMP\gpg-agent.log=
+
+Restart Kleopatra (you may have to shut down the pgp-agent via Task
+Manager, if it is still running), or you log out and log back into your
+Windows system.
+
+Also do not forget to delete or move the log file, especially if it has
+become a very large file. Before starting a new recording, it also makes
+sense to remove the log file.
+
+
+
+*** Activating GpgME log files
+
+#+index: Log file!GpgME
+
+The log file settings for GpgME ("GnuPG Made Easy") must be made for
+each user --- just like in Kleopatra.
+
+Open the Windows control panel, select {{{Menu(System)}}}, then the tab
+{{{Menu(Advanced)}}} and then the button {{{Button(Environment variables)}}}.
+
+Add the new *user variable*:
+
+#+BEGIN_QUOTE
+  Name der Variable: =GPGME_DEBUG=
+
+  Wert der Variable: =<DEBUGLEVEL;PFAD>=, also z.B.:
+   =5;c:\TEMP\gpgme.log=
+#+END_QUOTE
+
+Please note that the file order you have entered must also exist. You
+can also set it up afterwards.
+
+#+index: Diagnostic level
+The recommended diagnostic level is the value
+=5=. In most cases, this level supplies sufficient information.
+If not, then advanced users can gradually increase this level.
+
+To turn log data recording off, set the diagnostic level to the value
+=0= or remove the user variable.
+
+Also do not forget to delete or move the log file, especially if it has
+become a very large file. Before starting a new recording, it also makes
+sense to remove the log file.
+
+
+
+** Why Gpg4win cannot be broken ...
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:themath
+  :END:
+
+... at least not with currently known methods, and provided the software
+is free of errors.
+
+In reality however, it is precisely those errors in the programs that
+provide opportunities for obtaining secret information when the software
+is used, or errors that are contained in the operating system. Free
+software on the other hand offers virtually the best prerequisites to
+avoid these types of errors.
+
+Each example in this compendium has shown that there is a connection
+between the private and public key. Secret messages can only be
+decrypted if both match.
+
+#+index: Security philosophy
+You do not really have to know the secret behind this mathematical
+connection --- Gpg4win will also work without it. At the same time, even
+laymen can understand this complex mathematical method, since it only
+uses basic arithmetic methods (addition, subtraction, multiplication and
+division) in order to define a special kind of addition and
+multiplication. The fact that there are no secret methods and algorithms
+is what is behind the security philosophy of
+cryptography and the principle of Free Software. Finally, this is also
+the best way of really understanding why GnuPG (the actual machinery
+behind Gpg4win) is so secure.
+
+In other words, this is where the free program that follows the
+compulsory portion begins.
+
+
+
+** GnuPG and the mystery of large numbers
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:secretGnupg
+  :END:
+
+\Large{Cryptography for non-mathematicians}
+
+#+index: RSA algorithm
+
+There have been several attempts at 'cracking' the RSA algorithm
+ on which GnuPG is based [5], i.e. to calculate a
+private key when only the public key is known. However, this type of
+calculation has never been successful for the key lengths (1024 Bit and
+above) that are used in GnuPG. While it might be possible on a
+theoretical level, it is practically impossible since even with plenty
+of time (many years) and thousands of networked computers, there would
+never by sufficient storage to complete the last steps of this
+calculation.
+
+At the same time, it is entirely possible that one day an ingenious
+mathemtatical idea will provide a solution to the mathematical issues
+behind RSA. However, this is unlikely to happen anytime soon.
+
+From time to time the German Federal Agency for Security in Information
+Technology (BSI) publishes forecasts and assessments with regards to how
+long certain key lengths can likely be used for absolute security
+guarantee. GnuPG's standard settings far exceed these minimum
+requirements. As touched upon in the previous chapter, the mathemetical
+elements form by far the most secure portion of practically applied
+cryptography.
+
+The following discussion will show you how this mathematical
+method works. While not all details will be covered - as this would be
+far beyond the scope of this manual - with some effort on your part it
+will enable you to make correct en/decryption calculations and thus
+discover the "mystery of big numbers".
+
+Even non-mathematicians and mortals can understand this complex
+mathematical method. All that is required is a good grasp of simple
+additions and multiplication processes. It may be compared to the
+concept of a free skate, because the free skate is really much more
+about substance than the short program which is much heavier on the
+required elements. But most importantly, it will help you to understand
+why GnuPG is so secure.
+
+But first let us get some terminology out of the way:
+
+#+BEGIN_QUOTE
+  An *algorithm* is a mathemetical method for modifying or transforming
+  data or information.
+
+  *Arithmetics* is the method by which numbers are added and multiplied.
+#+END_QUOTE
+
+#+index: Modulo arithmetics
+Encryption using GnuPG is based on the so-called RSA algorithm [6]. RSA
+is derived from the last names of Ron Rivest, Ami Shamir und Ben
+Adleman, who discovered this algorithm in 1978. This algorithm uses a
+type of arithmetic which is called arithmetic with residue classes or
+"modular (or modulo) arithmetic" .
+
+
+
+*** Calcualting with residue classes
+
+#+index: Residue classes
+
+Calculating with residue classes means only calculating the "residue"
+(or remainder) which remains after an integer division by a whole
+number. This number, by which the division is carried out, is called the
+"module" or "modular number". If we calculate with the factor or the
+modular number 5, for example, this is called "arithmetic modulo 5".
+
+For in allustration of how arithmetic with residue classes - also called
+modular or congruence arithmetic - works, imagine the face of a clock:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.5\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/clock-face.png]]
+
+This clock is an example of arithmetic modulo 12 (hence the factor is
+also 12) --- a clock with an ordinary dial, except that it has a 0 where
+one would expect to see the 12. Using this example we can describe
+modulo arithmetic by simply moving the imaginary dial.
+
+For example, to calculate $3 + 2$, we begin at digit 2 and turn the dial
+by three digits (or start at 3 and turn by two digits, which works out
+to the same). The result is 5.
+
+Using the same method to add $7 + 8$, the result is 3. Why? 3 is the
+residual that results when dividing 15 (i.e. $7 + 8$) by 12. To multiply
+5 by 7, start at 0 and move forward by 5 digits each time for seven
+times (or begin by 0 and move forward by 7 digits 5 times). In both
+cases the dial stops at 11 because 11 is the residual obtained from
+dividing 35 (i.e.$7 * 5$) by 12.
+
+Therefore, by using arithmetic with residue classes we add and
+divide numbers according to the conventional rules of everyday
+arithmetics, while always only using the residual that remains after the
+division. The modulus (the factor) is added to indicate that the rules
+of modular arithmetic rather than conventional arithmetic are applied,
+hence we would say, for example, "4 modulo 5", or in short "$4
+\bmod 5$".
+
+A modulo 5 for example would be represented by a clock with only 5
+numbers (0, 1, 2, 3, 4), hence:
+
+$$4 \bmod 5 + 3 \bmod 5 = 7 \bmod 5 = 2 \bmod 5$$
+
+Said another way, using arithmetic modulo 5 the result of adding 4 and 3
+would be 2.
+
+Another example of modulo 5 arithmetics:
+
+$$8 \bmod 5 + 6 \bmod 5 = 14 \bmod 5 = 4 \bmod 5$$
+
+You can see that it doesn't matter in which sequence you proceed,
+because you could also write:
+
+$$8 \bmod 5 + 6 \bmod 5 = 3 \bmod 5 + 1 \bmod 5 = 4 \bmod 5$$
+
+3 is the same as 8, and 1 the same as 6, since you are only interested
+in the respective residual that remains after the division by the factor
+of 5.
+
+The last examples highlight the fact that by using this type of
+arithmetic, you can add a whole-number multiple of the module number
+(here 5) at any time, but the result will always be the same.
+
+This pattern also works for multiplication.
+
+An example:
+
+$$4 \bmod 5 * 2 \bmod 5 = 8 \bmod 5 = 3 \bmod 5$$
+
+You can also write:
+
+$$9 \bmod 5 * 7 \bmod 5 = 63 \bmod 5 = 3 \bmod 5$$
+
+since you can simply deduct 60, hence $5 * 12$.
+
+But you could also write:
+
+$$9 \bmod 5 * 7 \bmod 5 = 4 \bmod 5 * 2 \bmod 5 = 8 \bmod 5 = 3 \bmod 5$$
+
+because 4 corresponds with 9 and 2 corresponds with 7, if you examine
+only the residual after a division by 5.
+
+Again, we see that it does not matter if we simply leave out the
+multiple of five.
+
+Since this makes everything much simpler, we will do this before adding
+or multiplying numbers. This means that we only need to concern
+ourselves with numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 when doing arithmetic modulo 5, as
+we can leave out all that is divisible by 5.
+
+Three more examples:
+
+1. $ 5 \bmod 11 * 3 \bmod 11 = 15 \bmod 11 = 4 \bmod 11 $
+
+2. $ 2 \bmod 7 * 4 \bmod 7 = 1 \bmod 7 $
+
+3. $ 13 \bmod 17 * 11 \bmod 17 = 7 \bmod 17 $
+   The last example becomes clear when one considers that using
+   conventional arithmetic $ 13 * 11 = 143 $ and $ 143 = 8 * 17 + 7 $.
+
+
+
+*** RSA algorithm and calculating with residue classes
+
+Computers store letters as numbers. All the letters and symbols found on
+a computer keyboard are actually stored as numbers between 0 and 255.
+
+As a result, it is possible to convert a message into a series of
+numbers. The method (or algorithm) used for this process will be
+described in the next section, which will introduce the method used for
+the encryption with GnuPG: the RSA algorithm. This algorithm converts a
+series of numbers (which can represent a message) into a different
+series of numbers (transformation) in such a way that the message is
+thereby encrypted. Using the correct method, the message is securely
+encoded and may only be decoded by the right recipient.
+
+These are the principles behind the RSA algorithm:
+
+#+index: Prime numbers
+You created two large prime numbers when you
+entered your passphrase for creating a certificate (they are described
+as $p$ and $q$). Only you, or actually your computer, knows these two
+prime numbers and you must ensure they stay secret.
+
+They are now used to create three additional numbers:
+
+-  The first number :: is the result of muliplying the two prime
+   numbers, i.e. the product. This product is described as /modulus/ and
+   indicated by the letter $n$. It is the module number we will later
+   use for our calculations.
+
+-  The second number :: is the so-called /public exponent/ $e$, and is a
+   number with specific requirements (coprime to $(p-1)(q-1)$). Often
+   the numbers 41 or 65537 are used.
+
+-  The third number :: is calculated from the public exponent (the
+   second number) and the two prime numbers. This number is the /secret
+   exponent/ and is described with $d$. The formula for the calculation
+   is as follows: $$d = e^{-1} \bmod (p - 1)(q -1)$$
+
+The first and second number are published --- your public key. Both are
+used to encrypt messages. The third number --- your private key --- must
+be kept secret. Afterwards, the two prime numbers ($p$ und $q$) are no
+longer required.
+
+When an encrypted message is received, it can be decrypted using the
+first ($n$) and third number ($d$). Only the receipient knows both parts
+of the key --- his public and private key. The rest of the world only
+knows the public key ($n$ und $e$).
+
+The trick of the RSA algorithm is that it makes it impossible to
+calculate the private key portion ($d$) from the public key portion ($n$
+and $e$) and hence decrypt the message because --- only the person with
+$d$ is able to decrypt the message.
+
+
+
+*** RSA encryption with small numbers
+
+We will initially be using small numbers in order to show how the method
+works. However, in practice much larger multi-digit prime numbers are
+used.
+
+Let's take prime numbers 7 and 11 and use them to encrypt numbers --- or
+letters, which is one and the same to the computer --- according to the
+RSA algorithm.
+
+We will first be creating the public key
+
+-  The first number :: is 77, the product of the multiplication of the
+   two prime numbers 7 and 11. 77 will be used later as the modulus for
+   the encryption and decryption process.
+
+-  The second number :: is the public exponent. For the purpose of this
+   examples, we have selected the number 13.
+
+-  The third number :: is the private key. This number is calculated as
+   below:
+
+   First, we deduct 1 from each of our prime numbers 7 und 11 (hence
+   $7 - 1$ and $11 - 1$) and multiply the two resulting numbers to
+   obtain 60: $( 7 - 1 ) * ( 11 - 1) = 60$. 60 is our module number for
+   the further calculation of the private key (however, not to be
+   confused with the actual modulus 77).
+
+   Now we look for a number which, when multiplied with the public key,
+   results in the number 1, when using module 60:
+
+   $$13 \bmod 60 *~?~\bmod 60 = 1 \bmod 60$$
+
+   The only number that fits this requirement is 37 because
+
+   $$13 \bmod 60 * 37 \bmod 60 = 481 \bmod 60 = 1 \bmod 60$$
+
+   37 is the only number that results in 1 when multiplied with 13,
+   using module 60.
+
+
+
+**** Encrypting a message with the public key
+
+We now divide the message into a series of numbers between 0 and 76,
+i.e. 77 numbers, because both encryption and decryption use module 77
+(the product obtained from the prime numbers 7 and 11).
+
+Each one of these numbers is now multiplied with itself 13 times, as per
+modulo 77 arithmetics. Remember: 13 is our public key.
+
+Let's take an example using the number 2 which is converted into 30,
+because $ 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 * 2
+ = 2^{13} = 8192 = 30 \bmod 77 $.
+
+Another example: 75 is converted into 47, because 75 is multiplied by
+itself 13 times and divided by 77, leaving the residual 47.
+
+If you use this calculation for all numbers between 0 and 76 and insert
+the results into a table, it will look as follows:
+
+\begin{Label}{table1}
+
+  |    |  0 |  1 |  2 |  3 |  4 |  5 |  6 |  7 |  8 |  9 |
+  |----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----|
+  |  0 |  0 |  1 | 30 | 38 | 53 | 26 | 62 | 35 | 50 | 58 |
+  | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 41 | 49 | 64 | 37 | 73 | 46 | 61 |
+  | 20 | 69 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 52 | 60 | 75 | 48 |  7 | 57 |
+  | 30 | 72 |  3 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 63 | 71 |  9 | 59 | 18 |
+  | 40 | 68 |  6 | 14 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 74 |  5 | 20 | 70 |
+  | 50 | 29 |  2 | 17 | 25 | 54 | 55 | 56 |  8 | 16 | 31 |
+  | 60 |  4 | 40 | 13 | 28 | 36 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 19 | 27 |
+  | 70 | 42 | 15 | 51 | 24 | 39 | 47 | 76 |    |    |    |
+
+
+The left column shows multiples of tens, the upper row shows the
+units.
+
+
+
+**** Decrypting a message using the private key
+
+To reverse the example above using the number 2, i.e. to decode the
+message, we multiply 30 (the converted 2) by itself 37 times
+($30^{37}$). The result is calculated using module number 77. Remember:
+37 is the private key.
+
+This repeated multiplication results in $2 \bmod 77$. The other example:
+the number $47 \bmod 77$ is decoded into the number $75\bmod
+77$.
+
+Table \link*{2}[\ref{table2}]table2 shows the exact allocation of the 77
+numbers between 0 and 76.
+
+#+LABEL: table2
+#+CAPTION: Number transformation modulo 77, using the private key 37
+  |    |  0 |  1 |  2 |  3 |  4 |  5 |  6 |  7 |  8 |  9 |
+  |----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----|
+  |  0 |  0 |  1 | 51 | 31 | 60 | 47 | 41 | 28 | 57 | 37 |
+  | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 62 | 42 | 71 | 58 | 52 | 39 | 68 |
+  | 20 | 48 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 73 | 53 |  5 | 69 | 63 | 50 |
+  | 30 |  2 | 59 | 32 | 33 | 34 |  7 | 64 | 16 |  3 | 74 |
+  | 40 | 61 | 13 | 70 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 18 | 75 | 27 | 14 |
+  | 50 |  8 | 72 | 24 |  4 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 29 |  9 | 38 |
+  | 60 | 25 | 19 |  6 | 35 | 15 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 40 | 20 |
+  | 70 | 49 | 36 | 30 | 17 | 46 | 26 | 76 |    |    |    |
+
+
+
+In order to transform a number using Table
+\link*{2}[\ref{table2}]table2, we use the same method as for
+Table\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1. An example: 60 is transformed into
+the number in row 60 and column 0. Hence 60 is transformed to 25.
+
+This is not surprising, as if we assume that using
+Table\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1 for the conversion of 25 results in
+60, it only stands to reason that we should obtain 25 for the
+transformation of 60 when using Table \link*{2}[\ref{table2}]table2. In
+doing so we used the public key, 13, for the conversion (codification)
+of a number, and the private key 37 in order to reverse the process,
+i.e. decoding. We have used modulo 77 arithmetics both for the
+encryption and decryption process.
+
+
+
+**** Executive Summary
+
+You have ...
+
+-  created two random prime numbers using the computer;
+
+-  created the product and both the public and private subkey from these
+   numbers;
+
+-  encrypted a message using the public key;
+
+-  decrypted a message using a private key.
+
+The two prime numbers selected can be so large that it is impossible to
+decipher them by any publicly known product. This is the basis for the
+security of the RSA algorithm.
+
+We have seen that the calculations can become quite complex, even when a
+simple example is used. In this case, the person who made the key public
+has published the numbers 77 and 13 as a public key. With this
+information, anyone can send this person an encrypted number of series
+of numbers using the method described above --- as in the example of
+Table\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1. The intended recipient of the
+encrypted series of numbers can decode these using the number 77 and the
+private key 37.
+
+
+Of course, a simple example such as this one does not guarantee a
+particularly secure encryption, as it is quite clear that 77 is the
+product of 7 and 11.
+
+As a result, it would be fairly easy to crack the code of this simple
+example. The discerning reader will also have noticed that there are a
+whole series of numbers, such as the number 11 and its multiples (22, 33
+etc) and neighbouring numbers convert into themselves.
+
+#+LABEL: table3
+#+CAPTION: Table 25.3
+  |    |    0 |    1 |    2 |    3 |    4 |    5 |    6 |    7 |  8 |  9 |
+  |----+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+----+----|
+  |  0 |    0 |    1 |   51 |   31 |   60 |   47 |   41 |   28 | 57 | 37 |
+  | 10 | *10* | *11* | *12* |   62 |   42 |   71 |   58 |   52 | 39 | 68 |
+  | 20 |   48 | *21* | *22* | *23* |   73 |   53 |    5 |   69 | 63 | 50 |
+  | 30 |    2 |   59 | *32* | *33* | *34* |    7 |   64 |   16 |  3 | 74 |
+  | 40 |   61 |   13 |   70 | *43* | *44* | *45* |   18 |   75 | 27 | 14 |
+  | 50 |    8 |   72 |   24 |    4 | *54* | *55* | *56* |   29 |  9 | 38 |
+  | 60 |   25 |   19 |    6 |   35 |   15 | *65* | *66* | *67* | 40 | 20 |
+  | 70 |   49 |   36 |   30 |   17 |   46 |   26 |   76 |      |    |    |
+
+
+This appears to be a further weakness of this encryption
+method: one could assume that this would limit the security of the
+algorithm. However, imagine that the product of two large, randomly
+selected, prime numbers results in the following:
+
+#+begin_example
+  114, 381, 625, 757, 888, 867, 669, 235, 779, 976, 146, 612, 010,
+  218, 296, 721, 242, 362, 562, 561, 842, 935, 706, 935, 245, 733,
+  897, 830, 597, 123, 563, 958, 705, 058, 989, 075, 147, 599, 290,
+  026, 879, 543, 541
+#+end_example
+
+In this example it is no longer possible to discern the starting prime
+numbers. As a result it is very difficult to determine the private key
+using the public key. Even the fastest computers in the world would have
+great difficulty in calculating the two prime numbers. Hence - all that
+is required is to select prime numbers that are big enough to deter all
+known methods for determination in practice. Furthermore, the proportion
+of number which are converted into themselves --- as shown in above in
+\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1 and\link*{2}[\ref{table2}]table2,
+continuously decreases as the prime numbers get bigger.
+
+Of the prime numbers in the range which we use for encryption in
+practice, this portion is to small that the RSA algorithm is in no way
+restricted by it.
+
+The larger the prime numbers, the more secure the encryption. A normal
+PC has no difficulty in obtaining the product from the two large prime
+numbers. However, no computer in the world can derive the original prime
+numbers from this product --- at least not in the foreseeable future.
+
+
+
+*** Display using different base numbers
+
+In order to understand how messages are encrypted, one should know how a
+computer stores numbers and above all, how they can be represented in
+many different number bases.
+
+For this purpose, let us first look at the power of numbers.
+
+Two to the power of one, displayed as $2^1 = 2$;
+Two to the power of three, displayed as $2^3 = 2 * 2 * 2 = 8$;
+Two to the power of 10, displayed as
+$2^{10} = 2*2*2*2*2*2*2*2*2*2 = 1024$.
+
+Each number to the power of zero equals 1, e.g. $2^0 = 1$ and $5^0 = 1$.
+Put more generally, it means that a number is multiplied by itself as
+many times as indicated by the number of the power.
+
+The concept of a number basis can also be seen in the example of an
+odometer in a vehicle: the right wheel counts to the next number after
+each kilometre, according to the known sequence:
+0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0, 1, 2, ...
+
+Each time the right wheel reaches 0, the wheel on the left counts up by
+a level. And each time when this second wheel reaches 0, the wheel to
+its left also goes up by one ...and so on.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.4\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/mileage-indicator.png]]
+
+The right wheel counts single kilometres. When it marks an 8, it means
+8 kilomtres. The wheel to the left shows every full ten kilometres: a
+5 means 50 kilometres. This is followed by the hundred indicator: a 7
+means 700 kilometres.
+
+We use the same principles to illustrate regular numbers with the
+digits 0 to 9.
+
+For example, “578” means $5 * 100 + 7 * 10 + 8$, which corresponds to
+578.
+
+Here we have the “5” which stands for five hundred, “7” for seventy
+and “8” for eight. In this case the base is 10, one which is quite
+familiar to us.
+
+Hence the right digit represents the ‘units’ of a particular number
+(i.e. it is multiplied with 1), the digit to the left represents the
+‘tens’ (i.e. multiplied by 10), the next for ‘hundreds’
+(i.e. multiplied by 100) and so on. Since we usually represent numbers
+using a basis of 10, we do not need to separately indicate the
+base. On a more formal level, this would be indicated as $55_{10}$ for
+the number 55, whereby the base is represented by the subscript
+number.
+
+If we are not using a base of 10, we have to use a corresponding
+subscript to indicate the relevant number.
+
+Assume that, instead of using the digits 0 to 8, the odometer indicator
+only included digits 0 to 7. The right wheel would thus continue to
+count up one level after each kilometres, with the resulting number
+series looking as follows:
+
+  $0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, ...$
+
+For example, your three-digit odometer using the base 8 would represent
+the following number:
+
+  $356$
+
+The 6 on the right wheel counts single kilometres, hence $6*8^0=6$
+kilometres.  The 5 on the wheel beside it stands for $5 * 8^1$, hence
+40 kilometres.  The 3 left of that stands for each 64 kilometres per
+revolution, in this example $3 * 8^2$ kilometres.
+
+This is how calculating numbers with basis of 8 works. An example:
+$72_8$ represents $7 * 8^1 + 2 * 8^0 =  58$.
+In this illustration, the "2" from 72 stands for 2, but the "7" stands
+for $7 * 8$.
+
+Larger numbers are gradually assembled in the same way, so that $453_8$
+actually reprsents $4 * 64 + 5 * 8 + 3$, which results in $299_{10}$t.
+For $453_8$, the "3" stands for 3, the "5" for $5 * 8$ and the "4" for
+$4 * 64$, whereby the "64" is in turn derived from $8 *
+8$.
+
+In the example above digits are multiplied by ascending powers of 8,
+from left to right. The right digit is multiplied with $8^0$ (i.e. 1),
+while the the digit to the left is multiplied wiht $8^1$ (i.e. 8), and
+the one to the left with $8^2$ (i.e. 64), and so on.
+
+When representing numbers with a base of 10, there is no higher digit
+than 9 (i.e. 10 minus 1). Hence there is no digit which represents 10 or
+a higher number. In order to represent 10, we need two digits with which
+to write "10".
+So we only have digits 0 to 9.
+Much the same applies when calculating with the base number 8: the only
+available digits are 0 to 7. If we wish to represent a number higher
+than seven using this base, we must again use two digits. For example,
+$9_{10}$ is $11_8$, $73_{10}$ is $111_8$.
+
+Computers stores numbers as a series of zeros and ones. This
+is called the binary system or arithmetics using the base number 2,
+because we are only using the digits 0 and 1. Imagine counting
+kilometres with an odometer whose wheel only has two digits: 0 and 1.
+Hence, using the binary system, the number $10101_2$, for example, would
+look as follows
+
+$$1*2^4+0*2^3+1*2^2+0*2^1+1*2^0 = 1 * 16 + 0 * 8 + 1 * 4 + 0 * 2 + 1 = 21$$
+
+Groups of eight binary digits are also used in computer technology - the
+well known "byte". A byte can consist of values anywhere from 0 -
+represented as byte $00000000_2$ --- and 255 --- represented as byte
+$11111111_2$. A byte therefore represents the number to the base of
+$2^8 = 256$.
+
+Two more examples:
+
+$ 10101010_2 = 170 $
+
+$ 00000101_2 = 5 $
+
+Since the computer stores letters, digits and symbols as bytes, let us
+see the role played by the representation to the base of 256.
+
+Let's take the syllable "un". The computer stores "u" as 117,
+and the "n" as 110.
+
+These number values are standard for all computers and are called ASCII
+code.
+
+You can also represent the syllable "un" with the following number:
+
+$117 * 2^{8*1} + 110 * 2^{8*0} = 117 * 256 + 110 = 30062$
+
+Accordingly, the letter sequence "und" would be represented with the
+number
+
+$117 * 2^{8*2} + 110 * 2^{8*1} + 100 * 2^{8*0} = 117 * 65536 + 110 * 256 + 100 = 7695972$
+
+since "d" is represented by 100.
+
+We have therefore internally represented numbers and symbols which are
+available on a computer keyboard as normal numbers using the base of 10
+by numbers to the base of $2^8 = 256$.
+
+Accordingly we are able to turn every message into a big number. A long
+message leads to an enormously large number, which we wish to encrypt
+with the RSA algorithm.
+
+However, we must ensure that the number into which the message is
+encrypted does not become larger than the product of the prime numbers
+(modulus), otherwise it creates problems, as we will see below.
+
+Since the next process is
+comprised a number of steps, let's first summarize and then examine the
+individual steps in turn:
+
+1. The message /aba, cad, aca/ is converted into numbers, as described
+   above.
+
+2. This representation, for example using a basis of $2^2=4$ (instead of
+   $2^8=256$), is converted into a representation using a basis of 10,
+   so that you can use the Table\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1 for
+   encryption purposes, as this table displays numbers using a basis of
+   10. This creates a coded message using a basis of 10.
+
+3. To recognise the coding, as compared to "clear text", convert the
+   message that was coded using a basis of 10 back into a basis of 4,
+   and convert it back into a letter sequence.
+
+4. This turns the message /aba, cad, aca/ into the encrypted message
+   /dbb, ddd, dac/.
+
+And now in detail:
+
+1. Convert the message /aba, cad, ada/ into numbers.
+
+   Assuming we limit the messages to the four letters a, b, c und d,
+   using this --- very simple --- example we could represent the four
+   letters by the number values 0, 1, 2 and 3, and hence have
+
+   $$a = 0, b = 1, c = 2 ~\mbox{und}~ d = 3$$
+
+#+index: Prime numbers
+   Now encrypt the message /aba, cad, aca/. Encode the message using
+   prime numbers 7 and 11, with the public key 77
+   und 13 and associated private key 37. You area already familiar with
+   this example from an earlier chapter: You used it to construct the
+   tables\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1 and
+   \link*{2}[\ref{table2}]table2.
+
+2. This representation using a basis of 4 is converted into one using a
+   basis of 10. To do this, you can use
+   Table\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1 for encryption purposes, which
+   also uses numbers with a basis of 10.
+
+   Because you are using four letters for the message, calculate using a
+   basis of 4. For a modulo 77 calculation, you have to break down the
+   message into pieces of three digits each, because the largest
+   three-digit number using a basis of 4 is $333_4$. Using a basis of
+   10, this number has a value of 63.
+
+   If instead you were to divide the message into pieces of four
+   characters each, $3333_4$ would exceed the value of $76_{10}$ and
+   would result in unwanted ambiguity.
+
+   As a result, the message of three-digit pieces would result in
+   $$aba, cad, aca$$
+
+   Now assign your number values to the characters and do not forget
+   that the pieces represent three-digit numbers using a basis of 4.
+
+   Since you are representing the letters with the numbers a = 0, b = 1,
+   c = 2, d = 3, the resulting message will look as follows:
+   $$010_4, 203_4, 020_4$$
+
+   Using a basis of 10, this message will be represented by the number
+   sequence 4, 35, 8. Why? For example, take the middle part $203_4$:
+
+   $$\begin{aligned}
+        3 * 4^0, & ~\mbox{also}~ 3 * 1, & ~\mbox{also}~ 3. \\
+        0 * 4^1, & ~\mbox{also}~ 0 * 4, & ~\mbox{also}~ 0. \\
+        2 * 4^2, & ~\mbox{also}~ 2 * 16, & ~\mbox{also}~ 32.\\
+       \end{aligned}$$
+
+3. For encryption purposes, you can now use
+   Table\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1 from page \pageref{table1}, which
+   was calculated using a basis fo 10. We use this table because you are
+   working with the already familiar key pair. This created a coded
+   message using a basis of 10.
+
+   To encrypt the message, you now use the aforementioned
+   table\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1. The message now turns into the
+   number sequence 53, 63, 50 (basis of 10).
+
+4. Converted back to a basis of 4, the message becomes $311_4,
+       333_4, 302_4$. Converting it to a letter sequence creates /dbb,
+   ddd, dac/, which is very different from the original message.
+
+   Therefore we reverse the process and transform the number sequence
+   53, 63, 50 using Table\link*{2}[\ref{table2}]table2 to obtain the
+   sequence 4, 35, 8, which precisely corresponds with the original
+   message.
+
+   Using Tables \link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1
+   and\link*{2}[\ref{table2}]table2 you can also encrypt messages using
+   the private key (e.g. first use Table\link*{2}[\ref{table2}]table2
+   and then decode with the public key (i.e.
+   Table\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]table1) and thus restore your original
+   number). This allows the owner of the private key to encrypt messages
+   using the RSA algorithm, and it proves that the messages can only
+   come from him.
+
+
+
+**** The bottom line is...
+
+#+index: RSA algorithm
+... while this process is complicated in its details, the principle on
+the other hand is fairly easy to understand. After all, you should not
+just trust a method but also - at least on the basis of understanding
+the approach behind it - be able to see behind its mode of operation.
+Many of the other details can easily be found in other books (z.B.:
+R.~Wobst, "Abenteuer Kryptologie" (German)) or on the Internet.
+
+*In any case, now you know:* if someone should ever attempt to crack
+your encrypted emails, the process will keep them busy for such a
+long time that they will lose all interest in actually reading your
+messages......
+
+#+LaTeX: \appendix
+* Annex
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: part:Annex
+  :END:
+
+** Information on the GpgOL Outlook extension
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: appendix:gpgol
+  :END:
+#+index: Outlook!plugin
+
+GpgOL is a program extension for Microsoft Outlook; it integrates the
+operation of GnuPG into Outlook.
+
+Since Outlook is a proprietary product, hence is not available as free
+software with a source code, this integration still has a number of
+issues. In other words: Operation is not as comfortable as offered by,
+for example, email programs with integrated encryption and signature
+components (e.g. KMail/Kontact).
+
+GpgOL is installed by the
+Gpg4win installation asisstant. On the next startup of Outlook, the menu
+{{{Menu(Extras\to{}Options)}}} will contain the tab {{{Menu(GpgOL)}}}:
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.65\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-gpgol-options_de.png]]
+
+The tab {{{Menu(GpgOL)}}} is divided into three areas:
+
+1. *General information:*
+
+   {{{MarginCMS}}}{{{Menu(Turn on S/MIME support)}}}
+
+   Once Gpg4win has been intalled, S/MIME functionality is activated in
+   GpgOL. This refers to the S/MIME support of GnuPG. Outlook itself
+   also supports X.509 and S/MIME, but of course does not work with the
+   Gpg4win component GnuPG. This means that all settings, certificate
+   management and user dialogs will be different. Please also note that
+   Outlook itself does not offer any OpenPGP support.
+
+#+index: GpgOL options
+   If you wish to use S/MIME with Gpg4win in Outlook, leave the
+   GpgOL-Option
+   {{{Menu(Activate~S/MIME~support)}}} activated. If you wish to use
+   S/MIME supported by Outlook, deactivate this GpgOL S/MIME option.
+
+2. *Sending messages:*
+
+   {{{Menu(Encrypt new messages with default settings)}}}
+   {{{Menu(Sign new messages with default settings)}}}
+
+   These two options control whether new messages are encrypted and/or
+   signed with the default settings. You can also change these settings
+   when you create a message. Only the buttons are activated
+   accordingly.
+
+3. *Reading messages:*
+
+   {{{Menu(Show HTML display where possible)}}}
+
+   This option can be used to display the HTML version of a message.
+   Normally, or if HTML format is not available, the message will be
+   shown in text format.
+
+   {{{Menu(Display encrypted message as attachment)}}}
+
+   The encrypted portion of the message is also shown as an attachment.
+   This means that users can save the encrypted part separately, or
+   process it in another manner.
+
+All options are already pre-populated following a new installation.
+
+\label{OLandWord} To send encrypted messages using Outlook,
+you have to ensure that you do *not* use Microsoft Word to compose
+messages.
+
+It is also recommended that you do not use HTML messages.  These items
+can be controlled in the menu item {{{Menu(Extras\to{}Options)}}} on
+the {{{Menu(E-Mail~format)}}} tab. The message format should be set to
+{{{Menu(Text only)}}} (see highlighted area).  However, if you still
+want to use HTML for signed or encrypted emails, it is possible that
+the formatting information will be lost by the time the message
+reaches the recipient.
+
+#+ATTR_LaTeX: width=0.6\textwidth
+[[file:images-compendium/sc-gpgol-options-textformat_en.png]]
+
+*Please note:* The program extension GpgOL from Gpg4win makes it
+possible to handle emails according to the OpenPGP standard in Outlook
+2003/2007.  In WindowsXP and Outlook 2003, Gpg4win also enables
+Outlook 2007 to decrypt and create AES encrypted S/MIME emails, since
+along with GnuPG, Gpg4win brings along its own cryptocomponents that
+are independent of Outlook and Windows. Only Outlook 2007 under
+Windows Vista can handle AES encrypted S/MIME emails without Gpg4win.
+
+
+
+** Using GnuPG with other email programs
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:plugins
+  :END:
+
+The Gpg4win compendium mainly looks at the Outlook email program.
+However, GnuPG can also be used with all other email programs.
+However, there are great differences in user comfort --- the better
+GnuPG is integrated into an email program, the easier it is to use
+it.
+
+The simplest method, e.g. if an email program does not know anything
+about GnuPG, is to encrypt using the clipboard, with Kleopatra's
+assistance. This only works for OpenPGP; for S/MIME and complex PGP/MIME
+emails you will have to use intermediate storage as a file. Both
+methods are described in the first part of this compendium.
+
+Currently, an integration of GnuPG is offered for the following email
+programs under Windows:
+
+#+index: Thunderbird
+#+index: Enigmail
+ - Thunderbird :: with *Enigmail* [7].
+
+#+index: Outlook
+ - Outlook as of Version 2003 :: with GpgOL.  GpgOL is a part of the
+      Gpg4win package.
+
+#+index: Claws Mail
+ - Claws Mail ::  This email program is part of the Gpg4win package,
+                  and can be optionally installed. Such an
+                  installation already configures the program
+                  extension for the use of PGP/MIME and S/MIME. This
+                  extension however does not use Kleopatra, and
+                  therefore does not currently offer the same comfort
+                  as offered by the GpgOL Outlook extension.
+
+#+index: KMail
+#+index: Kontact
+-  KMail/Kontact ::  KMail and Kontact offer a comfortable and proven
+     integration of GnuPG. They are available for almost all GNU/Linux
+     systems and recently also for Windows and MacOS X.
+
+
+
+** Automatic installation of Gpg4win
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:auto
+  :END:
+#+index: Automatic installation
+
+This chapter looks at automated installations (without user dialogs).
+
+In some cases, such as for software shared systems, it is necessary that
+the installation of Gpg4win works without interaction using dialogs.
+However, in order to still define all installation settings in advance,
+Gpg4win supports the configuration of the installation path and other
+options on the command line as well as a control file.
+
+The installation path can be indicated with the option
+=/D=<PFAD>=, which must be submitted as the last option on the
+command line. The file name (here: =gpg4win.exe=) may vary
+depending on the version. It does make a difference whether you use
+capital or small letters when entering information in the command line.
+If required, access rights (e.g. read and write) may also be configured
+in the installation folder. An example:
+=gpg4win.exe /D=D:\Programme\Gpg4win=
+
+Using the option =/S=, the installation runs "silently", hence
+without any dialogs. If no other parameters are set, all default
+settings will be adopted.
+
+Gpg4win also supports a so-called control file. You can use the option
+=/C=<INIFILE>= to enter a control file (name usually ends in
+=.ini=).
+
+Another example:
+=gpg4win.exe /S /C=C:\TEMP\gpg4win.ini=
+
+
+This =.ini= file should contain exactly one section
+=[gpg4win]=. It is where various settings can be made,
+including absolute path information for the configuration files to be
+installed. Relative paths, hence those that are dependent on the current
+working directory, cannot be entered here. Absolute paths contain the
+complete path including the drive name. Usually settings must be entered
+if the default settings should not be used. Exceptions to this rule are
+documented in the example on the next page.
+
+This is an example of the contents in a control file which
+displays *all* authorized key words:
+
+#+BEGIN_EXAMPLE
+    [gpg4win]
+      ; Installation settings. Leave out or leave empty for
+      ; Default settings
+      inst_gpgol = true
+      inst_gpgex = true
+      inst_kleopatra = true
+      inst_gpa = true
+      inst_claws_mail = false
+      inst_compendium = true
+
+      ; The locations at which linkages are to be prepared.
+      inst_start_menu = true
+      inst_desktop = false
+      inst_quick_launch_bar = false
+
+      ; In contrast to the other options, this option overwrites
+      ; the user's settings in the installation assistant.
+      inst_start_menu_folder = Gpg4win
+
+      ; Standard configuration files.
+      gpg.conf = D:\config\gpg-site.conf
+      gpg-agent.conf = D:\config\gpg-agent-site.conf
+      trustlist.txt = D:\config\trustlist-site.txt
+      dirmngr.conf = D:\config\dirmngr-site.conf
+      dirmngr_ldapserver.conf = D:\config\dirmngr_ldapserver-site.conf
+      scdaemon.conf = D:\config\scdaemon-site.txt
+      gpa.conf = D:\config\gpa-site.conf
+#+END_EXAMPLE
+
+A corresponding request for automatic installation with a control file
+=gpg4win.ini= and an installation path
+=D:\Programme\Gpg4win= could look as follows:
+
+ : gpg4win.exe /S /C=C:\TEMP\gpg4win.ini /D=D:\Program Files\Gpg4win
+
+
+** Transfer from other programs
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: ch:migration
+  :END:
+
+This section explains how you can transfer from other Gnu-based programs
+to Gpg4win. The installation program recognizes some of these programs
+and will warn you in that case.
+
+Generally it is recommended that you remove an existing installation of
+a another GnuPG-based program before installing Gpg4win. It is important
+that the existing certificates are backed up prior to the installation
+process.
+
+The only really meaningful way to do this is to use the options
+available in the old program. Search for a menu item to back up your
+private certificates as well as a menu item for backing up all existing
+public certificates. Then back them up to one or more files.
+
+As soon as you have installed Gpg4win, check whether your old
+certificates are already there. You can do this using the Kleopatra or
+GPA certificate managers. If your certificates are already there, the
+old encryption system already corresponded with the new conventions for
+certificate storage locations, and you need not do anything else.
+
+If however your old certificates do not appear, simply import them from
+the backup copies. Please read Chapter\ref{ch:ImExport}.
+
+If your old cryptography system uses the GPA certificate manager, you
+can use the backup option offered by this program. It should be very
+similar to the function of the GPA version from Gpg4win.
+
+If you cannot find any way of locating your old certificates, please use
+the Windows dashboard tools to search for files with the name
+=secring.gpg= and =pubring.gpg= and import these two
+files using Kleopatra [8].
+
+
+
+*** Migration from Gpg4win-1.1.x to Gpg4win-2.x
+
+#+index: Migration from Gpg4win
+
+It is highly recommended that you first uninstall Gpg4win-1.1.x before
+installing Gpg4win-2.x.
+
+**** Technical background
+
+The problem with a migration /that does not include / a deinstallation
+of Gpg4win-1.1.x is highlighted by the following squence:
+
+1. Installation of Gpg4win in version X, incl. component K.
+
+2. Installation of Gpg4win in version X+1, but component K is now
+de-selected.
+The result: The old K component remains installed in Version X.
+
+3. Deinstallation of Gpg4win in version X+1.
+The result: The component K in version X remains "orphaned".
+This is a restriction on Gpg4win since the first version.
+
+*Comment 1*: When switching from 1.1.x to 2.x, this case will /always/
+occur, since certain components K are no longer in existence (e.g.
+GpgEE), and hence must be deemed as (automatically) de-selected.
+
+*Comment 2*: In the case of MSI, Windows assumes the task of removing
+components that are no longer in use. This means that the MSI
+installation assistant acts correctly in the above scneario (old
+component K in version X is no longer on the operating system after step
+2).
+
+
+
+** Uninstalling Gpg4win
+
+#+index: Uninstallation
+
+If you wish to uninstall Gpg4win, you should first shut down all other
+applications that are not required, and backup all certificates. If you
+are working on a computer with restricted rights, you will need to be
+registered with *administrator rights* for deinstallation purposes. If
+the installation was already carried out through your user account, it
+has administrator rights.
+
+*Important:*
+Before you start the deinstallation process, it is highly recommended
+that you "clean" your emails in Outlook which have been processed
+with GpgOL of all GpgOL information. Because: Gpg4win/GpgOL sets a
+specific marker for each of your crypto-emails in Outlook. You have
+to reset this marker prior to uninstalling the program, so that other
+cryptography software can later read and encrypt your emails
+correctly.
+
+#+index: Re-migration of GpgOL
+For the purpose of this *re-migration*,
+GpgOL will make the following function available in Outlook: Select an
+Outlook email folder, whose emails you wish to reset, then click on
+{{{Menu(Extras\to{}Remove~GpgOL~features~from~this~folder)}}}.
+
+You will be advised that GpgOL will be shut down (for the subsequent
+deinstallation process). Confirm whether you wish to clean the emails
+of the respective folder of the GpgOL markings with Yes.
+Now execute this command for all Outlook folders.
+
+Once you have reset all folders, you can begin to uninstall Gpg4win.
+
+There are three ways of uninstalling the program:
+
+-  Using Microsoft Windows' dashboard tools:
+
+   Open {{{Menu(Start\to{}Settings\to{}Control
+       panel\to{}Software)}}} and select {{{Menu(GnuPG for Windows)}}}.
+
+   Activating {{{Button(Remove)}}} will uninstall all Gpg4win program
+   components from your operating system.
+
+-  Another way of uninstalling Gpg4win is to use the exe file
+   =gpg4win-uninstall.exe=. This file is supplied with Gpg4win
+   and can be found in your installation folder (usually
+   =C:$\backslash$Programme$\backslash$GNU$\backslash$GnuPG$\backslash$=).
+   If you have selected a path that is different from the default path
+   during the installation process, you will find the
+   deinstallationprogram in the corresponding location.
+
+-  This exe file is also found in the start menu under Gpg4win.
+
+\newpageIn all three cases, all Gpg4win files will be removed from the
+installation folder, and from the link in the start menu, desktop and
+quick start bar.
+
+User-specific and system-wide application file folders with the
+configuration settings below will *not* be deleted:
+
+-  User-specific GnuPG application data
+   in =\%APPDATA\%\gnupg=, generally corresponds with
+   file folder:
+
+   : C:\Documents and settings\<USER>\Application data\gnupg\
+
+   This =gnupg= file folder contains all personal GnuPG
+   information, hence private certificates, trust settings and program
+   configurations.
+
+-  System-wide GnuPG application data
+   in =\%COMMON\_APPDATA\%\GNU=, usually corresponds with
+   file folder:
+
+   : C:\Documents and settings\All Users\Application data\GNU\
+
+*** Uninstalling Gpg4win-1.1.3
+
+Once Gpg4win-1.1.3 has been uninstalled, the following file folders or
+registry keys will remain:
+
+-  File name:
+   - =\%APPDATA\%\gnupg= :: (Continues to be used by a Gpg4win2
+        installation.)  Important: This is where your personal private
+        and public certificates and GnuPG settings are found.
+
+-  Registry keys
+   - =HKLM\Software\GNU\GnuPG= :: (No longer used by a Gpg4win2
+        installation.)
+   - =HKCU\Software\GNU\GPG4Win= :: (No longer used by a
+        Gpg4win2 installation.)
+   - =HKCU\Software\GNU\GpgOL= :: (No longer used by a Gpg4win2
+        installation.)
+   - =HKCU\Software\GPGee= :: (No longer used by a Gpg4win2
+        installation.)
+
+
+** GNU Free Documentation License
+  :PROPERTIES:
+  :CUSTOM_ID: fdl
+  :END:
+
+#+index: GNU Free Documentation License|see GNU FDL
+#+index: GNU FDL
+#+include: "gfdl.org"
+
+** History
+
+#+index: GnuPP
+ - "GnuPP für Einsteiger", 1st edition March 2002 and
+   "GnuPP für Durchblicker", 1st edition March 2002,
+   Authors: Manfred J. Heinze, TextLab text+media
+   Consultants: Lutz Zolondz, G-N-U GmbH
+   Illustrations: Karl Bihlmeier, Bihlmeier & Kramer GbR
+   Layout: Isabel Kramer, Bihlmeier & Kramer GbR
+   Technical text: Dr. Francis Wray, e-mediate Ltd.
+   Editors: Ute Bahn, TextLab text+media
+   Publisher: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (BMWi)
+   Available at http://www.gnupp.de/pdf/einsteiger.pdf
+   und
+   http://www.gnupp.de/pdf/durchblicker.pdf.
+
+ - Revised non-published version of TextLab text+media.
+
+ - "Gpg4win für Einsteiger" and "Gpg4win für Durchblicker", December
+   2005
+   Revision: Werner Koch, g10 Code GmbH
+   Publisher: the Gpg4win Initiative
+
+ - Thanks to the authorisation of the BMWi dated 14 November 2007, the
+   non-modifiable "Impressum" section was removed and adapted to the
+   current version.
+
+ - The "Gpg4win Compendium" combines "Gpg4win für Einsteiger" and
+   "Gpg4win für Durchblicker" and has been comprehensively updated and
+   supplemented for Gpg4win2 between 2009 and 2010.
+   Major revision:
+   Werner Koch, g10 Code GmbH
+   Florian v. Samson, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
+   Informationstechnik (BSI)
+   Emanuel Schütze, Intevation GmbH
+   Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner, Intevation GmbH
+   Translated into English from the German original by:
+   Brigitte Hamilton (http://www.linguaetc.com)
+
+   Gpg4win program package and Gpg4win Compendium are available at:
+   http://www.gpg4win.org
+
+ - Converted to Org-mode format and minor edits by g10 Code GmbH in
+   November 2013.
+
+
+
+# end of text
+
+[1] Any copying, distribution and/or modification to this document may
+    not create any impression of an association with the
+    Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (Federal Ministry
+    for Economics and Technology)
+
+[2] Often also referred to as Open Source Software (OSS).
+
+[3] http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/6/6928/1.html
+
+[4] Depending on the software version of Adele, it may look differently.
+    It's translated from German.
+
+[5] Here we use RSA as an example, since it is easier to understand than
+    the ElGamal algorithm, which is used as a pre-setting to GnuPG.
+
+[6] RSA is actually optional since due to patent reasons the ElGamal
+    algorithm, which is based on the more difficult to explain problem
+    of discrete logarithm, is used as the standard.
+
+[7] [[http://www.thunderbird-mail.de/wiki/Enigmail_OpenPGP]]
+
+[8] This is not an official method, but it still works with all current
+    GnuPG versions.
+
+* COMMENT
+
+#+begin_src emacs-lisp
+;; Not needed anymore; using \frontmatter does the same
+(defun org-latex-ignore-heading-filter-headline (headline backend info)
+    "Strip headline from HEADLINE. Ignore BACKEND and INFO."
+    (when (and (org-export-derived-backend-p backend 'latex)
+               (string-match "\\`.*ignoreheading.*\n" headline))
+      (replace-match "" nil nil headline)))
+(add-to-list 'org-export-filter-headline-functions
+             'org-latex-ignore-heading-filter-headline)
+#+end_src
diff --git a/doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.tex b/doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.tex
index b78de7c..18e0851 100644
--- a/doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.tex
+++ b/doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.tex
@@ -1,6 +1,14 @@
 % gpg4win-compendium-en.tex
 % Note, that this a HyperLaTeX source and not plain LaTeX!
 
+%%
+%%                 W A R N I N G
+%%
+%% Better don't edit this file!  The file has already been converted
+%% to org-mode as gpg4win-compendium-en.org.  Furture improvements
+%% should go into the org file.  -wk 2013-11-26
+
+
 % DIN A4
 \documentclass[a4paper,11pt,oneside,openright,titlepage]{scrbook}
 
@@ -8,30 +16,29 @@
 %\documentclass[a5paper,10pt,twoside,openright,titlepage,DIV11,normalheadings]{scrbook}
 
 \usepackage{ifthen}
-\usepackage{hyperlatex}
 
 % Switch between papersize DIN A4 and A5
 % Note: please comment in/out one of the related documentclass lines above
-\T\newboolean{DIN-A5}
-%\T\setboolean{DIN-A5}{true}
+\newboolean{DIN-A5}
+%\setboolean{DIN-A5}{true}
 
 % define packages
 \usepackage{times}
-\usepackage[latin1]{inputenc}
+\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
 \usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
-\T\usepackage[english]{babel}
-\W\usepackage[english]{babel}
+\usepackage[english]{babel}
+
 \usepackage[babel]{csquotes}
-\T\defineshorthand{``}{\openautoquote}
-\T\defineshorthand{''}{\closeautoquote}
+\defineshorthand{``}{\openautoquote}
+\defineshorthand{''}{\closeautoquote}
 \usepackage{ifpdf}
 \usepackage{graphicx}
 \usepackage{alltt}
 \usepackage{moreverb}
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\usepackage{a4wide}}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\usepackage{a4wide}}
 \usepackage{microtype}
-\W\usepackage{rhxpanel}
-\W\usepackage{sequential}
+
+
 \usepackage[table]{xcolor}
 \usepackage{color}
 
@@ -44,7 +51,7 @@
 % we need this to not let smae filenames overwrite each other
 % when we have more than one compendium. The Makefile.am needs
 % to be updated for this as well - not a trivial change.
-\W\htmldirectory{compendium-html/en}
+
 
 
 % Hyperref should be among the last packages loaded
@@ -52,7 +59,7 @@
     bookmarks,
     bookmarksnumbered,
     pdftitle={The Gpg4win Compendium},
-    pdfauthor={Emanuel Schütze; Werner Koch; Florian v. Samson; Dr.
+    pdfauthor={Emanuel Schütze; Werner Koch; Florian v. Samson; Dr.
       Jan-Oliver Wagner; Ute Bahn; Karl Bihlmeier; Manfred J. Heinze;
       Isabel Kramer; Dr. Francis Wray},
     pdfsubject={Secure e-mail and file encryption using GnuPG for Windows},
@@ -60,7 +67,7 @@
     OpenPGP; S/MIME; X.509; certificate; Kleopatra; GpgOL; GpgEX;
     GnuPG; secure; email security; cryptography; public key;
     Free Software; signature; verify; FLOSS; Open Source Software;
-    PKI; folder} 
+    PKI; folder}
 ]{hyperref}
 
 %\IfFileExists{hyperxmp.sty}{
@@ -72,34 +79,32 @@
 %}
 
 % set graphic extension
-\begin{latexonly}
     \ifpdf
         \DeclareGraphicsExtensions{.png}
     \else
         \DeclareGraphicsExtensions{.eps}
     \fi
-\end{latexonly}
 
 % set page header/footer
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}
 {% DIN A5
-    \T\fancyhead{} % clear all fields
-    \T\fancyhead[LO,RE]{\itshape\nouppercase{\leftmark}}
-    \T\fancyhead[RO,LE]{\large\thepage}
-    \T\fancyfoot[CE]{www.bomots.de}
-    \T\fancyfoot[CO]{Sichere  }
-    \T\pagestyle{fancy}
+    \fancyhead{} % clear all fields
+    \fancyhead[LO,RE]{\itshape\nouppercase{\leftmark}}
+    \fancyhead[RO,LE]{\large\thepage}
+    \fancyfoot[CE]{www.bomots.de}
+    \fancyfoot[CO]{Sichere  }
+    \pagestyle{fancy}
     \renewcommand\chaptermark[1]{\markboth{\thechapter. \ #1}{}}
-    \renewcommand{\footrulewidth}{0.2pt} 
+    \renewcommand{\footrulewidth}{0.2pt}
 }
-{% DIN A4 
-    \T\fancyhead{} % clear all fields
-    \T\fancyhead[LO,RE]{The Gpg4win Compendium \compendiumVersionEN
-        \T\\
-        \T\itshape\nouppercase{\leftmark}}
-    \T\fancyhead[RO,LE]{\includegraphics[height=0.7cm]{images-compendium/gpg4win-logo}}
-    \T\fancyfoot[C]{\thepage}
-    \T\pagestyle{fancy}
+{% DIN A4
+    \fancyhead{} % clear all fields
+    \fancyhead[LO,RE]{The Gpg4win Compendium \compendiumVersionEN
+        \\
+        \itshape\nouppercase{\leftmark}}
+    \fancyhead[RO,LE]{\includegraphics[height=0.7cm]{images-compendium/gpg4win-logo}}
+    \fancyfoot[C]{\thepage}
+    \pagestyle{fancy}
 }
 
 \makeindex
@@ -115,11 +120,7 @@
 \newcommand{\marginSmime}{\marginline{\vspace{10pt}\includegraphics[width=1.5cm]{images-compendium/smime-icon}}}
 \newcommand{\IncludeImage}[2][]{
 \begin{center}
-\texorhtml{%
   \includegraphics[#1]{images-compendium/#2}%
-}{%
-  \htmlimg{../images-compendium/#2.png}%
-}
 \end{center}
 }
 
@@ -127,8 +128,8 @@
 \definecolor{gray}{rgb}{0.4,0.4,0.4}
 \definecolor{lightgray}{rgb}{0.7,0.7,0.7}
 
-\T\parindent 0cm
-\T\parskip\medskipamount
+\parindent 0cm
+\parskip\medskipamount
 
 % Get the version information from another file.
 % That file is created by the configure script.
@@ -142,8 +143,8 @@
 % e.g.: \uniurl[example link]{http:\\example.com}
 \newcommand{\uniurl}[2][]{%
 \ifthenelse{\equal{#1}{}}
-{\texorhtml{\href{#2}{\Filename{#2}}}{\xlink{#2}{#2}}}
-{\texorhtml{\href{#2}{\Filename{#1}}}{\xlink{#1}{#2}}}}
+{\href{#2}{\Filename{#2}}}
+{\href{#2}{\Filename{#1}}}
 
 %%% HYPERLATEX %%%
 \begin{ifhtml}
@@ -214,62 +215,61 @@
 %%% TITLEPAGE %%%
 
 \title{
-    \htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+%%    \htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
     \IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{gpg4win-logo}%
     \T~\newline
-    \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}%
+    \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}%
     % DIN A5:
-    {\begin{latexonly}
+    {
         \LARGE The Gpg4win Compendium\\[0.3cm]
         \large \textmd{Secure e-mail and file encryption
         \\[-0.3cm] using GnuPG for Windows}
-     \end{latexonly}  
     }%
     % DIN A4:
     {The Gpg4win Compendium \\
-      \texorhtml{\Large \textmd}{\large}
-      {Secure e-mail and file encryption using GnuPG for 
+      {\Large \textmd}
+      {Secure e-mail and file encryption using GnuPG for
       Windows}
     }
 }
 \author{
     % Hyperlatex: Add links to pdf versions and Homepage
-    \htmlonly{
-        \xml{p}\small
-        \xlink{PDF version as a download}{http://wald.intevation.org/frs/?group_id=11}
-        \xml{br}
-        \xlink{\htmlattributes*{img}{style=border:none title=German}
-           \htmlimg{../images-hyperlatex/german.png}{} 
-           German Version}{../de/\HlxThisUrl}
-        \xml{br}
-        To the \xlink{Gpg4win homepage}{http://www.gpg4win.org/}
-        \xml{p}
-    }
-    % Authors
-    \T\\[-1cm]
+%    \htmlonly{
+%        \xml{p}\small
+%        \xlink{PDF version as a download}{http://wald.intevation.org/frs/?group_id=11}
+%        \xml{br}
+%        \xlink{\htmlattributes*{img}{style=border:none title=German}
+%           \htmlimg{../images-hyperlatex/german.png}{}
+%           German Version}{../de/\HlxThisUrl}
+%        \xml{br}
+%        To the \xlink{Gpg4win homepage}{http://www.gpg4win.org/}
+%        \xml{p}
+%    }
+%    % Authors
+    \\[-1cm]
       \small Based on a version by
-    \T\\[-0.2cm]
+    \\[-0.2cm]
       \small Ute Bahn, Karl Bihlmeier, Manfred J. Heinze,
       \small Isabel Kramer und Dr. Francis Wray.
-      \texorhtml{\\[0.2cm]}{\\}
+      {\\[0.2cm]}
       \small Extensively revised by
-    \T\\[-0.2cm]
-      \small Werner Koch, Florian v. Samson, Emanuel Schütze and Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner.
-      \texorhtml{\\[0.2cm]}{\\}
+    \\[-0.2cm]
+      \small Werner Koch, Florian v. Samson, Emanuel Schütze and Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner.
+      \\[0.2cm]}
       \small Translated from the German original by
-    \T\\[-0.2cm]
+    \\[-0.2cm]
       \small Brigitte Hamilton
-    \T\\[0.4cm]
+    \\[0.4cm]
 }
 
 \date{
-    \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}%
+    \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}%
     % DIN A5:
-    {\begin{latexonly}
+    {
         \large A publication of the Gpg4win Initiative
         \\[0.2cm]
-        Version \compendiumVersionEN~from \compendiumDateEN 
-     \end{latexonly}
+        Version \compendiumVersionEN~from \compendiumDateEN
+
     }%
     % DIN A4:
     {A publication of the Gpg4win Initiative
@@ -283,28 +283,27 @@
 % BEGIN DOCUMENT %%%
 
 \begin{document}
-\T\pdfbookmark[0]{Title page}{titel}
+\pdfbookmark[0]{Title page}{titel}
 % set title page
-\texorhtml{
     \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}
     {\noindent\hspace*{7mm}\parbox{\textwidth}{\centering\maketitle}\cleardoublepage}
     {\maketitle}
-}
-{\maketitle}
+
+
 
 
 % improved handling of long (outstanding) lines
-\T\setlength\emergencystretch{3em} \tolerance=1000
+\setlength\emergencystretch{3em} \tolerance=1000
 
 
-\T\section*{Publisher's details}
-\W\chapter*{Publisher's details}\\
+\section*{Publisher's details}
+
 
 \thispagestyle{empty}
-Copyright \copyright{} 2002 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und
+Copyright \copyright{} 2002 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und
 Technologie\footnote{Any copying, distribution and/or modification to
 this document may not create any impression of an association with the
-Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 
+Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie
 (Federal Ministry for
 Economics and Technology)}\\
 Copyright \copyright{} 2005 g10 Code GmbH\\
@@ -321,7 +320,7 @@ Documentation License''.
 
 \clearpage
 \chapter*{About this compendium}
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}}{}
 
 The Gpg4win Compendium consists of three parts:
 
@@ -329,7 +328,7 @@ The Gpg4win Compendium consists of three parts:
 \item \textbf{Part~\link*{1}[\ref{part:Novices}]{part:Novices}
     ``For Novices''}: A quick course in Gpg4win.
 
-\item \textbf{Part~\link*{2}[\ref{part:AdvancedUsers}]{part:AdvancedUsers} 
+\item \textbf{Part~\link*{2}[\ref{part:AdvancedUsers}]{part:AdvancedUsers}
     ``For Advanced Users''}: Background information for Gpg4win.
 
 \item \textbf{Annex}: Additional technical information about Gpg4win.\\
@@ -339,7 +338,7 @@ The Gpg4win Compendium consists of three parts:
 Novices''} provides a brief guide for the installation and daily use
 of Gpg4win program components.  The practice robot \textbf{Adele}
 will help you with this process and allow you to practice
-the de- and encryption process (using OpenPGP) until you 
+the de- and encryption process (using OpenPGP) until you
 have become familiar with Gpg4win.
 
 The amount of time required to work through this brief guide will
@@ -367,13 +366,13 @@ The Gpg4win program package and compendium can be obtained at: \\
 \uniurl{http://www.gpg4win.org}
 
 \clearpage
-\chapter*{Legend\htmlonly{\html{br}\html{br}}}
+\chapter*{Legend}
 
 This compendium uses the following text markers:
-\begin{itemize} 
+\begin{itemize}
     \item \textit{Italics} are used for text that appears on a screen
         (e.g. in menus or dialogs). In addition, square
-        brackets are used to mark \Button{buttons}. 
+        brackets are used to mark \Button{buttons}.
 
         Sometimes italics will also be used for individual words in
         the text, if their meaning in a sentence is to be highlighted
@@ -388,18 +387,18 @@ This compendium uses the following text markers:
 
     \item \texttt{Typewriter font} is used for all file names, paths,
         URLs, source codes, as well as inputs and outputs (e.g. for
-        command lines).  
+        command lines).
 \end{itemize}
 
 \cleardoublepage
-\T\pdfbookmark[0]{\contentsname}{toc}
+\pdfbookmark[0]{\contentsname}{toc}
 \tableofcontents
 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 % Part I
 \clearpage
-\T\part{For Novices}
-\W\part*{\textbf{I For Novices}}
+\part{For Novices}
+
 \label{part:Novices}
 \addtocontents{toc}{\protect\vspace{0.3cm}}
 \addtocontents{toc}{\protect\vspace{0.3cm}}
@@ -433,7 +432,7 @@ Gpg4win includes the following programs:
     \item \textbf{GNU Privacy Assistant (GPA)}\index{GNU Privacy
         Assistent|see{GPA}}\index{GPA}\\ is an alternative program for
         managing certificates, in addition to Kleopatra.
-    \item \textbf{GnuPG for Outlook (GpgOL)}\index{GnuPG für
+    \item \textbf{GnuPG for Outlook (GpgOL)}\index{GnuPG für
         Outlook|see{GpgOL}}\index{GpgOL}\\ is an extension for
         Microsoft Outlook 2003 and 2007, which is used to sign and
         encrypt messages.
@@ -475,17 +474,17 @@ years ago, it was briefly available at the same conditions as GnuPG.
 However, this version has not corresponded with the latest state of
 technology for some time.
 
-Gpg4win's predecessors were supported by the Bundesministerium für
-Wirtschaft und Technologie \index{Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und
+Gpg4win's predecessors were supported by the Bundesministerium für
+Wirtschaft und Technologie \index{Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und
 Technologie} as part of the Security on the Internet initiative.
-Gpg4win and Gpg4win2 were supported by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
-der Informationstechnik (BSI). \index{Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
+Gpg4win and Gpg4win2 were supported by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
+der Informationstechnik (BSI). \index{Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
 Informationstechnik}
 
 
 Additional information on GnuPG and other projects undertaken by the Federal Government for security on the Internet can be found on the webpages
-\uniurl[www.bsi.de]{http://www.bsi.de} and 
-\uniurl[www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de]{http://www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de} of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
+\uniurl[www.bsi.de]{http://www.bsi.de} and
+\uniurl[www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de]{http://www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de} of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
 
 
 \clearpage
@@ -499,7 +498,7 @@ as Egypt's pharaoh Khnumhotep II, and during Herodot's and Cesar's time. Thanks
 to Gpg4win, encryption is no longer the reserve of kings, but is
 accessible to everyone, for free.
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+%\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
 \IncludeImage[width=0.9\textwidth]{egyptian-stone}
 
 Computer technology has provided us with some excellent tools to
@@ -507,7 +506,7 @@ communicate around the globe and obtain information. However, rights
 and freedoms which are taken for granted with other forms of
 communication must still be secured when it comes to new technologies.
 The Internet has developed with such speed and at such a scale that it
-has been difficult to keep up with maintaining our rights. 
+has been difficult to keep up with maintaining our rights.
 
 With the old-fashioned way of writing a letter, written contents are
 protected by an envelope. The envelope protects messages from prying
@@ -517,7 +516,7 @@ post card, which can also be read by the mail carrier and others.
 
 \clearpage
 You and no one else decides whether the message is important,
-confidential or secret. 
+confidential or secret.
 
 \Email{}s do not provide this kind of freedom. An \Email{} is like a
 post card - always open, and always accessible to the electronic
@@ -536,15 +535,15 @@ system} provides interesting background information on this topic.
 
 Why is this an issue -- because the envelope is missing.
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+%\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
 \IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{sealed-envelope}
 
 \clearpage
 What we are suggesting here is essentially an ``envelope'' for your
 electronic mail. Whether you use it, when or for whom and how often -
-that is entirely up to you. Software such as Gpg4win merely returns 
+that is entirely up to you. Software such as Gpg4win merely returns
 the right to choose to you.  The right to choose whether you think a message
-is important and requires protection. 
+is important and requires protection.
 
 This is the key aspect of the right to privacy of correspondence, post
 and telecommunications in \index{Telecommunication secrecy}
@@ -585,7 +584,7 @@ though the way it works is actually quite complicated. This section
 will explain how Gpg4win works -- not in all details, but enough to
 explain the principles behind this software. Once you are familiar
 with the principles, you will have considerable trust in the security
-offered by Gpg4win. 
+offered by Gpg4win.
 
 At the end of this book, in Chapter~\ref{ch:themath}, you can also open
 the remaining secrets surrounding ``Public Key'' cryptography and
@@ -596,9 +595,9 @@ Gpg4win using current state of technology.
 \subsubsection{Lord of the keyrings}
 Anyone wishing to secure something valuable locks it away -- with a
 key. Even better is a key that is unique and is kept in a safe
-location. 
+location.
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+%\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
 \IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{schlapphut-with-key}
 
 If the key should ever fall into the wrong hands, the valuables are no
@@ -612,7 +611,7 @@ Secret keys are nothing new in cryptography: it has always been that
 keys were hidden to protect the secrecy of the messages. Making this
 process very secure is very cumbersome and also prone to errors.
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+%\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
 \IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{tangled-schlapphut}
 
 The basic problem with the ``ordinary'' secret transmission of messages
@@ -632,23 +631,23 @@ intercepted by third parties.
 \clearpage
 In contrast -- and not including the secret key -- Gpg4win works with
 another key that is fully accessible and public. It is also described
-as a ``public key'' encryption system. 
+as a ``public key'' encryption system.
 
 This may sound contradictory, but it is not. The clue: It is no longer
 necessary to exchange a secret key. To the contrary: The secret key
 can never be exchanged! The only key that can be passed on is the
-public key (in the public certificate)~-- which anyone can know. 
+public key (in the public certificate)~-- which anyone can know.
 
 That means that when you use Gpg4win, you are actually using a pair of
 keys\index{Key!pair} -- a secret and a second public key. Both key
 components are inextricably connected with a complex mathematical
 formula. Based on current scientific and technical knowledge, it is
 not possible to calculate one key component using the other, and it is
-therefore impossible to break the method. 
+therefore impossible to break the method.
 
 Section \ref{ch:themath} explains why that is.
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{verleihnix}
 
 
@@ -668,7 +667,7 @@ Both key components have very different functions:
     The secret key component \textbf{decrypts} messages.
 \end{quote}
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.75\textwidth]{key-with-shadow-bit}
 
 \begin{quote}
@@ -691,13 +690,13 @@ method)
 \textbf{The ``secret key method'' works like this:}
 
 Imagine that you have installed a mail strongbox in front of your
-house, which you want to use to send secret messages. 
+house, which you want to use to send secret messages.
 
 The strongbox has a lock for which there is only one single key. No
 one can put anything into or take it out of the box without this key.
 This way, your secret messages are pretty secure.
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.75\textwidth]{letter-into-safe}
 
 Since there is only one key, the person you are corresponding with
@@ -710,7 +709,7 @@ You have to give this key to that person via a secret route.
 \bigskip
 \bigskip
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.75\textwidth]{secret-key-exchange}
 
 \clearpage
@@ -720,7 +719,7 @@ have the secret key.
 Therefore everything hinges on this one key: If a third party knows
 the key, it is the end of the secret messages.  Therefore you and the
 person you are corresponding with \textbf{must exchange the key in a
-manner that is as secret} as the message itself. 
+manner that is as secret} as the message itself.
 
 But actually -- you might just as well give them the secret message
 when you are giving them the key...
@@ -732,7 +731,7 @@ per \Email{}.
 
 So we might as well forget about this option ...
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.75\textwidth]{letter-out-of-safe}
 
 \clearpage
@@ -740,26 +739,26 @@ So we might as well forget about this option ...
 
 You once again install a mail strongbox\index{Mail strongbox} in front of
 your house. But unlike the strongbox in the first example, this one
-is always open. On the box hangs a key --­ which is visible to
+is always open. On the box hangs a key --­ which is visible to
 everyone -- and which can be used by anyone to lock the strongbox
 (asymetric encryption method).
 \index{Asymmetric encryption}
 
 \textbf{Locking, but not opening:} that is the difference!
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.7\textwidth]{pk-safe-open}
 
 This key is yours and -- as you might have guessed -- it is your public key.
 
 If someone wants to leave you a secret message, they put it in the
 strongbox and lock it with your public key. Anyone can do this, since
-the key is available to everyone.  
+the key is available to everyone.
 
 No one else can open the strongbox
 and read the message.  Even the person that has locked the message in
 the strongbox cannot unlock it again, e.g. in order to change the
-message.  
+message.
 
 This is because the public half of the key can only be used for locking purposes.
 
@@ -768,7 +767,7 @@ and private part of the key.
 
 \clearpage
 \textbf{Getting back to how this applies to \Email{} encryption:}
-Anyone can encrypt an \Email{} for you.  
+Anyone can encrypt an \Email{} for you.
 
 To do this, they do not need a secret key; quite the opposite, they
 only need a totally non-secret \index{Key!public}, ``public'' key.
@@ -787,9 +786,9 @@ strongbox and locked it with the recipient's key, the message is not
 accessible to anyone, including you. Only the recipient can open the
 strongbox with his private key and read the message.
 
-\T\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}
+\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}
+
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
 \IncludeImage[width=0.75\textwidth]{pk-safe-opened-with-sk}
 
 \clearpage
@@ -800,7 +799,7 @@ key!
 
 However, this is quite different from the ``non-public key'' method:
 You are the only one who knows and uses your secret key. The key is
-never forwarded to a third party  ­-- it is not necessary to transfer
+never forwarded to a third party  ­-- it is not necessary to transfer
 keys in secret, nor is it advised.
 
 Nothing must be passed between sender and recipient in secret --
@@ -834,19 +833,19 @@ On a technical level, a private key is nothing more than a file which
 is stored on your computer. To prevent unauthorised access of this
 file, it is secured in two ways:
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{think-passphrase}
 
 First, no other user may read or write in the file -- which is
 difficult to warrant, since computer administrators always have access
-to all files, and the computer may be lost or attacked 
+to all files, and the computer may be lost or attacked
 by viruses\index{Viruses}, worms\index{Worms} or
 Trojans\index{Trojans} .
 
 For this reason we need another layer of protection: the passphrase.
 This is not a password -- a passphrase should not consist of only one
 word, but a sentence, for example. You really should keep this
-passphrase ``in your head'' and never have to write it down.  
+passphrase ``in your head'' and never have to write it down.
 
 At the same time, it cannot be possible to guess it.  This may sound
 contradictory, but it is not. There are several proven methods of
@@ -860,11 +859,11 @@ $\qquad$\verb-People in glass houses should not be throwing stones.-
 
 Now, take every third letter of this sentence:
 
-$\qquad$\verb-oegsoehloerisn- 
+$\qquad$\verb-oegsoehloerisn-
 \texttt{\scriptsize{(Pe\textbf{o}pl\textbf{e} in
 \textbf{g}la\textbf{s}s h\textbf{o}us\textbf{e}s
 s\textbf{h}ou\textbf{l}d n\textbf{o}t b\textbf{e}
-th\textbf{r}ow\textbf{i}ng \textbf{s}to\textbf{n}es.)}} 
+th\textbf{r}ow\textbf{i}ng \textbf{s}to\textbf{n}es.)}}
 
 
 While it may not be easy to remember
@@ -883,14 +882,14 @@ in any order. In principle, anything goes, including umlaute, special
 characters, digits etc. But remember -- if you want to use your secret
 key abroad at a different computer, please remember that not all
 keyboards may have such special characters. For example, you will
-likely only find umlaute (ä, ö, ü usw.) on German keyboards.  
+likely only find umlaute (ä, ö, ü usw.) on German keyboards.
 
 You can also make intentional grammar mistakes, e.g.  ``mustake''
 instead of ``mistake''. Of course you also have to be able to remember
 these ``mustakes''. Or, change languages in the middle of the phrase.
 You can change the sentence:
 
-$\qquad$\verb-In München steht ein Hofbräuhaus.-
+$\qquad$\verb-In München steht ein Hofbräuhaus.-
 
 into this passphrase:
 
@@ -916,7 +915,7 @@ remember. If you make your passphrase even shorter by using special
 characters, you will save some time entering the passphrase, but it is
 also morr likely that you will forget your passphrase.
 
-Here is an extreme example of a very short but also very secure 
+Here is an extreme example of a very short but also very secure
 passphrase:
 
 $\qquad$\verb-R!Qw"s,UIb *7\$-
@@ -974,7 +973,7 @@ real.
 \index{OpenPGP} \index{S/MIME}
 
 You have seen the importance of the ``envelope'' for your
-\Email{} and how to provide one 
+\Email{} and how to provide one
 using tools of modern information technology: a mail
 strongbox,\index{Mail strongbox} in which anyone can deposit encrypted
 mails which only you, the owner of the strongbox, can decrypt. It is
@@ -1004,7 +1003,7 @@ runs \index{Chain of trust} from ``the top'' to ``the bottom'', and is
 described as a \textbf{``hierarchical trust concept''}.
 \index{Hierarchical trust concept}
 
-In the case of Gpg4win or other \Email{} encryption programs, 
+In the case of Gpg4win or other \Email{} encryption programs,
  this concept is found in almost mirror-like fashion in
 \textbf{S/MIME}. Added to this is\textbf{OpenPGP}, another concept
 that only works this way on the Internet.  S/MIME and OpenPGP have the
@@ -1036,7 +1035,7 @@ non-hierarchical Internet and its users. For example, if User B trusts
 User A, then User B could also trust the public key of User C, whom he
 does not know, if this key has been authenticated by User A.
 
-Therefore OpenPGP offers the option of exchanging encrypted data and 
+Therefore OpenPGP offers the option of exchanging encrypted data and
 \Email{}s without authentication by a higher-ranking agency. It is
 sufficient if you trust the \Email{} address and
 associated certificate of the person you are communicating with.
@@ -1052,7 +1051,7 @@ Gpg4win and understand the following chapters:
         offer the required security.
     \item The methods are \textbf{not compatible} with each other.
         They offer two alternate methods for authenticating your
-        secret communication. Therefore they are not deemed to be 
+        secret communication. Therefore they are not deemed to be
         interoperable.
     \item Gpg4win allows for the convenient \textbf{and parallel} use
         of both methods -- you do not have to choose one or the other
@@ -1064,7 +1063,7 @@ creation of the key pair, therefore branches off to discuss both methods. At
 the end of Chapter~\ref{ch:CreateKeyPair} the information is combined
 again.
 
-\begin{latexonly} %no hyperlatex
+
 In this compendium, these two symbols will be used to refer to the two
 alternative methods:
 
@@ -1073,7 +1072,6 @@ alternative methods:
 \hspace{1cm}
 \includegraphics[width=2.5cm]{images-compendium/smime-icon}
 \end{center}
-\end{latexonly}
 
 
 \clearpage
@@ -1084,7 +1082,7 @@ Chapters 1 to 5 provided you with information on the background
 related to encryption. While Gpg4win also works if you do not
 understand the logic behind it, it is also different from other
 programs in that you are entrusting your secret correspondence to this
-program. Therefore it is good to know how it works.  
+program. Therefore it is good to know how it works.
 
 With this knowledge you are now ready to install Gpg4win and set up
 your key pair.
@@ -1096,7 +1094,7 @@ existing certificates.
 
 You can load and install Gpg4win from the Internet or a CD. To do
 this, you will need administrator rights to your Windows operating
-system. 
+system.
 
 If you are downloading Gpg4win from the Internet, please ensure that
 you obtain the file from a trustworthy site, e.g.:
@@ -1145,7 +1143,7 @@ On the page that contains \textbf{the selection of components} you can
 decide which programs you want to install.
 
 A default selection has already been made for you. Yo can also install
-individual components at a later time. 
+individual components at a later time.
 
 Moving your mouse cursor over a component will display a brief
 description.  Another useful feature is the display of required hard
@@ -1181,9 +1179,9 @@ Then click on \Button{Next}.
 \clearpage
 If you have selected the default setting -- \textbf{link with start
 menu} -- you can define the name of this start menu on the next page
-or simply accept the name. 
+or simply accept the name.
 
-% screenshot:  Startmenu auswählen
+% screenshot:  Startmenu auswählen
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-inst-startmenu_en}
 
 Then click on \Button{Install}.
@@ -1219,7 +1217,7 @@ see the following page:
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-inst-finished2_en}
 
 Now you can decide whether Windows should be restarted immediately or
-manually at a later time. 
+manually at a later time.
 
 Click on \Button{Finish}.
 
@@ -1266,7 +1264,7 @@ certificates correspond with a standard described as
 ~\\ \textbf{It would be nice if I could practice this important
 step of creating a key pair ....}
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 Not to worry, you can do just that -- but only with OpenPGP:
 
 If you decide for the OpenPGP method of authentication,
@@ -1294,7 +1292,7 @@ But more on that later.
 Open Kleopatra using the Windows start menu:
 
 % screenshot Startmenu with Kleopatra highlighted
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=400}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.7\textwidth]{sc-kleopatra-startmenu_en}
 
 You will see the main Kleopatra screen\index{Kleopatra} --
@@ -1302,14 +1300,14 @@ the certificate administration:
 \index{Certificate administration}
 
 % screenshot: Kleopatra main window
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=508}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-kleopatra-mainwindow-empty_en}
 
 At the beginning, this overview will be empty, since you have not
-created or imported any certificates yet. 
+created or imported any certificates yet.
 
 \clearpage
-Click on \Menu{File$\rightarrow$New~Certificate}. 
+Click on \Menu{File$\rightarrow$New~Certificate}.
 
 In the following dialog you select the format for the certificate. You
 can choose from the following: \textbf{OpenPGP} (PGP/MIME)
@@ -1344,7 +1342,7 @@ read either:
 \label{createKeyPairOpenpgp}
 \index{OpenPGP!create certificate}
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 In the certificate option dialog, click on \Button{Create
 personal OpenPGP key pair}.
 
@@ -1363,7 +1361,7 @@ public just like your name and \Email{} address.
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-kleopatra-openpgp-personalDetails_en}
 
 If you first wish to \textbf{test} your OpenPGP key pair, you can
-simply enter any name and fictional 
+simply enter any name and fictional
 \Email{} address, e.g.:\\ \Filename{Heinrich Heine}
 and \Filename{heinrich at gpg4win.de}
 
@@ -1393,31 +1391,31 @@ To create a key pair, you must enter your personal passphrase:
 
 If you have read Chapter~\ref{ch:passphrase} you should now have an
 easy-to-remember but hard to break secret passphrase. Enter it in the
-dialog displayed at the top. 
+dialog displayed at the top.
 
 Please note that this window may have been opened in the background
-and is not visible at first. 
+and is not visible at first.
 
 If the passphrase is not secure enough because it is too short or does
 not contain any numbers or special characters, the system will tell
-you. 
+you.
 
 At this point you can also enter a \textbf{test passphrase} or start
-in earnest; it's up to you. 
+in earnest; it's up to you.
 
 To make sure that you did not make any typing errors, the system will
 prompt you to enter your passphrase twice.  Always confirm your entry
 with \Button{OK}.
 
 \clearpage
-Now your OpenPGP key pair is being created: 
+Now your OpenPGP key pair is being created:
 
 % screenshot: Creating OpenPGP Certificate - Create Key
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-kleopatra-openpgp-createKey_en}
 
 This may take a couple of minutes. You can assist the creation of the
 required random numbers by entering information in the lower input
-field.  It does not matter what you type, as the characters will 
+field.  It does not matter what you type, as the characters will
 not be used, only the time period between each key stroke. You can also
 continue working with another application on your computer, which will
 also slightly increase the quality of the new key pair.
@@ -1433,13 +1431,13 @@ The 40-digit ``fingerprint'' of your newly\index{Fingerprint}
 generated OpenPGP certificate is displayed in the results text field.
 This fingerprint is unique anywhere in the world, i.e. no other person
 will have a certificate with the same fingerprint. Actually, even at
-8 digits it would already be quite unlikely that the same sequence would 
-occur twice anywhere in world.  For this reason, it is often only the 
+8 digits it would already be quite unlikely that the same sequence would
+occur twice anywhere in world.  For this reason, it is often only the
 last 8 digits of a
 fingerprint which are used or shown, and which are described as the
 key ID.\index{Key!ID} This fingerprint
 identifies the identity of the certificate as well as the fingerprint
-of a person. 
+of a person.
 
 However, you do not need to remember or write down the fingerprint.
 You can also display it later in Kleopatra's certificate details.
@@ -1459,16 +1457,16 @@ Next, you can activate one or more of the following three buttons:
     Kleopatra will automatically select the file type and store your
     certificate as an \Filename{.asc} or\Filename{.gpg} file --
     depending on whether you activate or deactivate the \textbf{ASCII
-    armor} option. 
-    
+    armor} option.
+
     For export, click on \Button{OK}.
 
     \textbf{Important:} If you save the file on the hard drive, you
     should copy the file to another data carrier (USB stick, diskette
     or CD-ROM) as soon as possible, and delete the original file
     without a trace, i.e. do not leave it in the Recycle bin! Keep
-    this data carrier and back-up copy in a safe place.  
-    
+    this data carrier and back-up copy in a safe place.
+
     You can also create a back-up copy later; to do this, select the
     following from the Kleopatra main menu:
     \Menu{File$\rightarrow$Export private certificate...} (see Chapter
@@ -1511,7 +1509,7 @@ the explanations for OpenPGP and X.509 will again be identical.
 \label{createKeyPairX509}
 \index{X.509!create certificate}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 In the certificate format selection dialog on page~,
 \pageref{chooseCertificateFormat} click on the button\\
 \Button{Create personal X.509 key pair and authentication
@@ -1524,7 +1522,7 @@ Locality) and department (OU = Organizational Unit).
 
 If you first wish to \textbf{test} the X.509 key pair creation
 process, you can enter any information for name, organization and
-country code, and can also enter a fictional 
+country code, and can also enter a fictional
 \Email{} address, e.g.:\Filename{CN=Heinrich
 Heine,O=Test,C=DE,EMAIL=heinrich at gpg4win.de}
 
@@ -1558,14 +1556,14 @@ passphrase:
 
 If you have read Chapter~\ref{ch:passphrase} you should now have an
 easy-to-remember but hard to break secret passphrase. Enter it in the
-dialog displayed at the top! 
+dialog displayed at the top!
 
 Please note that this window may have been opened in the background,
-so it may not be visible at first. 
+so it may not be visible at first.
 
 If the passphrase is not secure enough because it is too short or does
 not contain any numbers or special characters, the system will let you
-know. 
+know.
 
 At this point you can also enter a \textbf{test passphrase} or start
 in earnest; it's up to you.
@@ -1584,7 +1582,7 @@ Now your X.509 key pair is being created:
 
 This may take a couple of minutes. You can assist the creation of the
 required random numbers by entering information in the lower input
-field.  It does not matter what you type, as the characters will 
+field.  It does not matter what you type, as the characters will
 not be used, only the time period between each key stroke. You can also
 continue working with other applications on your computer, which will
 slightly increase the quality of the key pair that is being created.
@@ -1610,7 +1608,7 @@ The next steps are triggered with the following buttons:
     authentication instance (CA) that issues X.509 certificates free
     of charge.
 
-\item[Sending an request by \Email{}  
+\item[Sending an request by \Email{}
     ...]~\\This
     creates a new \Email{} with the certificate request
     which has just been created in the attachment. Enter a recippient
@@ -1621,8 +1619,8 @@ The next steps are triggered with the following buttons:
     \textbf{Please note:} Not all \Email{} programs support this
     function. Of course you can also do this manually: If you do not
     see a new \Email{}window, save your request in a file (see above)
-    and send it by \Email{} to your certificate authority (CA). 
-    
+    and send it by \Email{} to your certificate authority (CA).
+
     As soon as the CA has processed your request, the CA system
     administrator will send you the completed X.509 certificate, which
     has been signed by the CA. You only need to import the file into
@@ -1636,14 +1634,14 @@ End the Kleopatra assistant with \Button{Finish}.
 \clearpage
 \subsubsection{Creating an X509 certificate using www.cacert.org}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 CAcert\index{CAcert} is a non-commercial certificate authority which
 issues X.509 certificates free of charge. It offers an alternative to
 commercial root CAs, some of which charge very high fees for their
-certificates. 
+certificates.
 
 To create a (client) certificate at CAcert, you first have to register
-at \uniurl[www.cacert.org]{http://www.cacert.org}. 
+at \uniurl[www.cacert.org]{http://www.cacert.org}.
 
 Immediately following registration, you can create one or more client
 certificates on cacert.org: please make sure you have sufficient key
@@ -1657,7 +1655,7 @@ links to your new X.509 certificate and associated CAcert root
 certificate. Download both certificates.
 
 Follow the instructions to install the certificate on your browser. In
-Firefox, you can use e.g. 
+Firefox, you can use e.g.
 \Menu{Edit$\rightarrow$Settings$\rightarrow$Advanced$\rightarrow$Certificates}
 to find your installed certificate under the first tab ``Your
 certificates" with the name (CN) \textbf{CAcert WoT User}.
@@ -1702,7 +1700,7 @@ which was just created can be found in the certificate administration
 under the tab \Menu{My certificates}:
 
 % screenshot: Kleopatra with new openpgp certificate
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=508}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-kleopatra-withOpenpgpTestkey_en}
 
 \clearpage
@@ -1710,10 +1708,10 @@ Double-click on your new certificate to view all details related to
 the certificate:
 
 % screenshot: details of openpgp certificate
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=508}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-kleopatra-openpgp-certificateDetails_en}
 
-What do the certificate details mean? 
+What do the certificate details mean?
 
 Your certificate is valid indefinitely, i.e. it has no ``built-in
 expiry date''. To change its validity at a later point, click
@@ -1736,7 +1734,7 @@ secure, you have already gone a long way towards ensuring secrecy.
 
 Everyone can and should have your public certificate, and you can and
 should have the public certificates of your correspondence partners --
-the more, the better. 
+the more, the better.
 
 Because:
 
@@ -1777,9 +1775,9 @@ Let's look at the first two variants on the following pages.
 Do you wish to make your public certificate accessible to the person
 you are corresponding with? Simply send them your exported public
 certificate per \Email{}. This section will show you how this
-works.\\ 
+works.\\
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 Practice this process with your public OpenPGP certificate! Adele can
 assist you. The following exercises only apply to OpenPGP; for
 information on publishing public X.509 certificates, please see
@@ -1795,20 +1793,20 @@ correspond with a smart human being rather than a piece of software
 
 First, send Adele your public OpenPGP certificate. Using the public
 key in this certificate, Adele will send an encrypted \Email{}
-back to you. 
+back to you.
 
 You then use your own secret key to decrypt Adele's response. To be
 able to respond to Adele with an encrypted \Email{}, Adele has
-attached her own public certificate. 
+attached her own public certificate.
 
 Adele acts just like a real person you are corresponding with. Of
 course, Adele's \Email{}s are not nearly as interesting as those from
 the people you are actually corresponding with. On the other hand, you
 can use Adele to practice as much as you like -- which a real person
-might find bothersome after a while. 
+might find bothersome after a while.
 
 So, now you export your public OpenPGP certificate and send it via
-\Email{} to Adele. The following pages how how this works. 
+\Email{} to Adele. The following pages how how this works.
 
 
 \clearpage
@@ -1822,12 +1820,12 @@ Select a suitable file folder on your PC and save the public
 certificate with the file type\Filename{.asc} e.g.:
 \Filename{mein-OpenPGP-Zertifikat.asc}. The other file types, which
 can be selected, \Filename{.gpg} or\Filename{.pgp}, will save your
-certificate in binary format. That means that in contrast to an 
-\Filename{.asc}file, they cannot be read in the text editor. 
+certificate in binary format. That means that in contrast to an
+\Filename{.asc}file, they cannot be read in the text editor.
 
 When you select the menu item, please make sure that you are only
 exporting your public certificate -- and \textit{not } the certificate
-of your entire key pair with the associated private key by mistake. 
+of your entire key pair with the associated private key by mistake.
 
 Review the file once more by selecting Windows Explorer and selecting
 the same folder that you indicated for the export.
@@ -1836,22 +1834,22 @@ Now \textbf{open} the exported certificate file with a text
 editor, e.g. WordPad. The text editor will display your public OpenPGP
 certificate as it really looks -- a fairly confusing block of text and
 numbers:
-\T\enlargethispage{\baselineskip}
+\enlargethispage{\baselineskip}
 
 % screenshot: Editor mit ascii armored key
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-wordpad-editOpenpgpKey_en}
 
 \clearpage
 When publishing your OpenPGP certificate by \Email{}, there are
-two variants which can take into account whether an 
+two variants which can take into account whether an
 \Email{} program can send attachments.
 
-\subsubsection{Variant 1: Send public OpenPGP certificate as an 
+\subsubsection{Variant 1: Send public OpenPGP certificate as an
 \Email{} text}
 
 This option always works, even if you are not able to attach files --
 as may be the case with some \Email{} services on the Web.\\ Also,
-it is a way of seeing your public certificate for the first time, 
+it is a way of seeing your public certificate for the first time,
 knowing exactly what is behind it, and what the certificate actually
 consists of.
 
@@ -1868,8 +1866,8 @@ of your computer (Clipboard in a Windows context).
 Now you can start your \Email{} program -- it does not matter which
 one you use -- and add your public certificate into an empty \Email{}.
 In Windows, the key command for adding (``Paste'') is
-\Filename{Ctrl+V}. You may know this process ­-- copying and pasting
-­-- as ``Copy \& Paste''. 
+\Filename{Ctrl+V}. You may know this process ­-- copying and pasting
+­-- as ``Copy \& Paste''.
 
 The \Email{} program should be set up in such a way that it is
 possible to send only text messages and not HTML formated messages
@@ -1886,7 +1884,7 @@ This is approximately what your \Email{} will look like:
 % screenshot: Outlook composer fenster mit openpgp zertifikat.
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-ol-adele-sendOpenpgpKey-inline_en}
 
-Now send the \Email{} to Adele. Make sure to include your  
+Now send the \Email{} to Adele. Make sure to include your
 \textit{own} \Email{} address as the sender. Otherwise you will never receive Adele's response ...
 
 \clearpage
@@ -1899,7 +1897,7 @@ Above, you learnt about the ``Copy \& Paste'' method,
 because it is more transparent and easier to understand.
 
 Now write another \Email{} to Adele -- this time with the certificate
-file in the attachment: 
+file in the attachment:
 
 Add the previously exported certificate file as an attachment to your
 new \Email{} -- just as you would for any other file (e.g. pulling the
@@ -1909,10 +1907,10 @@ OpenPGP certificate - as a file attachment}.
 
 Of course you can also add a few explanatory sentences.  However,
 Adele does not need this explanations, because her only purpose is to
-help you practice this process. 
+help you practice this process.
 
 Your finished \Email{} should look something like this:
-\T\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}
+\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}
 
 % screenshot: Outlook composer window with attached openpgp certificate
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-ol-adele-sendOpenpgpKey-attachment_en}
@@ -1926,7 +1924,7 @@ You have exported your public OpenPGP certificate in Kleopatra into a
 file. Subsequently, you have also copied the content of the file
 directly into an \Email{} and attached the complete file as an
 \Email{}attachment. Both \Email{}s have been sent to someone else
--- in this case, to Adele. 
+-- in this case, to Adele.
 
 The same process applies if you are sending your public certificate to
 a real \Email{} address. Usually, you should send public certificates
@@ -1939,12 +1937,12 @@ directly into his own certificate administration (e.g. Kleopatra).
 \section{Publish via OpenPGP certificate server}
 \label{sec_publishPerKeyserver}
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 \textbf{Please note: You can only distribute your OpenPGP certificate
 via an OpenPGP certificate server.}
 
 Publishing your public OpenPGP certificate on a public certificate server is
-always a good idea, even if you are only exchanging encrypted \Email{}s 
+always a good idea, even if you are only exchanging encrypted \Email{}s
 with just a few people. This way, your public certificate is
 accessible to everyone on an Internet server. This saves you time in
 having to send your certificate \Email{} to all of the people
@@ -1954,8 +1952,8 @@ At the same time, publishing your \Email{} address on a certificate server can
 also make your \Email{} address more susceptible to spam. This can
 only be addressed with good spam protection.
 
-~\\ \textbf{This is how it works:} Select your public OpenPGP certificate in Kleopatra 
-and click on \Menu{File$\rightarrow$Export certificate to server...}. 
+~\\ \textbf{This is how it works:} Select your public OpenPGP certificate in Kleopatra
+and click on \Menu{File$\rightarrow$Export certificate to server...}.
 If you have not defined a certificate server, you will see a warning:
 
 % screenshot: Kleopatra keyserver export warning
@@ -1967,7 +1965,7 @@ The public OpenPGP certificate server already contains
 server. There, your public certificate is distributed to all globally
 connected certificate servers. Anyone can download your public certificate
 from one of these OpenPGP certificate servers and use it send you a secure
-\Email{}. 
+\Email{}.
 
 If you are only testing this process, please do \textit{not} send the
 practice certificate: In the top dialog, click on \Button{Cancel}. The
@@ -1981,7 +1979,7 @@ floating around on these servers ...
 Now you know how to publish your public OpenPGP certificate on an
 OpenPGP certificate server on the Internet.
 
-\textbf{For information on how to search for the public OpenPGP 
+\textbf{For information on how to search for the public OpenPGP
 certificate of people you are corresponding with on a certificate server, see
 Chapter~\ref{ch:keyserver}. You can read this chapter now or later when
 you need this function.}
@@ -1991,39 +1989,39 @@ you need this function.}
 \section{Publishing X.509 certificates}
 \label{publishPerEmailx509}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 In the case of public X.509 certificates, this process is even easier:
 all you need to do is to send a signed S/MIME \Email{} to the person
 you are corresponding with. Your public X.509 certificate is contained
 in this signature, and can be imported into the recipient's
-certificate administration. 
+certificate administration.
 
 Unfortunately, you cannot use Adele to practice X.509 certificates
 since the robot only supports OpenPGP.  Therefore you should pick
-another person to write you, or alternately write to yourself. 
+another person to write you, or alternately write to yourself.
 
 Some public X.509 certificates are distributed by the certificate
 authority. This is usually done using X.509 certificate servers, which however
 do not synchronize on a global basis, as is the case with OpenPGP key
-servers. 
+servers.
 
 When you export your public X.509 certificate, you can highlight the
 entire public certificate chain\index{Certificate!chain} and save it
 in a file -- generally the root certificate, CA
 certificate\index{Certificate!CA} and personal certificate -- or only
-your public certificate. 
+your public certificate.
 
 The first is recommended since the person you are corresponding with
 may be missing some parts of the chain, which he otherwise would have
 to find. To do this, click on all elements of the certificate chain in
 Kleopatra while holding the Shift key, and export the highlighted
-certificate into a file. 
+certificate into a file.
 
 If the person you are corresponding with does not have the root
 certificate, he must indicate that he trusts it, or have an
 administrator do so, in order to finally also trust you. If this has
 already been done (e.g. because they are both part of the same
-``root''), then this  shiop is already in place. 
+``root''), then this  shiop is already in place.
 
 
 \clearpage
@@ -2032,13 +2030,13 @@ already been done (e.g. because they are both part of the same
 \index{E-mail!decrypt}
 
 Gpg4win, the certificate of your key pair and of course your
-passphrase are all you need to decrypt \Email{}s. 
+passphrase are all you need to decrypt \Email{}s.
 
 This Chapter shows you step for step how to decrypt \Email{}s in
 Microsoft Outlook using the Gpg4win program component GpgOL.
 \index{Outlook}
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 Initially, you can practice this process with Adele and your public
 OpenPGP certificate. The following exercises again only apply to
 OpenPGP -- explanations regarding the decryption of S/MIME
@@ -2050,7 +2048,7 @@ OpenPGP certificate to Adele. Using this certificate, Adele will now
 encrypt an \Email{} and send a message back to you. You should
 receive Adele's response after a short time period.
 
-\T\enlargethispage{\baselineskip}
+\enlargethispage{\baselineskip}
 
 % cartoon: Adele typing and sending a mail
 \IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{adele02}
@@ -2073,22 +2071,22 @@ control the actual GnuPG encryption software and hence not just manage
 your certificates but also take care of all cryptographic tasks (with
 GnuPG's assistance). Kleopatra provides the visual user interface,
 hence the dialogs which you as the user see while you encrypt or
-decrypt \Email{}s. 
+decrypt \Email{}s.
 
 Hence Kleopatra processes Adele's encrypted
 \Email{}s. These \Email{}s have been encrypted by Adele using
-\textit{your} public OpenPGP key. 
+\textit{your} public OpenPGP key.
 
 To decrypt the message, Kleopatra
 will now ask for your passphrase that protects your private key. Enter
-your passphrase. 
+your passphrase.
 
 The decryption is successful if you do not see an
-error dialog! You can now read the decrypted \Email{}. 
+error dialog! You can now read the decrypted \Email{}.
 
 You can retrieve the exact results dialog of the decryption by
 clicking on \Menu{Extras$\rightarrow$GpgOL decryption/check} in the
-menu of the opened \Email{}. 
+menu of the opened \Email{}.
 
 However, surely you also want to see the result, namely the decrypted
 message ...
@@ -2101,14 +2099,14 @@ this\footnote{Depending on the software version of Adele, it may look
 differently. It's translated from German.}:
 
 %TODO: besser ein Screenshot von einer Adele-Mail in OL.
-%TODO: Schlüssel -> Zertifikat
+%TODO: Schlüssel -> Zertifikat
 
 \begin{verbatim}
-Hello Heinrich Heine, 
+Hello Heinrich Heine,
 
-here is an encrypted response to your e-mail. 
+here is an encrypted response to your e-mail.
 
-I received your public key with the key ID 
+I received your public key with the key ID
 FE7EEC85C93D94BA and the name
 `Heinrich Heine <heinrich at gpg4win.de>'.
 
@@ -2119,7 +2117,7 @@ Regards,
 adele at gnupp.de
 \end{verbatim}
 
-The text block that follows is Adele's public certificate. 
+The text block that follows is Adele's public certificate.
 
 In the next chapter, you will import this certificate and add it to
 your certificate administration. You can use imported public
@@ -2140,17 +2138,17 @@ corresponding with, or to check their signed \Email{}s.
 \subsubsection{\Email{} decryption using S/MIME}
 \label{encrypt-smime}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 So this is how \Email{}s are decrypted using the private OpenPGP
-key -- but how does it work with S/MIME? 
+key -- but how does it work with S/MIME?
 
 The answer: The same!
 
 To decrypt an encrypted S/MIME \Email{}, simply open the
 message in Outlook and enter your passphrase in the pin entry
 dialog. You will see a status dialog that is similar to that shown for
-OpenPGP. After closing this dialog, you will see the decrypted S/MIME 
-\Email{}. 
+OpenPGP. After closing this dialog, you will see the decrypted S/MIME
+\Email{}.
 
 Differently from OpenPGP decryption, however, when
 using S/MIME you cannot use Adele to practice, since Adele only
@@ -2170,7 +2168,7 @@ administrator -- e.g. Kleopatra.
 
 Before you import a public certificate into Kleopatra, you must save
 it in a file. Depending on whether you received the certificate as an
-\Email{}file attachment or as a block of text contained in your \Email{}, 
+\Email{}file attachment or as a block of text contained in your \Email{},
 please proceed as follows:
 
 \begin{itemize}
@@ -2181,16 +2179,16 @@ please proceed as follows:
 
 \item If the public certificate was mailed as a block of text
     that \textbf{was included in the} \Email{}, you have to
-    highlighte the entire certificate:  
-    
+    highlighte the entire certificate:
+
     In the case of (public)
-    OpenPGP certificates, please highlight the area from 
+    OpenPGP certificates, please highlight the area from
 
     \Filename{-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----}\\ up to\\
-    \Filename{-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----} 
-    
-    just as we have seen in Section~\ref{sec_publishPerEmail}. 
-    
+    \Filename{-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----}
+
+    just as we have seen in Section~\ref{sec_publishPerEmail}.
+
     Now use Copy \&  Paste to
     insert the highlighted section into a text editor and save the
     public certificate. For file endings, you should use
@@ -2203,7 +2201,7 @@ please proceed as follows:
 \clearpage
 \subsubsection{Importing public certificates into Kleopatra}
 
-Whether you have saved the public certificate as an \Email{} 
+Whether you have saved the public certificate as an \Email{}
 attachment or text block -- in both cases, you will be importing it
 into your Kleopatra certificate administration. To do this, start
 Kleopatra if the program is not running already. In the menu, click
@@ -2228,13 +2226,13 @@ than one certificate. You can close the tab using the
 ``Close tab'' button on the right side of the window).
 
 Now change over to the tab ``Other certificates''. You should also be
-able to see the public certificate you have imported. 
+able to see the public certificate you have imported.
 
 Now you have imported someone else's certificate~-- in this case
 Adele's public OpenPGP certificate -- into your certificate
 administration. You can use this certificate at any time to send
 encrypted messages to the owner of the certificate, and to check his
-signatures. 
+signatures.
 
 As soon as you are exchanging encrypted \Email{} more
 frequently and with a larger number of persons, you will likely want
@@ -2246,10 +2244,10 @@ servers. To see how this works, please see Chapter~\ref{ch:keyserver}
 How do you know that the public OpenPGP certificate really came from
 Adele? It is possible to send \Email{}s under someone else's
 name -- in this respect, merely having the sender's name does not mean
-anything. 
+anything.
 
 So how can you ensure that a public certificate actually
-belongs to the sender? 
+belongs to the sender?
 
 \textbf{This key question related to certificate inspections is
 explained in the next Chapter~\ref{ch:trust}}.
@@ -2279,7 +2277,7 @@ other certificate.
 
 Each certificate features a unique identification, which is even
 better than someone's fingerprint. For this reason this identification
-is also referred to as a ``fingerprint''. 
+is also referred to as a ``fingerprint''.
 
 If you display the details of a certificate in Kleopatra, e.g. by
 double-clicking on the certificate, you will see its 40-character
@@ -2292,12 +2290,12 @@ The fingerprint of the above OpenPGP certificate is therefore as
 follows:\\ \Filename{7EDC0D141A82250847448E91FE7EEC85C93D94BA}
 
 ~\\In short - the fingerprint clearly identifies the certificate and
-its owner. 
+its owner.
 
 Simply call the person you are corresponding with and let them read
 the fingerprint of their certificate to you. If the information
 matches the certificate you have on hand, you clearly have the right
-certificate. 
+certificate.
 
 Of course you can also meet the owner of the certificate in person, or
 use another method to ensure that certificate and owner can be
@@ -2310,11 +2308,11 @@ guaranteed, you can save yourself a phone call.
 \subsubsection{Authenticating an OpenPGP certificate}
 \index{Certificate!authenticate}
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 Once you have obtained confirmation of the authenticity of the
 certificate ``via a fingerprint'', you can authenticate it -- but only
 in OpenPGP. With X.509, users cannot authenticate certificates -- this
-can only be done by the certificate authorities (CA). 
+can only be done by the certificate authorities (CA).
 
 By authenticating a certificate, you are letting other (Gpg4win) users
 know that you are of the opinion that this certificate is real --
@@ -2323,7 +2321,7 @@ certificate, and help to increase the general level of trust in its
 authenticity.
 
 ~\\
-\textbf{So how does the authentication process work?}\\ 
+\textbf{So how does the authentication process work?}\\
 In Kleopatra, select an OpenPGP certificate that you think is real and
 would like to authenticate. In the menu, select:
 \Menu{Certificates$\rightarrow$Authenticate certificates...}
@@ -2347,7 +2345,7 @@ variant, you have the option of subsequently uploading the
 authenticated certificate to an OpenPGP certificate server, and hence make an
 updated and authenticated certificate available to the entire world.
 
-Now confirm your selection with \Button{Authenticate}. 
+Now confirm your selection with \Button{Authenticate}.
 
 Similar to the process of signing an \Email{}, you also have to enter
 your passphrase when authenticating a certificate (with your private
@@ -2363,7 +2361,7 @@ Following a successful authentication, the following window appears:
 ~\\Do you want to check the authentication one more? To do this, open
 the certificate details of the certificate you have just
 authenticated.Select the tab \Menu{User ID and authentications} and
-click on the button \Button{Obtain authentications}. 
+click on the button \Button{Obtain authentications}.
 
 You will now see all authentications contained in this certificate,
 sorted by user ID. You should also be able to see your certificate in
@@ -2373,23 +2371,23 @@ this list, if you have just authenticated it.
 \subsubsection{Web of trust}
 \index{Web of Trust}
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 The process of authenticating certificates creates a ``Web of Trust''
 (WoT), which extends beyond the group of Gpg4win users and their
 correspondence, and it means that you are not always required to
 verify an OpenPGP certificate for its authenticity.
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{key-with-sigs}
 
 Naturally, trust in a certificate will increase if it has been
 authenticated by a lot of people. Your own OpenPGP certificate will
 receive authentications from other GnuPG users over time. This enables
 more and more people to trust that this certificate is really yours
-and not someone else's. 
+and not someone else's.
 
 The continued weaving of this ``Web of Trust'' creates a flexible
-authentication structure. 
+authentication structure.
 
 There is one theoretical possibility of making this certificate test
 null and void: Someone plants a wrong certificate on you. In other
@@ -2416,17 +2414,17 @@ known to you by phoning the municipal office, but rather trust that
 the office that issued the ID will have already checked and
 authenticated these details.
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 These types of authentication instances also exist in the case of
 OpenPGP certificates. In Germany, for example, the magazine c't has
 long been offering such a service free of charge, as have many
-universities. 
+universities.
 
 Therefore, if you have received an OpenPGP certificate
 whose authenticity has been confirmed by such an authentication
 instance, you should be able to rely on it.
- 
-\T\marginSmime
+
+\marginSmime
 Such authentication instances or ``Trust Centers'' are also provided
 for in other encryption methods -- such as S/MIME. However, in
 contrast to the "Web of Trust", these feature a hierarchical
@@ -2439,7 +2437,7 @@ a seal: The sticker on your license plate can only be provided by an
 institution that is authorised to issue such stickers, and they have
 received that right from another superordinate body. On a technical
 level, an authentication is \index{Authentication} nothing more than
-an authenticating party signing a certificate. 
+an authenticating party signing a certificate.
 
 Of course, hierarchical authentication infrastructures are much better
 suited to the requirements of government and official instances than
@@ -2450,7 +2448,7 @@ addition to the ``Web of Trust'' (OpenPGP). Accordingly, Gpg4win
 offers a basis that corresponds with the Signature Act of the Federal
 Republic\index{Signature law} of Germany.
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 If you would like to learn more about this topic, the following websites provide more information on this and other IT security topics:
 \begin{itemize}
     \item \uniurl[www.bsi.de]{http://www.bsi.de}
@@ -2469,7 +2467,7 @@ found at:\\
 \index{E-mail!encrypt}
 
 Now it is getting exciting again: You are sending an encrypted
-\Email{}. 
+\Email{}.
 
 In this case, you will need Outlook (or another \Email{} program that
 supports cryptography), Kleopatra and of course the public certificate
@@ -2477,27 +2475,27 @@ of the person you are correspondign with.
 
 \textbf{Note for OpenPGP:}
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 You can use Adele to practice the encryption process with OpenPGP; on
 the other hand, Adele does not support S/MIME. You can send the
 \Email{} to be encrypted to \Filename{adele at gnupp.de}. It does not
 matter what your write in your message, since Adele cannot read it.
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 
 \textbf{Note for S/MIMIE:}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 Following the installation of Gpg4win, the S/MIME functionality is
 already activated in GpgOL. If you want to turn off S/MIME (with
 GnuPG), for example to use Outlook's own S/MIME function, you have to
 deactivate the option \Menu{Activate S/MIME support} in the following
 GpgOL option dialog under
-\Menu{Extras$\rightarrow$Options$\rightarrow$GpgOL}: 
+\Menu{Extras$\rightarrow$Options$\rightarrow$GpgOL}:
 
 % screenshot: GpgOL options
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{
-    \T\IncludeImage[width=0.75\textwidth]{sc-gpgol-options_en}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{
+    \IncludeImage[width=0.75\textwidth]{sc-gpgol-options_en}
 \T}
 \T{
     \IncludeImage[width=0.55\textwidth]{sc-gpgol-options_en}
@@ -2508,12 +2506,12 @@ GpgOL option dialog under
 \subsubsection{Send an encrypted message}
 
 First, compose a new in Outlook and address it to the person you are
-writing to. 
+writing to.
 
 To send your message as in an encrypted form, select the item
 \Menu{Extras$\rightarrow$Encrypt message} in the menu of the message
 window. The button with the lock icon in the tool bar is activated --
-you can also click right on the lock. 
+you can also click right on the lock.
 
 Your Outlook message windows should look something like this:
 
@@ -2524,10 +2522,10 @@ Now click \Button{Send}.
 
 \label{encryptProtocol} ~\\Gpg4win will automatically detect the
 protocol -- OpenPGP or S/MIME -- of the public certificate provided by
-the person you are corresponding with. 
+the person you are corresponding with.
 
 As long as there is only one certificate that matches the recipient's
-\Email{} address, your message will be encrypted and sent. 
+\Email{} address, your message will be encrypted and sent.
 
 
 \clearpage
@@ -2581,7 +2579,7 @@ own private OpenPGP key.
 This chapter also explains how to \textbf{sign} a complete
 \textbf{\Email{}} rather than only the certificate. That means
 applying a digital signature to the \Email{} -- which is a form of an
-electronic seal.  
+electronic seal.
 
 ``Sealed'' in this way, the text can still be read by everyone, but it
 allows the recipient to find out whether the \Email{} was manipulated
@@ -2599,17 +2597,17 @@ website. While these \Email{} signatures simply function as a type of
 business card, a digital signature will protect your \Email{} from
 manipulation and clearly confirms the sender.
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 Besides, a digital signature cannot be compared with a qualified
 electronic signature, \index{Signature!qualified electronic} as it
-went into effect as part of the Signature Act\index{Signature Act} 
+went into effect as part of the Signature Act\index{Signature Act}
 (22~May 2001). However, it serves exactly the same purpose for private
 or professional \Email{} communication.
 
-% cartoon: Müller mit Schlüssel
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{
-    \T\IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{man-with-signed-key}
+% cartoon: Müller mit Schlüssel
+
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{
+    \IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{man-with-signed-key}
 \T}
 \T{
     \IncludeImage[width=0.35\textwidth]{man-with-signed-key}
@@ -2617,7 +2615,7 @@ or professional \Email{} communication.
 
 \clearpage
 \section{Signing with GpgOL}
-\T\enlargethispage{\baselineskip}
+\enlargethispage{\baselineskip}
 In fact, signing an \Email{} is even easier than encrypting it (see
 Chapter~\ref{ch:encrypt}). Once you have composed a new \Email{}, go
 through the following steps -- similar to the encryption process:
@@ -2653,7 +2651,7 @@ Now click on \Button{Send}.
 
 Just as is the case for encrypting \Email{}s, Gpg4win automatically
 detects the protocol -- OpenPGP or S/MIME -- for which your own
-certificate (with the private key for signing) is available. 
+certificate (with the private key for signing) is available.
 
 If you have your own OpenPGP \textit{and} S/MIME certificate with the
 same \Email{} address, Kleopatra will ask you to select a protocol
@@ -2688,7 +2686,7 @@ It makes sense, because only your own private key confirms your identity. The pe
 
 Confirm your passphrase entry with \Button{OK}. Your message is now signed and sent.
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 Once your message has been signed successfully, the following dialog appears:
 
 % screenshot: kleopatra sign successful
@@ -2700,10 +2698,10 @@ Once your message has been signed successfully, the following dialog appears:
 \clearpage
 \subsubsection{In short:}
 You have learnt how to \textbf{sign} an \Email{} using your own
-certificate -- which contains your private key. 
+certificate -- which contains your private key.
 
 You know how to \textbf{encrypt} an \Email{} using the public
-certificate of the person you are writing to. 
+certificate of the person you are writing to.
 
 Now you are familiar with the two most important techniques for
 sending secure \Email{}s: encryption and signatures.
@@ -2736,12 +2734,12 @@ It is very easy to check this digital signature. All you need is the
 public OpenPGP or X.509 certificate of your correspondence partner.
 You should have already imported his public certificate into your
 certificate administration prior to performing this check (see
-Chapter~\ref{ch:importCertificate}). 
+Chapter~\ref{ch:importCertificate}).
 
 To check a signed OpenPGP or S/MIME \Email{}, proceed as you would for
 decrypting an \Email{} (see Chapter~\ref{ch:decrypt}):
 
-Start Outlook and open a signed \Email{}. 
+Start Outlook and open a signed \Email{}.
 
 GpgOL will automatically transfer the \Email{} to Kleopatra for a
 signature check. Kleopatra will report the result in a status dialog,
@@ -2755,7 +2753,7 @@ to read the signed \Email{}.
 
 If you want to perform the check again manually, select
 \Menu{Extras$\rightarrow$Decrypt/Check GpgOL} in the menu of the
-open \Email{}. 
+open \Email{}.
 
 If the signature check is not successful, it means that the message
 was changed during the delivery process. Because of the technical
@@ -2772,16 +2770,16 @@ such a case.
 \label{sec_brokenSignature}
 \index{Signature!broken}
 
-There are several reasons for a broken signature: 
+There are several reasons for a broken signature:
 
 If you receive the message ``Bad signature'' or ``Check failed'', it
 is a warning that your \Email{} may have been manipulated! That means
 that it is possible that someone changed the \Email{}'s contents or
-the subject line. 
+the subject line.
 
 At the same time, a broken signature does not necessarily mean that
 the \Email{} was manipulated. It is also possible that the \Email{}
-was modified due to a defective transmission. 
+was modified due to a defective transmission.
 
 In any case, you should always take a broken signature seriously and
 ask the sender to resend the \Email{}!\\
@@ -2790,10 +2788,10 @@ It is recommended that you set your program to only send \Email{}s in
 ``text'' format and \textbf{not} in ``HTML'' format. However, if you
 decide to use HTML for signed or encrypted \Email{}s, it is possible
 that formatting information will be lost by the time it reaches the
-recipient, which can result in a broken signature. 
+recipient, which can result in a broken signature.
 
 In Outlook 2003 and 2007, you can set the message format to \Menu{Text
-only} in 
+only} in
 %TODO correct english menu?
 \Menu{Extras$\rightarrow$Options$\rightarrow$E-Mail Format}.
 
@@ -2805,20 +2803,20 @@ only} in
 
 You know: A message is usually encrypted using the public certificate
 of your correspondence partner, who then decrypts the \Email{} using
-his private key. 
+his private key.
 
 The reverse possibility -- encryption with a private key -- does not
 make sense, since the whole world knows the associated public
-certificate and could then decrypt the message. 
+certificate and could then decrypt the message.
 
 However, as you have already seen in this chapter, there is still
 another method to create a file using your private key -- namely the
-signature. 
+signature.
 
 A digital signature confirms the author  -- because if someone
 successfully applies your public certificate to this file (the
 signature), this file could only have been encoded by your private
-key. And only you can have access to this key. 
+key. And only you can have access to this key.
 
 You can combine both options, namely encrypting and signing the
 \Email{}:
@@ -2839,14 +2837,14 @@ This means that the message has two security characteristics:
         certificate of the person you are corresponding with.
 \end{enumerate}
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 
 Your correspondence partner opens the outer strong envelope with his
 own private key. This ensures secrecy, because only this key can be
 used to decode the text. He reads the seal with your public
 certificate, which proves that you were the author, because if your
 public certificate matches, the seal (digital signature) can only have
-been encoded with your private key. 
+been encoded with your private key.
 
 It is pretty tricky when you think about it, but also very simple.
 
@@ -2857,7 +2855,7 @@ It is pretty tricky when you think about it, but also very simple.
 \index{E-mail!archive in encrypted form}
 
 You should also archive your important -- and hence possibly encrypted
--- \Email{}s in only one way: encrypted. 
+-- \Email{}s in only one way: encrypted.
 
 Of course you can simply save a clear text version of your texts, but
 that is actually not required. If your message was supposed to be
@@ -2869,7 +2867,7 @@ You can probably already guess the problem: To decrypt your archived
 (sent) \Email{}s, you will need the private key of the recipient --
 and you don't or will ever have it ...
 
-So what to do?  
+So what to do?
 
 Very easy: \textbf{You also encrypt to yourself!}
 
@@ -2915,8 +2913,8 @@ compendium. It contains even more interesting stuff!
 \addtocontents{toc}{\protect\newpage}
 
 \clearpage
-\T\part{For Advanced Users}
-\W\part*{\textbf{II For Advanced Users}}
+\part{For Advanced Users}
+
 \label{part:AdvancedUsers}
 \addtocontents{toc}{\protect\vspace{0.3cm}}
 
@@ -2952,10 +2950,10 @@ certificates, including:
     user IDs to your certificate using the
     menu \Menu{Certificates$\rightarrow$Add user ID...} menu item.
     This makes sense if, for example, you wish to use the same
-    certificate for another \Email{} address. 
-    
+    certificate for another \Email{} address.
+
     Please note: Kleopatra only allows you to add user IDs for OpenPGP
-    certificates, but not X.509. 
+    certificates, but not X.509.
 
 \item[Fingerprints] are used to differentiate multiple certificates
     from each other. You can use fingerprints to look for (public)
@@ -2970,7 +2968,7 @@ certificates, including:
 
 \item[The validity] of certificates describes the duration of their
     validity and their expiry date, if applicable.\index{Expiry date}
-    
+
     In the case of OpenPGP certificates, the validity is usually set
     to \Menu{Indefinite} . You can change this in Kleopatra by
     clicking on \Button{Change expiry date} in the certificate details
@@ -2978,13 +2976,13 @@ certificates, including:
     date} and enter a new date. This means that you can declare the
     certificate valid for a limited time period, e.g. in order to
     issue it to outside employees.
-    
+
     The validity of X.509 certificates is defined by the certificate
     authority when the certificate is issued, and cannot be changed by
     the user.
 
 \clearpage
-\item[Trust in the certificate holder] \T\marginOpenpgp quantifies
+\item[Trust in the certificate holder] \marginOpenpgp quantifies
     your own subjective confidence that the owner of the OpenPGP
     certificate is real (authentic) and that he will also correctly
     authenticate other OpenPGP certifictes. You set the trust with
@@ -2995,7 +2993,7 @@ certificates, including:
     The trust status is only relevant for OpenPGP certificates. No
     such method exists for X.509 certificates.
 
-\item[Authentications] \T\marginOpenpgp of your OpenPGP certificate
+\item[Authentications] \marginOpenpgp of your OpenPGP certificate
     include the user IDs of those certificate holders who are
     convinced of the authenticity of your certificate and have thus
     authenticated it. Trust in the authenticity of your certificate
@@ -3007,7 +3005,7 @@ certificates, including:
 
 \end{description}
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}}{}
 You do not necessarily have to know the certificate details to use
 Gpg4win on a daily basis, but they do become relevant when you want to
 receive or change new certificates.
@@ -3027,12 +3025,12 @@ Section~\ref{sec_publishPerKeyserver} already provided a lot of information on h
 Key servers can be used by all programs that support the standards OpenPGP or X.509. Kleopatra supports both types, hence both OpenPGP as well as X.509 certificate servers.
 
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 
 \begin{description}
 
-\item[OpenPGP certificate servers]\T\marginOpenpgp
-    \index{Certificate server!OpenPGP} (also called ``key server'') 
+\item[OpenPGP certificate servers]\marginOpenpgp
+    \index{Certificate server!OpenPGP} (also called ``key server'')
     are organized on a decentralised basis and synchronize each other
     on a global basis.  There are no current statistics about their
     number of how many OpenPGP certificates they contain. This shared
@@ -3045,7 +3043,7 @@ Key servers can be used by all programs that support the standards OpenPGP or X.
     \htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
     \IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{keyserver-world}
 
-\item[X.509 certificate servers] \T\marginSmime
+\item[X.509 certificate servers] \marginSmime
     \index{Certificate server!X.509} are generally made available by
     the certificate authorities via LDAP\index{LDAP} and are sometimes
     also described as directory services for X.509 certificates.
@@ -3075,14 +3073,14 @@ addresses on the next page.
 For \Menu{X.509} you will see the following default settings for an
 X.509 certificate server: (Protokoll: ldap, Servername: server, Server-Port:
 389).  Complete the information on the server name and basic DN of
-your X.509 certificate server and check the server port. 
+your X.509 certificate server and check the server port.
 
 If your certificate server requires a user name and password, activate
 the option \Menu{Requires user authentication} and enter the required
 information.
 
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 The screenshot below shows a configured OpenPGP certificate server:
 
 % screenshot: Kleopatra OpenPGP certificate server config dialog
@@ -3097,7 +3095,7 @@ instructions, see
 Section~\ref{searchAndImportCertificateFromServer}).
 
 \newpage
-\textbf{Proxy setting:}\index{Proxy} 
+\textbf{Proxy setting:}\index{Proxy}
 If you use a proxy in your network, you should add the parameter
 \Filename{http-proxy=<proxydomain>} to the certificate server address in the
 \Menu{Server name} column.  The full server name could therefore look
@@ -3112,9 +3110,9 @@ servers can be found in  Section~\ref{x509CertificateServers}.
 
 \subsubsection{OpenPGP certificate server addresses}
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 We recommend that you only use up-to-date OpenPGP certificate servers,
-since only they can handle the newer OpenPGP characteristics. 
+since only they can handle the newer OpenPGP characteristics.
 
 Here is a selection of well-functioning certificate servers:
 \begin{itemize}
@@ -3138,7 +3136,7 @@ The certificate servers under the addresses
     \item hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
 \end{itemize}
 are a collection point for an entire network of these servers; a
-concrete server will be selected randomly. 
+concrete server will be selected randomly.
 
 \textbf{Attention:} Do not use \Filename{ldap://keyserver.pgp.com} as
 a certificate server, since it does synchronize with other servers (Status:
@@ -3181,11 +3179,11 @@ Kleopatra's certificate administration.
 \section{Export certificates to OpenPGP certificate servers}
 \index{Certificate!export}
 
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\marginOpenpgp
 If you have configured an OpenPGP certificate server as described in
 Section \ref{configureCertificateServer}, a click of your mouse will
-send your public OpenPGP certificate around the world.  
-        
+send your public OpenPGP certificate around the world.
+
 Select your OpenPGP certificate in Kleopatra and then click on the
 menu item \Menu{File$\rightarrow$Export certificate to server...}.
 
@@ -3231,14 +3229,14 @@ Chapter~\ref{ch:EncFiles}.
 \index{GpgEX}
 
 You can use Gpg4win for signing and encrypting not just \Email{}s, but
-also individual files. The principle is the same: 
+also individual files. The principle is the same:
 
 \begin{itemize}
   \item You \textbf{sign} a file using your private certificate, to
-      ensure that the file cannot be modified. 
+      ensure that the file cannot be modified.
 
   \item Then \textbf{encrypt} the file using a public certificate, to
-      prevent unauthorized persons from seeing it. 
+      prevent unauthorized persons from seeing it.
 \end{itemize}
 
 Using the application \textbf{GpgEX}, you can sign or encrypt files
@@ -3247,7 +3245,7 @@ shows you exactly how this works.
 
 If you are sending a file as an \Email{} attachment, e.g. GpgOL will
 automatically look after signing and encrypting your file together
-with your \Email{}.  You do not have to do anything else. 
+with your \Email{}.  You do not have to do anything else.
 
 \clearpage
 \section{Signing and checking files}
@@ -3260,7 +3258,7 @@ not changed, rather than keeping it secret (Integrity).
 
 Signing is very easy using \textbf{GpgEX} from the Windows Explorer
 context menu.  Select one or more files or folders and use the right
-mouse key to select the context menu: 
+mouse key to select the context menu:
 
 % screenshot GpgEX contextmenu sign/encrypt
 \IncludeImage[width=0.3\textwidth]{sc-gpgex-contextmenu-signEncrypt_en}
@@ -3277,7 +3275,7 @@ If required, you can also use the option  \Menu{Output as text (ASCII
 armor\index{ASCII armor})}.  The signature file will receive the file
 ending \Filename{.asc} (OpenPGP) or  \Filename{.pem} (S/MIME).  These
 file types can be opened with any text editor -- you will however only
-see the numbers and letters you have already seen before. 
+see the numbers and letters you have already seen before.
 
 If this option is not selected, the signature will be created with the
 ending \Filename{.sig} (OpenPGP) or \Filename{.p7s} (S/MIME).  These
@@ -3315,7 +3313,7 @@ The example below shows which new file you will receive if you sign
 your selected file (here \Filename{<dateiname>.txt}) using OpenPGP or
 S/MIME. There are four possible resulting file types:
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}}{}
 
 \begin{description}
     \item[OpenPGP:]~\\
@@ -3336,7 +3334,7 @@ S/MIME. There are four possible resulting file types:
 \index{File!check signature}
 
 Now check the integrity of the file that has just been signed, i.e.
-check that it is correct! 
+check that it is correct!
 
 To check for integrity and authenticity, the signature file -- hence
 the file with the ending \Filename{.sig}, \Filename{.asc},
@@ -3404,7 +3402,7 @@ right mouse key:
 Select \Menu{Sign and encrypt} again.
 
 \clearpage
-You will see the already familiar dialog from signing a file (see also 
+You will see the already familiar dialog from signing a file (see also
 section~\ref{sec_signFile}).
 
 In the top field, select the option \Menu{Encrypt}:
@@ -3412,7 +3410,7 @@ In the top field, select the option \Menu{Encrypt}:
 % screenshot kleopatra encrypt file, step 1
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-kleopatra-encryptFile1_en}
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}}{}
 
 You should only change the encryption settings if this is required:
 \begin{description}
@@ -3421,7 +3419,7 @@ You should only change the encryption settings if this is required:
         the file ending \Filename{.asc} (OpenPGP) or \Filename{.pem}
         (S/MIME).  These file types can be opened with any text editor
         -- but you will only see the mixture of letters and characters
-        you have already seen before. 
+        you have already seen before.
 
         If this option is not selected, the system will create an
         encrypted file with the ending  \Filename{.gpg} (OpenPGP) or
@@ -3429,29 +3427,29 @@ You should only change the encryption settings if this is required:
         they cannot be viewed with a text editor.
 
     \item[Delete unencrypted original:] If this option is activated,
-        the selected original file will be deleted after encryption. 
+        the selected original file will be deleted after encryption.
 \end{description}
 
 Click on \Button{Next}.
 
 \clearpage
 Who should the file be encrypted for? Select one or more recipient
-certificates in the next dialog: 
+certificates in the next dialog:
 
 % screenshot kleopatra encrypt file, step 2
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-kleopatra-encryptFile2_en}
 
 To make your selection, choose the required certificates in the top
 portion and press \Button{Add}. You will see all selected certificates
-in the lower dialog portion for review purposes.  
+in the lower dialog portion for review purposes.
 
 Depending on the selected recipient certificate and its type (OpenPGP
 or S/MIME), your file is then encrypted using OpenPGP and/or S/MIME.
 So if you selected an OpenPGP certificate \textit{and } an S/MIME
 certificate, you will receive two encrypted files. The possible file
-types for the encrypted files are found on the next page. 
+types for the encrypted files are found on the next page.
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{\baselineskip}}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{\baselineskip}}{}
 
 Now click on \Button{Encrypt}: The file is encrypted.
 
@@ -3464,7 +3462,7 @@ something like this:
 
 That's it! You have successfully encrypted your file!
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 
 Similar to signing a file, the result will depend on the selected
 encryption method (OpenPGP or S/MIME). An encryption of your original
@@ -3491,7 +3489,7 @@ You now forward one of these four possible encrypted files to your selected reci
 \clearpage
 \subsubsection{Decrypting a file}
 \index{File!decrypt}
-Now you can decrypt the previously encrypted file for test purposes. 
+Now you can decrypt the previously encrypted file for test purposes.
 
 To this end, you should also have encrypted to your own certificate
 during the previous encryption process -- otherwise you cannot decrypt
@@ -3507,7 +3505,7 @@ menu:
 
 \clearpage
 If you like, you can still change the output folder in the following
-decryption dialog. 
+decryption dialog.
 
 % screenshot kleopatra decrypt file, step 1
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-kleopatra-decryptFile1_en}
@@ -3523,7 +3521,7 @@ The result shows that the decryption was successful:
 \IncludeImage[width=0.85\textwidth]{sc-kleopatra-decryptFile2_en}
 
 You should now be able to easily read the decrypted file or use it
-with a corresponding program. 
+with a corresponding program.
 
 \clearpage
 \subsubsection{In short}
@@ -3601,12 +3599,12 @@ When you activate the option \Menu{ASCII-protected (ASCII
 armor\index{ASCII armor})}, the file ending \Filename{.asc} (OpenPGP)
 or \Filename{.pem} (S/MIME) will be selected. These file types can be
 opened with any text editor -- but you will only see the "mess" of
-numbers and characters that we have already seen before. 
+numbers and characters that we have already seen before.
 
 If this option is not selected, an encrypted file with the ending
 \Filename{.gpg} (OpenPGP) or \Filename{.p12} (S/MIME) will be created.
 These files are binary files, so they cannot be viewed with a text
-editor.  
+editor.
 
 Kleopatra stores both key parts -- private and public -- in
 \textbf{one} private certificate.
@@ -3662,8 +3660,8 @@ Then delete it from your hard drive and also remember to remove the
 deleted file from your ``recycling bin''. Otherwise this file poses a
 great security risk for your secret \Email{} encryption.\\
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
-\T\marginOpenpgp
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\marginOpenpgp
 There may be cases when you are not able to import a certificate
 exported with PGP (``Pretty Good Privacy''). This is because some PGP
 versions use an algorithm (IDEA) which cannot be supported by GnuPG
@@ -3684,11 +3682,11 @@ passphrase} in PGP and Gpg4win.
 \protect{S/MIME}}
 \label{ch:smime-configuration}
 
-\T\enlargethispage{\baselineskip}
-\T\marginSmime
+\enlargethispage{\baselineskip}
+\marginSmime
 As part of a central software distribution or environments in which
 many users are working on one computer, it makes sense to set up some
-system-wide specifications and pre-populations for Gpg4win.  
+system-wide specifications and pre-populations for Gpg4win.
 
 This relates particularly to S/MIME, because in the case of specified
 chains of trust it makes sense that users share the information.
@@ -3698,20 +3696,20 @@ Some typical system-wide settings include:
 \begin{description}
 \item[Trustworthy root certificates:]
     \index{Trustworthy root certificates}
-    \index{Root certificates} 
+    \index{Root certificates}
     To avoid a situation where each user must search and install the
     required root certificates, and check and authenticate the
     trustworthiness of the same (see Section
     \ref{sec_allow-mark-trusted}), it is useful to install a
     system-wide pre-population of the most important root
     certificates.
-    
+
     To this end, the root certificates should be saved
     -- as described in Section \ref{trustedrootcertsdirmngr} -- and
     the trustworthy root certificates should be defined -- as
     described in Section \ref{sec_systemtrustedrootcerts}.
-    
-\item[Directly available CA certificates:] \index{Certificate!CA}    
+
+\item[Directly available CA certificates:] \index{Certificate!CA}
     To save users from searching and importing the certificates of
     certificate authorities, it also makes sense to pre-populate the
     system with the most important CA certificates. For a description,
@@ -3719,7 +3717,7 @@ Some typical system-wide settings include:
 
 \item[Proxy for certificate server and certificate revocation list searches:]
     \index{Proxy}
-    
+
     With respect to validity information, X.509 protocols offer
     different options. Most certification agencies publish certificate
     revocation lists\index{Certificate Revocation Lists} (also
@@ -3731,12 +3729,12 @@ Some typical system-wide settings include:
     GnuPG can work with both options; component ``DirMngr''
     \index{Directory Manager|see{DirMngr}} \index{DirMngr} that
     runs as the system-wide service.
-    
+
     Internal networks cannot permit individual computers to directly
     connect to the outside (central firewall), but can provide an
     acting service, a so-called ``proxy''. DirMngr can also handle
     HTTP and LDAP proxies \index{LDAP} \index{HTTP}.
-    
+
     S/MIME certificates usually contain information on where your
     certificate revocation list can be picked up externally.
     Oftentimes it includes HTTP, but also directory services via
@@ -3747,12 +3745,12 @@ Some typical system-wide settings include:
     allow both HTTP as well as LDAP queries to the outside. If
     possible, an acting service can ensure, at the content level, that
     only X.509 certificate revocation lists with correct information
-    are transmitted. 
-    
+    are transmitted.
+
     If your network requires a proxy for the HTTP and HKP or LDAP
     queries required for OpenPGP or S/MIME, please follow these
     steps:
-   
+
     \begin{enumerate}
         \item Set the X.509 certificate server search to a proxy, as
             described in Section~\ref{x509CertificateServers}.
@@ -3767,16 +3765,16 @@ Some typical system-wide settings include:
 \chapter{Known problems and help}
 \index{Troubleshooting}
 
-\section{GpgOL menus and dialogs no longer found in Outlook} 
+\section{GpgOL menus and dialogs no longer found in Outlook}
 \index{Outlook}
 It may happen that the menus and dialogs added to Outlook by GpgOL can
 no longer be found.
 
 This may be due to a technical problem that caused Outlook to
 deactivate the GpgOL component.
-    
-Reactivate GpgOL via the Outlook menu:\\ 
-Outlook2007: \Menu{?$\rightarrow$Deactivated components}\\ 
+
+Reactivate GpgOL via the Outlook menu:\\
+Outlook2007: \Menu{?$\rightarrow$Deactivated components}\\
 Outlook2003: \Menu{?$\rightarrow$Info$\rightarrow$Deactivated components}
 
 To (de)activate GpgOL manually, use Outlook's add-in manager:
@@ -3800,7 +3798,7 @@ signature/encryption icons.
 You can display these buttons by clicking on the small icon with the
 arrow pointing downwards on the tool bar (\Menu{Options for toolbar}):
 You will see an overview of all non-displayed buttons. Clicking on an
-entry will move it into the visible area of the toolbar. 
+entry will move it into the visible area of the toolbar.
 
 
 \section{GpgOL button are listed unter ``Add-Ins'' (Outlook 2007)}
@@ -3834,7 +3832,7 @@ You can solve this problem by resetting the internal Outlook (cached)
 program extension path. To do this, please delete the following
 file:\\
 \Filename{\%APPDATA\%\back{}Lokale
-Einstellungen\back{}Application data\back{}Microsoft\back{}\T\\
+Einstellungen\back{}Application data\back{}Microsoft\back{}\\
 Outlook\back{}extend.dat}
 
 \textbf{Outlook should not be running during this process.} Then
@@ -3870,7 +3868,7 @@ S/MIME support}.
 \label{dirmngr-restart}
 \index{DirMngr}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 The ``Directory Manager'' (DirMngr) is a service installed by Gpg4win,
 which manages access to certificate servers. One task of the DirMngr
 is to load certificate revocation lists (CRLs) for S/MIME
@@ -3894,7 +3892,7 @@ context menu.
 \section{S/MIME operations not allowed (CRLs not available)}
 \label{smime-problem-crl}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 
 It is possible that S/MIME operations (signature creation and check,
 encryption and decryption) cannot be performed because the CRLs are
@@ -3917,13 +3915,13 @@ off the revocation list check is never a substitute for setting up a
 proxy.
 
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\clearpage}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\clearpage}
 
 \section{S/MIME operations not allowed (root certificate is not trustworthy)}
 \label{smime-problem-rootcertificate}
 \index{Root certificates}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 The respective root certificate must be trusted for a full review of
 X.509 certificate chains\index{Certificate!chain}.  Otherwise it is
 not possible to perform S/MIME operations (signature creation and
@@ -3954,11 +3952,11 @@ To express your trust in a root certificate, you have two options.
 
 \section{Personal user settings}
 
-The personal settings for each user are found in the file folder:\\ \Filename{\%APPDATA\%\back{}gnupg}\\ 
+The personal settings for each user are found in the file folder:\\ \Filename{\%APPDATA\%\back{}gnupg}\\
 Often, this is the following folder: \\
 \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and
 settings\back{}<name>\back{}Application data\back{}%
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\\}{}%
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\\}{}%
 gnupg\back{}}
 
 Please note that this is a hidden file folder. To make it visible, you
@@ -3974,18 +3972,18 @@ you make regular backup copies of this folder.
 \section{Cached certificate revocation lists}
 \index{Certificate Revocation Lists}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 The system-wide service Mngr (Directory Manager) \index{DirMngr} also
 checks whether an X.509 certificate is blocked and can therefore not
 be used. To this end, certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are picked
 up from the issuing offices for the certificates (CAs) and cached for
 the duration of the validity period.
 
-The lists are saved under: 
+The lists are saved under:
 \newline
 \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and
 Settings\back{}LocalService\back{}Lokale Settings\back{}Application
-data\back{}\T\newline
+data\back{}\newline
 GNU\back{}cache\back{}dirmngr\back{}crls.d\back{}}
 
 These are \textit{protected} files, which Explorer does not display by
@@ -3995,14 +3993,14 @@ option \Menu{Hide protected system files} in the Window Explorer
 
 No changes should be made to this file folder.
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\clearpage}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\clearpage}
 \section{Trustworthy root certificates from DirMngr}
 \label{trustedrootcertsdirmngr}
 \index{DirMngr}
 \index{Trustworthy root certificates}
 \index{Root certificates}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 For a full review of X.509 certificates, you must trust the root
 certificates which were used to sign the revocation lists.
 
@@ -4011,7 +4009,7 @@ system when performing its checks are stored in the following file
 folder:
 
 \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and settings\back{}All
-Users\back{}Application data\back{}\T\newline
+Users\back{}Application data\back{}\newline
 GNU\back{}etc\back{}dirmngr\back{}trusted-certs\back{}}
 
 \W~\\\\
@@ -4028,21 +4026,21 @@ Please also see Section \ref{sec_systemtrustedrootcerts} in order to
 completely trust root certificates (system-wide).
 
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 \section{Other certificates from DirMngr}
 \label{extracertsdirmngr}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 Since the X.509 certificate chain must be checked prior to a
 cryptography operation, the corresponding certificate of the
 authentication instance (``Certificate Authority'', CA) must also be
 checked.
 
 For immediate availability, CA certificates can be saved in this
-(system-wide) file folder: 
+(system-wide) file folder:
 \newline
 \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and settings\back{}All
-Users\back{}Application data\back{}\T\newline
+Users\back{}Application data\back{}\newline
 GNU\back{}lib\back{}dirmngr\back{}extra-certs\back{}}
 
 Certificates that are not available here and/or not available from
@@ -4054,10 +4052,10 @@ folder as part of system-wide specifications.
 
 
 \clearpage
-\section{System-wide configuration for use of external  
+\section{System-wide configuration for use of external
 X.509 certificate servers \label{x509CertificateServers}}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 GnuPG can be configured in such a way that allows the system to search
 for missing X.509 certificates or certificate revocation lists on
 external X.509 certificate servers (see also Chapter
@@ -4067,8 +4065,8 @@ To conduct a \textbf{X.509 certificate search}, the system service
 DirMngr uses a list of certificate servers which can be entered in the
 file \newline
 \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and settings\back{}All
-Users\back{}Application data\back{}\T\\
-GNU\back{}etc\back{}dirmngr\back{}ldapservers.conf}\\ 
+Users\back{}Application data\back{}\\
+GNU\back{}etc\back{}dirmngr\back{}ldapservers.conf}\\
 These certificate servers are used for all users (system-wide). In
 addition, users can also set up additional user-specific certificate
 servers for certificate searches -- e.g. directly via Kleopatra (see
@@ -4093,7 +4091,7 @@ Lists}\index{Certificate Revocation Lists} (CRLs), the same directory
 contains a configuration file from:
 
 \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and settings\back{}All
-Users\back{}Application data\back{}\T\\
+Users\back{}Application data\back{}\\
 GNU\back{}etc\back{}dirmngr\back{}dirmngr.conf}
 
 Please note that only administrators can write in this file.
@@ -4120,13 +4118,13 @@ You can add the following proxy options to this configuration file
         will overwrite the LDAP URL contained in the certificate, or
         will use  \Filename{HOST} and\Filename{PORT}if no LDAP URL has
         been entered.
-        
+
     \item \Filename{only-ldap-proxy}
         This option ensures that DirMngr only uses the proxy
         configured under \Filename{ldap-proxy}. Because otherwise
         DirMngr will try to use other configured certificate servers,
         if the connection via \Filename{ldap-proxy} is not successful.
-        
+
 \end{itemize}
 
 
@@ -4135,10 +4133,10 @@ You can add the following proxy options to this configuration file
 \label{sec_systemtrustedrootcerts}
 \index{Root certificates}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 The pre-populated root certificates which are deemed as trustworthy
-for the entire system are defined in the \\ 
-\Filename{C:\back{}Documents and settings\back{}All Users\back{}Application data\T\\
+for the entire system are defined in the \\
+\Filename{C:\back{}Documents and settings\back{}All Users\back{}Application data\\
 \back{}GNU\back{}etc\back{}gnupg\back{}trustlist.txt} \index{trustlist.txt}file.
 
 To mark a root certificate as trustworthy, the corresponding
@@ -4153,7 +4151,7 @@ and ignored.
 Important: The end of the file must be followed by an empty row.
 
 An example:
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\scriptsize}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\scriptsize}{}
 \begin{verbatim}
 # CN=Wurzel ZS 3,O=Intevation GmbH,C=DE
 A6935DD34EF3087973C706FC311AA2CCF733765B S
@@ -4165,7 +4163,7 @@ DC:BD:69:25:48:BD:BB:7E:31:6E:BB:80:D3:00:80:35:D4:F8:A6:CD S
 !14:56:98:D3:FE:9C:CA:5A:31:6E:BC:81:D3:11:4E:00:90:A3:44:C2 S
 
 \end{verbatim}
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\normalsize}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\normalsize}{}
 
 In some cases it is useful to reduce the criteria for checking the
 root certificate. To do this, you can set an additional flag
@@ -4173,13 +4171,13 @@ root certificate. To do this, you can set an additional flag
 
 \textbf{Important:} Using \Filename{relax} reduces the level of
 security, so it needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis and should
-only be used in the case of problems. 
+only be used in the case of problems.
 
 For more details, see current GnuPG documentation (item ``trustlist.txt''):\\
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{
-    \T\scriptsize
-    \T\texttt{http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Agent-Configuration.html}
-    \T\normalsize
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{
+    \scriptsize
+    \texttt{http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Agent-Configuration.html}
+    \normalsize
 \T}
 \T{
     \uniurl{http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Agent-Configuration.html}
@@ -4204,7 +4202,7 @@ must also be stored for the DirMngr, as described in Section
 \index{Trustworthy root certificates}
 \index{Root certificates}
 
-\T\marginSmime
+\marginSmime
 
 Root certificates can also be marked as trustworthy by individual
 users -- this means that a system-wide configuration (see Section
@@ -4218,13 +4216,13 @@ if you are using a root certificate that has not been previously
 marked as trustworthy, the system will ask you whether you wish to
 classify it as trustworthy. Please ensure that the gpg-agent may have
 to be restarted before a change takes effect (e.g. by logging in and
-out). 
+out).
 
 The root certificates which you have marked as trustworthy (or
 explicitly marked as non-trustworthy) are automatically stored in the
 following file: \\
 \Filename{C:\back{}Dokumente und
-Einstellungen\back{}<Nutzername>\back{}\T\\
+Einstellungen\back{}<Nutzername>\back{}\\
 Application data\back{}gnupg\back{}trustlist.txt}
 \index{trustlist.txt}
 
@@ -4260,11 +4258,11 @@ this information helpful:
 
 Log files -- described as ,,debug information'' in the
 above-mentioned URL -- frequently offer valuable information and
-should therefore be attached to an error report.   
+should therefore be attached to an error report.
 
 This chapter describes how to activate program process information
 (which is what log files essentially are) for individual Gpg4win
-programs. 
+programs.
 
 \clearpage
 \section{Activating Kleopatra log files}
@@ -4280,7 +4278,7 @@ to create Kleopatra log data, and you must ensure that different
 \Filename{kleologdir} file folders are used.
 
 The path to this folder must be noted in the new environment variables
-\Filename{KLEOPATRA\_LOGIDR}: 
+\Filename{KLEOPATRA\_LOGIDR}:
 
 To do this, open the control panel, choose \Menu{System}, then the tab
 \Menu{Advanced} and finally the button \Button{Environment
@@ -4299,7 +4297,7 @@ create it afterwards.
 
 To ensure the log function goes into effect, Kleopatra must be shut
 down and restarted, the file folder of log data must exist and must be
-available for Kleopatra to write on. 
+available for Kleopatra to write on.
 
 While Kleopatra is used, it will record process information in the
 file \Filename{kleo-log} (main log file) as well as possibly many
@@ -4325,13 +4323,13 @@ environment file or slightly varying its name (so it can be easily
 reactivated later on). Do not forget to delete or move the log files,
 especially if they have become very large or there are a lot of files.
 It also makes sense to remove the log files before you start a new
-recording. 
+recording.
 
 
 \clearpage
 \section{Activating GpgOL log files}
 \index{Log file!GpgOL}
-                      
+
 To activate a GpgOL log file, you have to start a ``Registry Editor".
 To do this, enter the command \Filename{regedit} under
 \Menu{Start$\rightarrow$Execute} or into an input request field.
@@ -4355,11 +4353,11 @@ Restart Outlook to start the recording process.
 
 Remember that this file can become very large. Set
 \Filename{enableDebug} to \Filename{0} as soon as you no longer
-require the GpgOL log data recordings. 
+require the GpgOL log data recordings.
 
 Also do not forget to delete or move the log file, especially if it
 has become a very large file. Before starting a new recording, it also
-makes sense to remove the log file. 
+makes sense to remove the log file.
 
 More advanced technical information on GpgOL -- such as more possible
 values for {enableDebug} -- can be found in the technical (English)
@@ -4377,7 +4375,7 @@ activated with administrator rights.
 
 To activate the log file, open the following configuration file:\\
 \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and settings\back{}All
-Users\back{}Application data\back{}\T\\
+Users\back{}Application data\back{}\\
 GNU\back{}etc\back{}dirmngr\back{}dirmngr.conf}
 
 Add the following two rows in the configuration file (the path to the
@@ -4391,7 +4389,7 @@ log file can of course be adjusted):
 Then restart DirMngr under \Menu{System
 controls$\rightarrow$Administration$\rightarrow$Services} so that the
 modified configuration file is reimported and the new settings become
-active. 
+active.
 
 Comment out your adjustment in the aforementioned configuration file
 (hence \texttt{\#~debug-all}) as soon as you no longer need the
@@ -4399,7 +4397,7 @@ DirMngr log file recording.
 
 Also do not forget to delete or move the log file, especially if it
 has become a very large file. Before starting a new recording, it also
-makes sense to remove the log file. 
+makes sense to remove the log file.
 
 \clearpage
 \section{Activating GnuPG log files}
@@ -4424,12 +4422,12 @@ Kleopatra...$\rightarrow$GnuPG system}.  This configuration window
 features two debug options for eac hof the four programs:
 
 \begin{itemize}
-    \item Option \Menu{Set debug level to }\\ 
+    \item Option \Menu{Set debug level to }\\
         Here you define the details of the information to be recorded.
         Debug level \Menu{4 - Guru} is the highest level and creates
         very big files. If you no longer need these files, set the
-        debug level to \Menu{0 - None}). 
-    \item Option \Menu{Write log to FILE in server mode}\\ 
+        debug level to \Menu{0 - None}).
+    \item Option \Menu{Write log to FILE in server mode}\\
         Here, you enter the log file into which all debug information
         should be stored, e.g.
         \Filename{C:\back{}TEMP\back{}gpg-agent.log}
@@ -4437,11 +4435,11 @@ features two debug options for eac hof the four programs:
 
 Restart Kleopatra (you may have to shut down the pgp-agent via Task
 Manager, if it is still running), or you log out and log back into
-your Windows system. 
+your Windows system.
 
 Also do not forget to delete or move the log file, especially if it
 has become a very large file. Before starting a new recording, it also
-makes sense to remove the log file. 
+makes sense to remove the log file.
 
 \clearpage
 \section{Activating GpgME log files}
@@ -4459,7 +4457,7 @@ Add the new \textbf{user variable}:
     Name der Variable: \Filename{GPGME\_DEBUG}
 
     Wert der Variable: ~\Filename{<DEBUGLEVEL;PFAD>}, also z.B.:
-    \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newline}{}
+    \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newline}{}
      \Filename{5;c:\back{}TEMP\back{}gpgme.log}
 \end{quote}
 
@@ -4469,22 +4467,22 @@ can also set it up afterwards.
 The recommended diagnostic level\index{Diagnostic level} is the value
 \Filename{5}. In most cases, this level supplies sufficient
 information. If not, then advanced users can gradually increase this
-level. 
+level.
 
 To turn log data recording off, set the diagnostic level to the value
 \Filename{0} or remove the user variable.
 
 Also do not forget to delete or move the log file, especially if it
 has become a very large file. Before starting a new recording, it also
-makes sense to remove the log file. 
+makes sense to remove the log file.
 
 
-\clearpage 
+\clearpage
 \chapter{Why Gpg4win cannot be broken ...}
 \label{ch:themath}
 
 ... at least not with currently known methods, and provided the
-software is free of errors. 
+software is free of errors.
 
 In reality however, it is precisely those errors in the programs that
 provide opportunities for obtaining secret information when the
@@ -4506,7 +4504,7 @@ and algorithms is what is behind the security
 philosophy\index{Security philosophy} of cryptography and the
 principle of Free Software. Finally, this is also the best way of
 really understanding why GnuPG (the actual machinery behind Gpg4win)
-is so secure. 
+is so secure.
 
 In other words, this is where the free program that follows the
 compulsory portion begins.
@@ -4531,11 +4529,11 @@ this type of calculation has never been successful for the key lengths
 possible on a theoretical level, it is practically impossible since
 even with plenty of time (many years) and thousands of networked
 computers, there would never by sufficient storage to complete the
-last steps of this calculation. 
+last steps of this calculation.
 
 At the same time, it is entirely possible that one day an ingenious
 mathemtatical idea will provide a solution to the mathematical issues
-behind RSA. However, this is unlikely to happen anytime soon.  
+behind RSA. However, this is unlikely to happen anytime soon.
 
 From time to time the German Federal Agency for Security in
 Information Technology (BSI) publishes forecasts and assessments with
@@ -4545,7 +4543,7 @@ these minimum requirements. As touched upon in the previous chapter,
 the mathemetical elements form by far the most secure portion of
 practically applied cryptography.
 
-\clearpage 
+\clearpage
 The following discussion will show you how this
 mathematical method works. While not all details will be covered - as
 this would be far beyond the scope of this manual - with some effort
@@ -4564,8 +4562,8 @@ But first let us get some terminology out of the way:
 
 \begin{quote}
     An \textbf{algorithm} is a mathemetical method for modifying or
-    transforming data or information. 
-    
+    transforming data or information.
+
     \textbf{Arithmetics} is the method by which numbers are added and
     multiplied.
 \end{quote}
@@ -4595,7 +4593,7 @@ called modular or congruence arithmetic - works, imagine the face of a
 clock:
 
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.5\textwidth]{clock-face}
 
 This clock is an example of arithmetic modulo 12 (hence the factor is
@@ -4621,7 +4619,7 @@ while always only using the residual that remains after the division.
 The modulus (the factor) is added to indicate that the rules of
 modular arithmetic rather than conventional arithmetic are applied,
 hence we would say, for example,  ``4 modulo 5'', or in short ``$4
-\bmod 5$''. 
+\bmod 5$''.
 
 A modulo 5 for example would be represented by a clock with only 5
 numbers (0, 1, 2, 3, 4), hence:
@@ -4642,7 +4640,7 @@ because you could also write:
 
 3 is the same as 8, and 1 the same as 6, since you are only interested
 in the respective residual that remains after the division by the
-factor of 5.   
+factor of 5.
 
 The last examples highlight the fact that by using this type of
 arithmetic, you can add a whole-number multiple of the module number
@@ -4682,7 +4680,7 @@ Three more examples:
 \begin{enumerate}
     \item[I.] $ 5 \bmod 11 * 3 \bmod 11 = 15 \bmod 11 = 4 \bmod 11 $
     \item[II.] $ 2 \bmod 7 * 4 \bmod 7 = 1 \bmod 7 $
-    \item[III.] $ 13 \bmod 17 * 11 \bmod 17 = 7 \bmod 17 $\\ 
+    \item[III.] $ 13 \bmod 17 * 11 \bmod 17 = 7 \bmod 17 $\\
     The last example becomes clear when one considers that using conventional arithmetic $ 13 * 11 = 143 $ and $ 143 = 8 * 17 + 7 $.
 \end{enumerate}
 
@@ -4701,14 +4699,14 @@ for the encryption with GnuPG: the RSA algorithm. This algorithm
 converts a series of numbers (which can represent a message) into a
 different series of numbers (transformation) in such a way that the
 message is thereby encrypted. Using the correct method, the message is
-securely encoded and may only be decoded by the right recipient. 
+securely encoded and may only be decoded by the right recipient.
 
 These are the principles behind the RSA algorithm:
 
 You created two large prime numbers\index{Prime numbers|(} when you
 entered your passphrase for creating a certificate (they are described
 as $p$ and $q$). Only you, or actually your computer, knows these two
-prime numbers and you must ensure they stay secret. 
+prime numbers and you must ensure they stay secret.
 
 They are now used to create three additional numbers:
 
@@ -4745,7 +4743,7 @@ calculate the private key portion ($d$) from the public key portion
 person with $d$ is able to decrypt the message.
 
 
-\clearpage 
+\clearpage
 \section{RSA encryption with small numbers}
 
 We will initially be using small numbers in order to show how the
@@ -4809,14 +4807,14 @@ itself 13 times and divided by 77, leaving the residual 47.
 If you use this calculation for all numbers between 0 and 76 and
 insert the results into a table, it will look as follows:
 
-\W\xmlattributes*{table}{BORDER}
-\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"}
+
+
 \begin{table}[htbp]
 \begin{center}
 \begin{Label}{table1}
 \begin{tabular}{|r||r|r|r|r|r|r|r|r|r|r|}
 \hline
-\bf \T\cellcolor{gray}
+\bf \cellcolor{gray}
 &\bf 0&\bf 1&\bf 2&\bf 3&\bf 4&\bf 5&\bf 6&\bf 7& \bf 8&\bf 9\\
 \hline
 \hline
@@ -4834,16 +4832,16 @@ insert the results into a table, it will look as follows:
 \hline
 \bf 60& 4& 40& 13& 28& 36& 65& 66& 67& 19& 27\\
 \hline
-\bf 70& 42& 15& 51& 24& 39& 47& 76\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \T\cellcolor{gray}
-\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \T\cellcolor{gray}
-\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \T\cellcolor{gray}
-\T\\
+\bf 70& 42& 15& 51& 24& 39& 47& 76\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \cellcolor{gray}
+
+
+\\
 \hline
 \end{tabular}
 \texorhtml{\caption}{\htmlcaption}{~}
 \end{Label}\end{center}
 \end{table}
-\W\textit{Table 1}\\\\\\
+
 
 The left column shows multiples of tens, the upper row shows the
 units.
@@ -4864,14 +4862,14 @@ example: the number $47 \bmod 77$ is decoded into the number $75\bmod
 Table \link*{2}[\ref{table2}]{table2} shows the exact allocation of
 the 77 numbers between 0 and 76.
 
-\W\xmlattributes*{table}{BORDER}
-\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"}
+
+
 \begin{table}[htbp]
 \begin{center}
 \begin{Label}{table2}
 \begin{tabular}{|r||r|r|r|r|r|r|r|r|r|r|}
 \hline
-\bf \T\cellcolor{gray}
+\bf \cellcolor{gray}
 &\bf 0&\bf 1&\bf 2&\bf 3&\bf 4&\bf 5&\bf 6&\bf 7& \bf 8&\bf 9\\
 \hline
 \hline
@@ -4889,22 +4887,22 @@ the 77 numbers between 0 and 76.
 \hline
 \bf 60& 25& 19& 6& 35& 15& 65& 66& 67& 40& 20\\
 \hline
-\bf 70& 49& 36& 30& 17& 46& 26& 76\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \T\cellcolor{gray}
-\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \T\cellcolor{gray}
-\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \T\cellcolor{gray}
-\T\\
+\bf 70& 49& 36& 30& 17& 46& 26& 76\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \cellcolor{gray}
+
+
+\\
 \hline
 \end{tabular}
 
 %TODO: Hyperlatex's htmlcaption generates wrong html code -> so set caption
 %part for tex only; and set htmlcaption as normal text below the table
-%\texorhtml{\caption}{\htmlcaption}{Number conversion modulo 77, using 
+%\texorhtml{\caption}{\htmlcaption}{Number conversion modulo 77, using
 %the private key 37}
 
-\T\caption{Number transformation modulo 77, using the private key 37}
+\caption{Number transformation modulo 77, using the private key 37}
 \end{Label}\end{center}
 \end{table}
-\W\textit{Table 2: Number transformation modulo 77, using the private key 37}\\\\\\
+
 
 In order to transform a number using Table
 \link*{2}[\ref{table2}]{table2}, we use the same method as for
@@ -4925,14 +4923,14 @@ for the encryption and decryption process.
 \clearpage
 \subsubsection{Executive Summary}
 
-You have ... 
+You have ...
 
 \begin{itemize}
 \item created two random prime numbers using the computer;
 \item created the product and both the public and private subkey from
     these numbers;
 \item encrypted a message using the public key;
-\item decrypted a message using a private key. 
+\item decrypted a message using a private key.
 \end{itemize}
 
 The two prime numbers selected can be so large that it is impossible
@@ -4948,7 +4946,7 @@ Table~\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]{table1}. The intended recipient of the
 encrypted series of numbers can decode these using the number 77 and
 the private key 37.
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 
 Of course, a simple example such as this one does not guarantee a
 particularly secure encryption, as it is quite clear that 77 is the
@@ -4959,61 +4957,61 @@ example. The discerning reader will also have noticed that there are a
 whole series of numbers, such as the number 11 and its multiples (22,
 33 etc) and neighbouring numbers convert into themselves.
 
-\W\xmlattributes*{table}{BORDER}
-\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"}
+
+
 \begin{table}[htbp]
 \begin{center}
 \begin{Label}{table3}
 \begin{tabular}{|r||r|r|r|r|r|r|r|r|r|r|}
 \hline
-\bf \T\cellcolor{gray}
+\bf \cellcolor{gray}
 &\bf 0&\bf 1&\bf 2&\bf 3&\bf 4&\bf 5&\bf 6&\bf 7& \bf 8&\bf 9\\
 \hline
 \hline
 \bf 0& 0& 1& 51& 31& 60& 47& 41& 28& 57& 37\\
 \hline
-\bf 10\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-10\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-11\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
+\bf 10\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+10\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+11\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
 12& 62& 42& 71& 58& 52& 39& 68\\
 \hline
-\bf 20& 48\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-21\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-22\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
+\bf 20& 48\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+21\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+22\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
 23& 73& 53& 5& 69& 63& 50\\
 \hline
-\bf 30& 2& 59\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-32\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-33\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
+\bf 30& 2& 59\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+32\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+33\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
 34& 7& 64& 16& 3& 74\\
 \hline
-\bf 40& 61& 13& 70\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-43\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-44\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray} 
+\bf 40& 61& 13& 70\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+43\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+44\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
 45& 18& 75& 27& 14\\
 \hline
-\bf 50& 8& 72& 24& 4\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-54\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-55\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray} 
+\bf 50& 8& 72& 24& 4\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+54\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+55\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
 56& 29& 9& 38\\
 \hline
-\bf 60& 25& 19& 6& 35& 15\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-65\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray}
-66\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \T\cellcolor{lightgray} 
+\bf 60& 25& 19& 6& 35& 15\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+65\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
+66\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="lightgray"} & \cellcolor{lightgray}
 67& 40& 20\\
 \hline
-\bf 70& 49& 36& 30& 17& 46& 26& 76\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \T\cellcolor{gray}
-\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \T\cellcolor{gray}
-\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \T\cellcolor{gray}
-\T\\
+\bf 70& 49& 36& 30& 17& 46& 26& 76\htmlattributes*{td}{BGCOLOR="gray"} & \cellcolor{gray}
+
+
+\\
 \hline
 \end{tabular}
 %TODO:
 %\texorhtml{\caption}{\htmlcaption}{~}
-\T\caption{~}
+\caption{~}
 \end{Label}\end{center}
 \end{table}
-\W\textit{Table 3}\\\\\\
+
 
 
 \clearpage
@@ -5042,7 +5040,7 @@ prime numbers get bigger.
 
 Of the prime numbers in the range which we use for encryption in
 practice, this portion is to small that the RSA algorithm is in no way
-restricted by it. 
+restricted by it.
 
 The larger the prime numbers, the more secure the encryption. A normal
 PC has no difficulty in obtaining the product from the two large prime
@@ -5066,7 +5064,7 @@ Two to the power of 10, displayed as $2^{10} = 2*2*2*2*2*2*2*2*2*2 = 1024$.
 
 Each number to the power of zero equals 1, e.g. $2^0 = 1$ and $5^0 = 1$.
 Put more generally, it means that a number is multiplied by itself as
-many times as indicated by the number of the power. 
+many times as indicated by the number of the power.
 
 The concept of a number basis can also be seen in the example of an
 odometer in a vehicle: the right wheel counts to the next number after
@@ -5077,7 +5075,7 @@ Each time the right wheel reaches 0, the wheel on the left counts up
 by a level. And each time when this second wheel reaches 0, the wheel
 to its left also goes up by one \ldots and so on.
 
-\htmlattributes*{img}{width=300}
+
 \IncludeImage[width=0.4\textwidth]{mileage-indicator}
 
 The right wheel counts single kilometres. When it marks an 8, it means
@@ -5193,9 +5191,9 @@ You can also represent the syllable ``un'' with the following number:
 $117 * 2^{8*1} + 110 * 2^{8*0} = 117 * 256 + 110 = 30062$
 
 Accordingly, the letter sequence ``und'' would be represented with the
-number 
+number
 
-$117 * 2^{8*2} + 110 * 2^{8*1} + 100 * 2^{8*0} = 117 * 65536 + 110 * 256 + 100 = 7695972$ 
+$117 * 2^{8*2} + 110 * 2^{8*1} + 100 * 2^{8*0} = 117 * 65536 + 110 * 256 + 100 = 7695972$
 
 since ``d'' is represented by 100.
 
@@ -5211,13 +5209,13 @@ However, we must ensure that the number into which the message is
 encrypted does not become larger than the product of the prime numbers
 (modulus), otherwise it creates problems, as we will see below.\\
 
- \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+ \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 Since the next process is comprised a number of steps, let's first
 summarize and then examine the individual steps in turn:
 
-\begin{enumerate} 
+\begin{enumerate}
     \item The message \emph{aba, cad, aca} is converted into numbers,
-        as described above. 
+        as described above.
 
     \item This representation, for example using a basis of $2^2=4$
         (instead of $2^8=256$), is converted into a representation
@@ -5229,9 +5227,9 @@ summarize and then examine the individual steps in turn:
     \item To recognise the coding, as compared to ``clear text'',
         convert the message that was coded using a basis of 10 back
         into a basis of 4, and convert it back into a letter sequence.
-       
+
     \item This turns the message \emph{aba, cad, aca} into the
-        encrypted message \emph{dbb, ddd, dac}. 
+        encrypted message \emph{dbb, ddd, dac}.
 \end{enumerate}
 
 \clearpage
@@ -5256,25 +5254,25 @@ And now in detail:
 \item This representation using a basis of 4 is converted into one
     using a basis of 10. To do this, you can use
     Table~\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]{table1} for encryption purposes,
-    which also uses numbers with a basis of 10. 
-    
+    which also uses numbers with a basis of 10.
+
     Because you are using four letters for the message, calculate
     using a basis of 4. For a modulo 77 calculation, you have to break
     down the message into pieces of three digits each, because the
     largest three-digit number using a basis of 4 is $333_4$. Using a
-    basis of 10, this number has a value of 63. 
-    
+    basis of 10, this number has a value of 63.
+
     If instead you were to divide the message into pieces of four
     characters each, $3333_4$ would exceed the value of $76_{10}$ and
     would result in unwanted ambiguity.
 
-    As a result, the message of three-digit pieces would result in 
-    \[ aba, cad, aca \] 
+    As a result, the message of three-digit pieces would result in
+    \[ aba, cad, aca \]
 
     Now assign your number values to the characters and do not forget
     that the pieces represent three-digit numbers using a basis of 4.
-    
-    \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+
+    \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 
     Since you are representing the letters with the numbers a = 0, b =
     1, c = 2, d = 3, the resulting message will look as follows:
@@ -5284,16 +5282,16 @@ And now in detail:
     number sequence 4, 35, 8.  Why? For example, take the middle part
     $203_4$:
 
-    \T\begin{eqnarray*}
+    \begin{eqnarray*}
     \W\begin{tabular}{rrr}
      3 * 4^0, & ~\mbox{also}~ 3 * 1, & ~\mbox{also}~ 3. \\
      0 * 4^1, & ~\mbox{also}~ 0 * 4, & ~\mbox{also}~ 0. \\
      2 * 4^2, & ~\mbox{also}~ 2 * 16, & ~\mbox{also}~ 32.\\
     \W\end{tabular}
-    \T\end{eqnarray*}
+    \end{eqnarray*}
 
 
-    \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\clearpage}
+    \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\clearpage}
 
 \item For encryption purposes, you can now use
     Table~\link*{1}[\ref{table1}]{table1} from page \pageref{table1},
@@ -5348,14 +5346,14 @@ your messages\ldots...
 % Appendix
 
 % page break in toc (for A5 paper only)
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{addtocontents{toc}{\protect\newpage}}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{addtocontents{toc}{\protect\newpage}}{}
 
 \appendix
-\T\part{Annex}
-\W\part*{\textbf{III Annex}}
+\part{Annex}
+
 \addtocontents{toc}{\protect\vspace{0.3cm}}
 
-%\T\chapter{Glossar}
+%\chapter{Glossar}
 %\W\chapter*{A Glossar}
 %\label{glossar}
 %[Dieses Glossar ist noch in Arbeit.]
@@ -5366,8 +5364,8 @@ your messages\ldots...
 
 
 
-\T\chapter{Information on the GpgOL Outlook extension}
-\W\chapter*{A Information on the GpgOL Outlook extension}
+\chapter{Information on the GpgOL Outlook extension}
+
 \label{appendix:gpgol}
 \index{Outlook!plugin}
 
@@ -5380,14 +5378,14 @@ issues. In other words: Operation is not as comfortable as offered by,
 for example, \Email{} programs with integrated encryption and
 signature components (e.g. KMail/Kontact).
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{} 
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 GpgOL is installed by the Gpg4win installation asisstant. On the next
 startup of Outlook, the menu \Menu{Extras$\rightarrow$Options} will
 contain the tab \Menu{GpgOL}:
 
 % screenshot: GpgOL options
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{
-    \T\IncludeImage[width=0.75\textwidth]{sc-gpgol-options_en}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{
+    \IncludeImage[width=0.75\textwidth]{sc-gpgol-options_en}
 \T}
 \T{
     \IncludeImage[width=0.65\textwidth]{sc-gpgol-options_en}
@@ -5398,16 +5396,16 @@ contain the tab \Menu{GpgOL}:
 The tab \Menu{GpgOL} is divided into three areas: \begin{enumerate}
     \item \textbf{General information:}
 
-        \T\marginSmime
+        \marginSmime
         \Menu{Turn on S/MIME support}
-        
+
         Once Gpg4win has been intalled, S/MIME functionality is
         activated in GpgOL. This refers to the S/MIME support of
         GnuPG. Outlook itself also supports X.509 and S/MIME, but of
         course does not work with the Gpg4win component GnuPG. This
         means that all settings, certificate management and user
         dialogs will be different. Please also note that Outlook
-        itself does not offer any OpenPGP support. 
+        itself does not offer any OpenPGP support.
 
         If you wish to use S/MIME with Gpg4win in Outlook, leave the
         GpgOL-Option\index{GpgOL options} \Menu{Activate S/MIME
@@ -5417,26 +5415,26 @@ The tab \Menu{GpgOL} is divided into three areas: \begin{enumerate}
     \item \textbf{Sending messages:}
 
         \Menu{Encrypt new messages with default settings}\\
-        \Menu{Sign new messages with default settings} 
+        \Menu{Sign new messages with default settings}
 
         These two options control whether new messages are encrypted
         and/or signed with the default settings. You can also change
         these settings when you create a message. Only the buttons are
-        activated accordingly. 
-    
+        activated accordingly.
+
     \item \textbf{Reading messages:}
 
         \Menu{Show HTML display where possible}
 
         This option can be used to display the HTML version of a
         message. Normally, or if HTML format is not available, the
-        message will be shown in text format. 
+        message will be shown in text format.
 
         \Menu{Display encrypted message as attachment}
-        
+
         The encrypted portion of the message is also shown as an
         attachment. This means that users can save the encrypted part
-        separately, or process it in another manner. 
+        separately, or process it in another manner.
 \end{enumerate}
 
 All options are already pre-populated following a new installation.
@@ -5446,13 +5444,13 @@ All options are already pre-populated following a new installation.
 To send encrypted messages using Outlook, you have to ensure that you
 do \textbf{not} use Microsoft Word to compose messages.
 
-It is also recommended that you do not use HTML messages.\\ 
+It is also recommended that you do not use HTML messages.\\
 These items can be controlled in the menu item
 \Menu{Extras$\rightarrow$Options} on the \Menu{E-Mail format} tab.
 The message format should be set to \Menu{Text only} (see highlighted
 area). However, if you still want to use HTML for signed or encrypted
 \Email{}s, it is possible that the formatting information will be lost
-by the time the message reaches the recipient. 
+by the time the message reaches the recipient.
 
 % screenshot: Outlook text format options
 \IncludeImage[width=0.6\textwidth]{sc-gpgol-options-textformat_en}
@@ -5468,8 +5466,8 @@ Vista can handle AES encrypted S/MIME \Email{}s without Gpg4win.
 
 
 \clearpage
-\T\chapter{Using GnuPG with other \Email{} programs}
-\W\chapter*{B Using GnuPG with other \Email{} programs}
+\chapter{Using GnuPG with other \Email{} programs}
+
 \label{ch:plugins}
 
 The Gpg4win compendium mainly looks at the Outlook \Email{} program.
@@ -5490,7 +5488,7 @@ Currently, an integration of GnuPG is offered for the following
 
 
 
-\begin{description} \item[Thunderbird] with 
+\begin{description} \item[Thunderbird] with
     \textbf{Enigmail}\footnote{\uniurl{http://www.thunderbird-mail.de/wiki/Enigmail\_OpenPGP}}.
     \index{Thunderbird} \index{Enigmail}
 
@@ -5513,8 +5511,8 @@ Currently, an integration of GnuPG is offered for the following
 
 
 \clearpage
-\T\chapter{Automatic installation of Gpg4win}
-\W\chapter*{C Automatic installation of Gpg4win}
+\chapter{Automatic installation of Gpg4win}
+
 \label{ch:auto}
 \index{Automatic installation}
 
@@ -5541,14 +5539,14 @@ settings will be adopted.
 
 Gpg4win also supports a so-called control file. You can use the option
 \Filename{/C=<INIFILE>} to enter a control file (name usually ends in
-\Filename{.ini}). 
+\Filename{.ini}).
 
 Another example:\\
 \Filename{gpg4win.exe /S /C=C:\back{}TEMP\back{}gpg4win.ini}
 
 ~\\
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 
 This \Filename{.ini} file should contain exactly one section
 \Filename{[gpg4win]}. It is where various settings can be made,
@@ -5561,13 +5559,13 @@ to this rule are documented in the example on the next page.
 
 
 \clearpage
-This is an example of the contents in a control file which displays 
+This is an example of the contents in a control file which displays
 \textbf{all} authorized key words:
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\scriptsize}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\scriptsize}{}
 \begin{verbatim}
 [gpg4win]
-  ; Installation settings. Leave out or leave empty for  
+  ; Installation settings. Leave out or leave empty for
   ; Default settings
   inst_gpgol = true
   inst_gpgex = true
@@ -5594,20 +5592,20 @@ This is an example of the contents in a control file which displays
   scdaemon.conf = D:\config\scdaemon-site.txt
   gpa.conf = D:\config\gpa-site.conf
 \end{verbatim}
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\normalsize}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\normalsize}{}
 
 A corresponding request for automatic installation with a control file
 \Filename{gpg4win.ini} and an installation path
 \Filename{D:\back{}Programme\back{}Gpg4win} could look as follows:\\
 \Filename{
-  \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\scriptsize}{}
+  \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\scriptsize}{}
   gpg4win.exe /S /C=C:\back{}TEMP\back{}gpg4win.ini  /D=D:\back{}Programme\back{}Gpg4win
-  \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\normalsize}{}
+  \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\normalsize}{}
 }
 
 \clearpage
-\T\chapter{Transfer from other programs}
-\W\chapter*{D Transfer from other programs}
+\chapter{Transfer from other programs}
+
 \label{ch:migration}
 
 This section explains how you can transfer from other Gnu-based
@@ -5628,7 +5626,7 @@ As soon as you have installed Gpg4win, check whether your old
 certificates are already there. You can do this using the Kleopatra or
 GPA certificate managers. If your certificates are already there, the
 old encryption system already corresponded with the new conventions
-for certificate storage locations, and you need not do anything else. 
+for certificate storage locations, and you need not do anything else.
 
 If however your old certificates do not appear, simply import them
 from the backup copies. Please read Chapter~\ref{ch:ImExport}.
@@ -5644,8 +5642,8 @@ two files using Kleopatra\footnote{This is not an official method, but
 it still works with all current GnuPG versions.}.
 
 \clearpage
-\T\section*{Migration from Gpg4win-1.1.x to Gpg4win-2.x}
-\W\section*{D.1 Migration from Gpg4win-1.1.x to Gpg4win-2.x}
+\section*{Migration from Gpg4win-1.1.x to Gpg4win-2.x}
+
 \index{Migration from Gpg4win}
 
 It is highly recommended that you first uninstall Gpg4win-1.1.x before installing Gpg4win-2.x.
@@ -5672,12 +5670,12 @@ de-selected.
 removing components that are no longer in use. This means that the MSI
 installation assistant acts correctly in the above scneario (old
 component K in version X is no longer on the operating system after
-step 2). 
+step 2).
 
 
 \clearpage
-\T\chapter{Uninstalling Gpg4win}
-\W\chapter*{E Uninstalling Gpg4win}
+\chapter{Uninstalling Gpg4win}
+
 
 \index{Uninstallation}
 
@@ -5711,9 +5709,9 @@ deinstallation process). Confirm whether you wish to clean the
 Now execute this command for all Outlook folders.
 
 Once you have reset all folders, you can begin to uninstall Gpg4win.\\
- 
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
+
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\newpage}{}
 There are three ways of uninstalling the program:
 
 \begin{itemize}
@@ -5731,7 +5729,7 @@ There are three ways of uninstalling the program:
     \Filename{C:$\backslash$Programme$\backslash$GNU$\backslash$GnuPG$\backslash$}).
     If you have selected a path that is different from the default
     path during the installation process, you will find the
-    deinstallationprogram in the corresponding location. 
+    deinstallationprogram in the corresponding location.
 
 \item This exe file is also found in the start menu under Gpg4win.
 
@@ -5748,25 +5746,25 @@ configuration settings below will \textbf{not} be deleted:
 \begin{itemize}
     \item User-specific GnuPG application data\\
         in \Filename{\%APPDATA\%\back{}gnupg}, generally corresponds
-        with file folder: \\ 
-        \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and settings\back{}<Benutzername>\back{}\T\\
+        with file folder: \\
+        \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and settings\back{}<Benutzername>\back{}\\
         Application data\back{}gnupg\back{}}
 
         This \Filename{gnupg} file folder contains all personal GnuPG
         information, hence private certificates, trust settings and
-        program configurations. 
+        program configurations.
 
     \item System-wide GnuPG application data\\ in
         \Filename{\%COMMON\_APPDATA\%\back{}GNU}, usually corresponds with
-        file folder: \\ \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and 
+        file folder: \\ \Filename{C:\back{}Documents and
         settings\back{}All
-        Users\back{}\T\\
+        Users\back{}\\
         Application data\back{}GNU\back{}}
 \end{itemize}
 
 
-\T\section*{Uninstalling Gpg4win-1.1.3}
-\W\section*{F.1 Uninstalling Gpg4win-1.1.3}
+\section*{Uninstalling Gpg4win-1.1.3}
+
 Once Gpg4win-1.1.3 has been uninstalled, the following file folders or
 registry keys will remain:
 
@@ -5775,7 +5773,7 @@ registry keys will remain:
         \Filename{\%APPDATA\%$\backslash$gnupg} (\textit{Continues} to
         be used by a Gpg4win2 installation.)\\
         Important: This is where your personal private and public
-        certificates and GnuPG settings are found. 
+        certificates and GnuPG settings are found.
 
     \item Registry key:\\
         \Filename{HKLM$\backslash$Software$\backslash$GNU$\backslash$GnuPG}
@@ -5790,34 +5788,34 @@ registry keys will remain:
 
 
 \clearpage
-\T\chapter{History}
-\W\chapter*{F History}
+\chapter{History}
+
 
-\T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}}{}
+\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\enlargethispage{2\baselineskip}}{}
 \begin{itemize}
-\item ``GnuPP\index{GnuPP} für Einsteiger'', 1st edition March 2002 and\\
-      ``GnuPP für Durchblicker'', 1st  edition March 2002,\\
+\item ``GnuPP\index{GnuPP} für Einsteiger'', 1st edition March 2002 and\\
+      ``GnuPP für Durchblicker'', 1st  edition March 2002,\\
   Authors: Manfred J. Heinze, TextLab text+media\\
   Consultants: Lutz Zolondz, G-N-U GmbH\\
   Illustrations: Karl Bihlmeier, Bihlmeier \& Kramer GbR\\
   Layout: Isabel Kramer, Bihlmeier \& Kramer GbR\\
   Technical text: Dr. Francis Wray, e-mediate Ltd.\\
   Editors: Ute Bahn, TextLab text+media\\
-  Publisher: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (BMWi)\\
+  Publisher: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (BMWi)\\
   Available at
   \uniurl{http://www.gnupp.de/pdf/einsteiger.pdf}
-  \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\\}{}
+  \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{\\}{}
   und
-  \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\\}
+  \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\\}
   \uniurl{http://www.gnupp.de/pdf/durchblicker.pdf}.
-%    The section ``History'' is not contained in the original document and was added by Werner Koch. 
-\item Revised non-published version of TextLab text+media.      
-\item ``Gpg4win für Einsteiger'' and ``Gpg4win für Durchblicker'', December 2005 \\
+%    The section ``History'' is not contained in the original document and was added by Werner Koch.
+\item Revised non-published version of TextLab text+media.
+\item ``Gpg4win für Einsteiger'' and ``Gpg4win für Durchblicker'', December 2005 \\
       Revision: Werner Koch, g10 Code GmbH\\
       Publisher: the Gpg4win Initiative
 \item Thanks to the authorisation of the BMWi dated 14 November 2007, the non-modifiable ``Impressum'' section was removed  and adapted to the current version.
-\item The ``Gpg4win Compendium'' combines ``Gpg4win für Einsteiger'' and
-      ``Gpg4win für Durchblicker'' and has been comprehensively updated and supplemented for Gpg4win2 between 2009 and 2010.\\
+\item The ``Gpg4win Compendium'' combines ``Gpg4win für Einsteiger'' and
+      ``Gpg4win für Durchblicker'' and has been comprehensively updated and supplemented for Gpg4win2 between 2009 and 2010.\\
       Major revision:\\
       Werner Koch, g10 Code GmbH\\
       Florian v. Samson, Bundesamt f\"ur Sicherheit in der
@@ -5827,8 +5825,8 @@ registry keys will remain:
       Translated into English from the German original by:\\
       Brigitte Hamilton (\uniurl{http://www.linguaetc.com})
 
-      Gpg4win program package and Gpg4win Compendium are available at: 
-      \T\ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\\}
+      Gpg4win program package and Gpg4win Compendium are available at:
+      \ifthenelse{\boolean{DIN-A5}}{}{\\}
       \uniurl{http://www.gpg4win.org}
 \end{itemize}
 
@@ -5839,14 +5837,14 @@ registry keys will remain:
 
 \clearpage
 % in Part aufnehmen
-\T\pdfbookmark[-1]{Index}{Index}
-\T\begingroup
-  \T\let\WriteBookmarks\relax
-  \T\phantomsection
-  \T\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Index}
-\T\endgroup
+\pdfbookmark[-1]{Index}{Index}
+\begingroup
+  \let\WriteBookmarks\relax
+  \phantomsection
+  \addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Index}
+\endgroup
 
 % Index ausgeben
-\T\printindex
+\printindex
 
 \end{document}

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 doc/manual/Makefile.am               |    1 +
 doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.org | 5378 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.tex | 1158 ++++----
 3 files changed, 5957 insertions(+), 580 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/manual/gpg4win-compendium-en.org


hooks/post-receive
-- 
GnuPG for Windows
http://git.gnupg.org