<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
And now successfully preceded by Key (asc) importation. Indeed, now
the output shows both primary (key) fingerprint and sub (sig)
fingerprint, as well as the RSA (absent from GUI execution). A few
notes, then, for anyone to whom it may concern: <br>
<br>
1) The Gpg4Win GUI is faulty, and a cause of much trouble. It cannot
be used in verification to gain the data available with the command
line, though the key (asc) importation will provide immediate access
to ID, fingerprint, and RSAs. <br>
2) The Gpg4Win GUI cannot produce sha256sums: an alternative
application is required. (For this I used RapidCRCUnicode, in its
Portable Apps form.)<br>
3) Online command lists for Gnu command line are also misleading. Do
not run gpg.exe, and precede commands by two hyphens not one. The
only two commands really required are import and verify: "gpg
--import [path, key (ie. asc) file)]" and "gpg --verify [path, sig
file] [path, data file]", along with trusting and signing. Include
full paths to asc, sig and data files. External locations appear to
be unworkable (I lack much experience in command line to explain
why, but perhaps this is a command line limitation).<br>
4) If the Tails key (asc file) is imported using the GUI, this
should produce the expected data (as above, origin Tails developers
- dates, ID -58ACD84F - primary key fingerprint-
A490D0F4D311A4153E2BB7CADBB802B258ACD84F - and constituent RSAs -
DBB802B258ACD84F, 98FEC6BC752A3DB6 and 3C83DCB52F699C56). <br>
5) "Completely Trusting" the key will not have it appear in the
Trusted keys field (a bug or misdescription). <br>
6) If the sig and iso are verified using the GUI after key
importation, this will produce only the Tails subkey fingerprint
(BA2C222F44AC00ED9899389398FEC6BC752A3DB6: the one that was located
on a Debian list, but fails to be mentioned on the Tails site). <br>
7) If the key (asc file) is imported using the command line, it will
show origin and key ID (Tails Developers, 58ACD84F). <br>
8) If the sig and iso are verified using the command line without
initial key importation, they will show part of the RSAs, seen in
the subkey fingerprint (752A3DB6). <br>
9) If the sig and iso are verified after key (asc) importation, they
will show "Good signature", and the origin (Tails Developers), and
both primary and subkey fingerprints (A490 D0F4 D311 A415 3E2B B7CA
DBB8 02B2 58AC D84F and BA2C 222F 44AC 00ED 9899 3893 98FE C6BC 752A
3DB6). <br>
<br>
I hope that aids anyone who encounters the problems I did, should
they locate these notes, and perhaps suggests a number of
rectifications needed to the Gpg4Win and Tails data. <br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 29/05/2015 01:24, L wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:5567B1C3.9070604@riseup.net" type="cite">
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
I've tried the command line execution, finally with success (ie.
actually attempts to verify iso-sig). I get the sign date and an
RSA ID (752A3DB6) identifiable to the Tails RSAs available in the
key (ie. asc file) (98FEC6BC752A3DB6). It does not, and as far as
I can see will never, produce what the Tails instructions say it
should, despite the Debian list number (I know Tails is based on
Debian, but still). Along with checksum, which I did with another
app, that will have to do: it shows the copy is genuine and comes
from Tails dev. <br>
I suggest to the Tails site people that these issues should be
addressed (warnings regarding Gpg4Win and checksums, and whatever
is going on with the verification ID data). <br>
<br>
El<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 27/05/2015 00:36, L wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:55650369.1080108@riseup.net" type="cite">
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
Um. I hav the new key, and there is no problem with that - as I
have said, it is clearly the Tails developer key, by all
indicators. The data on the old key page is just for those who
have used the older key. On the other hand, the ISO verification
using the signature file produces the anomalous string I have
quoted. You pointed me to a Debian list, but the string is not
listed on the Tails site. Regarding verification, it says: <br>
<p><i>If you see the following warning:</i></p>
<i> </i><i> </i>
<pre><i>Not enough information to check the signature validity.
Signed on ... by <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:tails@boum.org">tails@boum.org</a> (Key ID: 0x58ACD84F
The validity of the signature cannot be verified.
</i></pre>
<i> </i>
<p><i>Then the ISO image is still correct, and valid according
to the Tails signing key that you downloaded. This warning
is related to the trust that you put in the Tails signing
key. See, </i><i><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://tails.boum.org/doc/get/trusting_tails_signing_key/index.en.html">Trusting
Tails signing key</a></i><i>. To remove this warning you
would have to personally </i><i><span class="definition"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keysigning">sign</a></span></i><i>
the Tails signing key with your own key.</i></p>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://tails.boum.org/download/index.en.html#download.verify-the-iso-image-using-other-operating-systems">https://tails.boum.org/download/index.en.html#download.verify-the-iso-image-using-other-operating-systems</a><br>
<br>
This is not the result I have, and the statement lacks any such
string; the ID shown is the Tails developer key (as I have said,
imported and verified). So what of this anomalous string, which
you apparently located on a Debian list? Bear in mind, the Tails
iso, downloaded several times from different locations,
checksums fine, and I have of course also downloaded the asc and
sig files numerous times, including through TOR, easy given
their tiny size. If the Iso is a fraud, I need to know that,
though if that is the case it is hard to see how I am going to
get a genuine copy after so many attempts. If the sig-iso output
is actually correct, what the hell is it doing on an obscure
Debian list, and why on earth have Tails misstated the
verification data? <br>
<br>
Thanks again. <br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 26/05/2015 22:17, Juan Miguel
Navarro Martínez wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:5564E305.5090503@gmail.com" type="cite">
<pre wrap="">The information about Tails key was given in this post about the
transition from the old to the new one:
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://tails.boum.org/news/signing_key_transition/index.en.html">https://tails.boum.org/news/signing_key_transition/index.en.html</a>
You can compare the IDs/Fingerprints which the ones you have, but I can
tell you yours matches.
L:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Thanks. If that is the case, it should certainly be listed on the Tails
site; I found no mention of the string there, when I last checked, only
that of the developers key from the Tails site (you can download it
there yourself):
User-ID:
Tails developers (offline long-term identity key) <a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:tails@boum.org"><tails@boum.org></a>
Validity:
from 2015-01-18 14:17 through 2016-01-11 14:17
Certificate type:
4,096-bit RSA
Certificate usage:
Signing EMails and Files, Certifying other Certificates
Key-ID:
58ACD84F
Fingerprint:
A490D0F4D311A4153E2BB7CADBB802B258ACD84F
Neither can it be found among the IDs (see Technical Details):
DBB802B258ACD84F/98FEC6BC752A3DB6/3C83DCB52F699C56
Nor does it match anything stated in sig-iso verification. That was the
whole point :)
On 26/05/2015 04:37, Juan Miguel Navarro Martínez wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">L:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">3) I will also try trusting the Tails key using my own key; still,
Gpg4Win does offer the ability to " completely trust" a key without
using your own, and even when this is the case, the key fails to
appear in Kleopatra's trusted field, also an apparent bug. If the
trusted field only admits keys when signed with your own, this
should be made clear.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">You can give a trust level using command-line but it won't affect
Kleopatra "Trusted keys" list, it only will show if you sign it with
your own key.
I would try and confirm it but I'm having some problems here.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">4) This still fails to account for the unidentified string (short
and post-key-imported long), unmatched to anything on the Tails
site, the real issue. Can anyone account for this string
(/0xBA2C222F44AC00ED9899389398FEC6BC752A3DB6)?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">That's Tails developers signing subkey:
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://paste.debian.net/183806/">https://paste.debian.net/183806/</a>
See the second key fingerprint, it matches the 0xFingerprint key ID
format you typed.
_______________________________________________
Gpg4win-users-en mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Gpg4win-users-en@wald.intevation.org">Gpg4win-users-en@wald.intevation.org</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://lists.wald.intevation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gpg4win-users-en">https://lists.wald.intevation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gpg4win-users-en</a>
_______________________________________________
Gpg4win-users-en mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Gpg4win-users-en@wald.intevation.org">Gpg4win-users-en@wald.intevation.org</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://lists.wald.intevation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gpg4win-users-en">https://lists.wald.intevation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gpg4win-users-en</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Gpg4win-users-en mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Gpg4win-users-en@wald.intevation.org">Gpg4win-users-en@wald.intevation.org</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://lists.wald.intevation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gpg4win-users-en">https://lists.wald.intevation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gpg4win-users-en</a></pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
Gpg4win-users-en mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Gpg4win-users-en@wald.intevation.org">Gpg4win-users-en@wald.intevation.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://lists.wald.intevation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gpg4win-users-en">https://lists.wald.intevation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/gpg4win-users-en</a></pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>